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Abstract 
This thesis is about how and why Restoration-period political culture changed in England in 
the run up to the dissolution of the Oxford Parliament in March 1681.  It argues that it was 
the tension between Charles II’s desire and attempts to rule personally and his opponents’ 
desire and attempts to prevent him from doing so, which drove politics and change during the 
1670s.  It suggests that while people in the Restoration period were concerned with 
developing, representing and debating issues, ideas and identities, that intellectual process 
was only one part of political culture.  The other was a much broader practical concern with 
how those ideas could be turned into reality through policymaking and practice.  This thesis 
aims to explore these more practical concerns and to show that it was the contest for the 
power to turn ideas into policy and then to turn that policy into practice which proved 
decisive in the gradual breakdown of relations between the king and his opponents 
throughout the 1670s and in the final dissolution of parliament in 1681.  In order to explore 
this other practical side of political culture, which has not yet received a great deal of 
scholarly attention, the thesis will draw upon methods and source material outside of those 
traditionally used by political historians and in doing so will try to make a meaningful 
contribution to an emerging historiographical trend, perhaps best described as the ‘process 
turn’. 
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Introduction 
 
This thesis is about policymaking and political practice in 1670s England.  It will distinguish 
between politics and policy, as contemporaries did, and will argue that political culture at this 
time was shaped as much by the day to day competition for the means of exercising power, or 
how politics was done, as it was by the longer development of the ideas and ideologies which 
underpinned political practice, or why politics was done.  It aims to explore political culture 
in the run up to the dissolution of the Oxford parliament in March 1681 and to suggest that it 
was the tension between Charles II’s continuing attempts to develop and implement policy 
personally and different groups in parliament’s efforts to introduce a more collective and 
collaborative method of making and implementing policy which drove political change in this 
period. 
On the morning of 20
th
 March 1669, Samuel Pepys visited his friend William Coventry, 
member of the house of commons for Great Yarmouth and a former privy councillor, in the 
Tower of London.
1
  Whatever they thought of his supposed irreligion, his brazen obstinacy, 
or his Machiavellian approach to politics, Coventry’s contemporaries agreed that he was, as 
even his old nemesis the earl of Clarendon described him, ‘a man of quick parts and a ready 
speaker, unrestrained by any modesty or submission to the age, experience or dignity of other 
men’.2  Pepys himself admired and affirmed his friend’s ability to speak ‘with so much 
reason, and eloquence so natural’.3  And when he visited him in the Tower that day in March, 
Coventry’s conversation seems to have been no different.  They had walked alone on the 
stone walk, Pepys wrote in his diary later that day, and had talked about politics, the navy, 
and the possibility of a new war with the Dutch.
4
  And, most notably, they had discussed the 
former lord treasurer, the earl of Southampton, who Coventry still retained a deep 
professional respect for, and the former lord chancellor, the earl of Clarendon, who Coventry 
had been so instrumental in removing from office and still disliked two years on. 
 Coventry had explained to Pepys how he had heard those two lords each trying to 
shape the king’s policy of indemnifying the participants in the regicide at the beginning of his 
reign, the one hoping to use Charles’ power of pardon as leverage to ensure that the crown 
                                                 
1
 ‘William Coventry’, History of Parliament. 
2
 Edward Hyde, earl of Clarendon, The life of Edward earl of Clarendon, written by himself, vol. 3 (Oxford, 
third edn. 1761), p. 569. 
3
 Pepys’ Diary, Monday 22nd July 1667. 
4
 Ibid, Saturday 20
th
 March 1669. 
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came out favourably in the impending Restoration settlement, and the other hoping to rush it 
into implementation in the knowledge that at that time parliament were on the king’s side 
anyway.  ‘When the king did shew himself forward for passing the Act of Indemnity’, 
Coventry had said, ‘[Southampton] did advise the king that he would hold his hand in doing 
it, till he had got his power restored that had been diminished by the late times, and his 
revenue settled in such a manner as he might depend on himself, without resting upon 
parliaments’.5  But Clarendon, on the other hand, ‘because for the king’s sake [parliament] 
were awhile willing to grant all the king desired, did press for its being done; and so it was, 
and the king from that time able to do nothing with the parliament’.6 
Coventry’s story, recorded by Pepys as an anecdotal titbit alongside his usual 
recollections of what he had had for lunch and how late he had had to stay at his office, was 
more than just the idle chatter of a man bored by three weeks in prison.  It revealed, in fact, 
how the constitutional settlement made in the first years after the Restoration laid the 
foundations for the way in which politics would be done for the rest of Charles’ reign.  
Charles had failed, Coventry thought, to capitalise on the power which his ability to 
indemnify his opponents had given him over the how the Restoration settlement was made, 
meaning that many parts of the new constitution had remained rushed, ill thought out, and 
unfinished.  Far from clearly and conclusively distributing power between politicians, locking 
them in to a defined and accepted set of practices and behaviours which would from then on 
keep debate constructive and politics moving forward, the Restoration settlement had ended 
up being sufficiently loose and incomplete to leave the way open for political dispute and 
opposition in the future.  Certain political processes, structures of state, and methods of 
governance were left exposed to competition by anyone who could construct a claim to 
ownership over them.  As Coventry and Pepys discussed, even by the end of his first decade 
as king, Charles and his many opponents were still contesting the means of controlling public 
access to information and the arcana imperii, who had legislative power and who executive, 
who had access to and control over government bureaucracy, and who should fund 
government and by what means.  As the second decade of the restored king’s reign began, 
this competition for the means of exercising power had grown to such a height that the 
country was poised for political crisis. 
While, as historians have for a long time shown, people in the Restoration period were 
concerned with developing, representing and debating issues, ideas and identities, that 
                                                 
5
 Ibid. 
6
 Ibid. 
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intellectual process was only one part of political culture.  The other was a much broader 
practical concern, born out of the constitutional gaps in the Restoration settlement, with how 
those ideas could be turned into reality through policymaking and practice.  This thesis aims, 
then, to explore these more practical concerns, and to show that it was the continuing contest 
for the power to turn ideas into policy and then to turn that policy into practice which proved 
decisive in the gradual breakdown of relations between the king and his opponents 
throughout the 1670s and in the final dissolution of parliament in 1681.  In order to explore 
this other practical side of political culture, which has not yet received a great deal of 
scholarly attention, the thesis will draw upon methods and source material outside of those 
traditionally used by political historians, and in doing so will try to make a meaningful 
contribution to an emerging historiographical trend perhaps best described, as we will see, as 
the ‘process turn’. 
 
Scope of the Current Study 
 
It is only relatively recently that the Restoration period has received any great scholarly 
attention, with the reigns of Charles II and James II having traditionally been overshadowed 
by the events of the 1640s and 50s before them, and the glorious revolution afterwards.  The 
earlier of these periods in particular drew a lot of attention from Marxist historians 
preoccupied with how class tensions contributed to and could be read out of the great 
political, religious and social upheavals of the time.
7
  But the absence of any major 
revolutionary movement for the majority of the Restoration period, and the relative stability 
which it is tempting to assume existed as a result, did not produce the same kind of scholarly 
interest. 
From the mid-1970s and in to the 1980s, however, revisionist historians, seeking to 
address the intellectual and evidential gaps in three hundred years-worth of often partisan and 
gossipy accounts of Charles and James’ reigns, turned their attention to this then under-
studied period.  With few Marxist histories of the Restoration to respond to, it was the 
traditional whiggish histories of the period which revisionists began to question.  They 
challenged these older accounts, which aimed to chart how the period progressed towards the 
                                                 
7
 The greatest of these Marxist historians was Christopher Hill.  His huge output in the middle decades of the 
twentieth century posed many of the questions which scholars are still trying to answer even now.  There are too 
many of Hill’s works which are important to be able to cite them all here.  But his The Intellectual Origins of the 
English Revolution (1965) and The World Turned Upside Down: Radical Ideas During the English Revolution 
(1972) are, I think, two of the best early modern history books ever written. 
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glorious revolution and the liberty waiting beyond it, by exploring the influence of shorter-
term, contextual moments in the organisation and negotiation of power in Restoration 
political culture.
8
  Revisionists reduced the scale of their studies and began to regard the 
twenty eight years between the civil wars and the glorious revolution in their own right, in 
order to examine the character of the period free from the contamination of unwieldy longer-
term narratives and overly-schematic explanations of the progress of history.
9
  They asked 
questions of how changing national interests influenced individual policy or groups of 
policies and then played out in wider political debate.
10
  They began to explore how 
developing economic trends and principles affected how official policy and legislation 
featured in broader political designs.
11
  They asked how new methods of explaining and 
approaching the world developed in the face of changing attitudes to the established church, 
and how catholicism and protestant dissent interacted with more traditional belief systems.
12
  
And, perhaps most importantly for political historians, they studied how, as broader 
influences pushed and pulled society in different directions, Restoration identity began to 
solidify into distinct political institutions and even political parties.
13
 
By emphasising the agency of contingent moments, then, and by thus rejecting all 
sense of inevitability in the development of the period, revisionists have been able to credit 
                                                 
8
 Two of the more important Whiggish histories were written by David Hume and T. B. Macaulay.  Hume wrote 
about the Restoration period in his The history of England, from the invasion of Julius Caesar to the Abdication 
of James II.  Macaulay wrote about it in his The history of England from the accession of James II.  Both 
histories have run to innumerable editions since their original publication in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries respectively.  More recently, the Whiggish tradition was advanced by G. M. Trevelyan, in his England 
Under The Stuarts: The political, constitutional, and social history of England in the seventeenth century (1904, 
first edn.). 
9
 John Morrill has made one of the clearest revisionist statements about the agency of contingency in the 
development of the past in his 2003 Stenton Lecture, which has since been published by the University of 
Reading.  J. Morrill, ‘Uneasy lies the head that wears a crown’: Dynastic crises in Tudor and Stewart Britain and 
Ireland 1502-1746’ (The Stenton Lecture, 2003: University of Reading, 2005 [ISBN 0704998556]).  In this 
lecture, by setting up a series of counter-factuals Morrill manages to explore how the specific circumstances in 
which individuals found themselves guided their actions and identities and led to the decisions which they made 
and the changes which eventually took place.  In this sense, Morrill shows that it is fair to regard circumstances 
as having agency in the development of history as well as people.  As will be seen below, however, this 
understanding of where agency lies is the basis of a great deal of debate among historians. 
10
 J. L. Price, ‘Restoration England and Europe’, in J. R. Jones (ed.) The Restored Monarchy, 1660-1688 
(London, 1979); R. Hutton, The Restoration: A Political and Religious History of England and Wales, 1658-
1667 (Oxford, 1985). 
11
 H. Tomlinson, ‘Financial and Administrative Developments in England, 1660-1688’, in J. R. Jones (ed.) The 
Restored Monarchy; J. P. Kenyon, The Stuart Constitution, 1603-1688 (Cambridge, 1986). 
12
 J. P. Kenyon, The Popish Plot (New York, 1972); J. Miller, Popery and Politics in England, 1660-1688 
(London, 1972); R. A. Beddard, ‘The Restoration Church’, in J. R. Jones (ed.) The Restored Monarchy; J. 
Miller, ‘The Potential For ‘Absolutism’ in Later Stuart England’, History vol. 69 issue 226 (1984), pp. 187-207; 
R. Greaves, Deliver Us From Evil: The Radical Underground in Britain, 1660-1663 (Oxford, 1986). 
13
 J. R. Jones, The First Whigs: the politics of the exclusion crisis 1678-1683 (London, 1961); J. H. Plumb, The 
Growth of Political Stability in England (1967); J. Miller, Restoration England: The reign of Charles II 
(London, 1985); R. Ashcraft, Revolutionary Politics and Locke's Two Treatises of Government (Princeton, 
1986); J. R. Jones, Charles II, Royal Politician (London, 1987). 
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Restoration politicians and the identities which they developed with a great deal more 
sophistication and organisation than previously acknowledged.  They have shown us that, 
instead of being driven by the huge undercurrents of class struggle or by a teleological 
progression towards freedom and modernity, seventeenth-century history developed on a 
human level, as people reacted to events, thought about their circumstances, and tried to 
respond to and interpret the world around them.  This thesis will draw upon the synchronic 
approach to studying the past which revisionist historians have emphasised, and aims to 
contribute to the study of the Restoration as a period of change in its own right, rather than as 
a by-product of prior events or as a signifier of things to come.  It will reduce the chronology 
of study to the second decade of Charles II’s reign, and it will read outwards more in an 
attempt to account for a wider range of influences over Restoration politics and how those 
influences combined and interacted to shape the period in the way that they did. 
But in spite of the revisionist insistence that studying the period for its own sake is 
important, in many respects the Restoration is still ‘the historiographical poor relation to both 
the earlier and later periods’.14  Any new study of this phase of English history owes much 
more methodologically to histories of other parts of the seventeenth century.  Historians of 
the pre-civil war period in particular have recently taken up and advanced the revisionist 
emphasis on the relationship between identity and issues in the development of their period, 
and have begun to demonstrate how the forms, basis, character and objectives of political 
debate were not only dependent on the contingent moments in which that debate took place.  
They changed, rather, through the designs of political participants who understood and would 
willingly adjust the world around them.  These more recent post-revisionist historians, then, 
the majority of whom have worked on the first half of the seventeenth century, have begun to 
identify agency in historical change in people, rather than in circumstances.  Seemingly 
unconvinced by descriptions of people being passively moulded by contingency or 
unconsciously shaped by long-term undercurrents of social, economic and intellectual 
change, both of which often depict the past as being one unplanned moment after another, 
post-revisionists have explored how people actively and performatively shaped identity and 
the issues which mattered to them themselves, in the pages of printed material and through 
the processes of debate.
15
 
                                                 
14
 Tim Harris described the Restoration period in this way in 1987, in his London Crowds in the Reign of 
Charles II: Propaganda and Politics from the Restoration Until the Exclusion Crisis (Cambridge, 1987).  I think 
his reflection on the scholarship of the period is still appropriate now. 
15
 The output of many of these historians is enormous.  So, what follows is a very select few titles which I think 
epitomise how post-revisionism has moved the scholarship onwards. 
6 
 
As a result, these historians have been able to show how people from all levels and in 
all corners of seventeenth-century society actively engaged with and contested power, and 
sought to reinforce and adjust their place in the world by asking difficult and sophisticated 
questions of political and religious authority and claims to legitimacy.
16
  They have 
challenged the idea that authority was exercised linearly between a series of static and 
established positions towards singular, consistent ends, and have shown that power was 
negotiated as people used multivalent language to represent and debate labile concepts, issues 
and identities.
17
  And they have shown how the ways in which news, ideas and polemic were 
represented and read by different people, in different locations, and at different times allowed 
people to develop nuanced political attitudes and identities in individual localities and across 
the country.
18
 
This thesis will try to emulate and expand on this post-revisionist effort to shift the 
focus in explanations of historical change away from the circumstances in which it took place 
and towards people’s attempts to acquire and develop the agency to influence their world 
themselves.  It aims to contribute to the more detailed picture of the past which these 
historians have tried to draw, by exploring how fluid and changeable identities and issues in 
Restoration politics could be, as people created and then tried to resolve political, religious 
and social tension.  And, importantly, therefore, it will try to take up the, at times elided, 
emphasis placed by some post-revisionist historians on the processes of debate in politics.  
Political ideas and ideologies were not pitched at each other in stationary and complete forms 
until one of them found the correct audience and environment and somehow prevailed.  They 
                                                 
16
 While difficult to place in any one historiographical category, Peter Lake is perhaps most responsible for 
taking seventeenth-century political and religious history beyond the revisionist method.  In one of his more 
recent works, he summarises the post-revisionist approach by saying that, in order to ‘recuperate, to animate and 
inhabit imaginatively and intellectually’ early modern ideas and identities, we should take what people in the 
period ‘were doing and saying about themselves and their place in the world seriously’.  P. Lake, Bad Queen 
Bess? Libels, Secret Histories, and the Politics of Publicity in the Reign of Queen Elizabeth I (Oxford, 2016), p. 
4.  Also, see P. Lake, The Boxmaker's Revenge: 'orthodoxy', 'heterodoxy', and the Politics of the Parish in Early 
Stuart London (Stanford, 2001), or A. Hughes, Gangraena and the Struggle for the English Revolution (Oxford, 
2004). 
17
 P. Lake, ‘Calvinism and the English Church 1570-1635’, Past & Present no. 114 (1987), pp. 32-76; P. Lake 
with M. Questier, The Anti-Christ's Lewd Hat: Protestants, Papists and Players in Post-Reformation England 
(New Haven, 2002); M. Questier, ‘What happened to English Catholicism after the English Reformation?’, 
History, 85 (2000), pp. 28-47; M. Questier, Catholicism and community in early modern England (Cambridge, 
2006); Harris, London Crowds; J. Scott, Algernon Sidney and the Restoration Crisis, 1677-1683 (Cambridge, 
1991); M. Knights, Politics and Opinion in Crisis, 1678-81 (Cambridge, 1994); T. Harris, Restoration: Charles 
II and his kingdoms (London, 2006). 
18
 R. Cust, ‘News and Politics in Early Seventeenth-Century England’, Past & Present, no. 112 (Aug, 1986), pp. 
60-90; K. Sharpe, ‘Crown, parliament and locality: government and communication in early Stuart England’, 
English Historical Review, Volume 101 (1986), pp. 321-50; T. Cogswell, The Blessed Revolution: English 
Politics and the Coming of War, 1621-1624 (Cambridge, 1989); P. Hinds, ‘The Horrid Popish Plot’: Roger 
L’Estrange and the Circulation of Political Discourse in Late-Seventeenth-Century London (Oxford, 2010); R. 
Bullard, The Politics of Disclosure, 1674-1725: Secret History Narratives (Abingdon, 2015). 
7 
 
were, instead, constantly changing and developing as, in the face of competing designs, 
people rethought and revised their political ambitions and the ways in which they wanted to 
realise them, in order more successfully to gain and exercise power.  This thesis will take 
seriously, then, as some historians have recently suggested we should, people’s competing 
statements about their intentions to effect change and the means by which they aimed to do 
so, and to recognise them as part of an ongoing struggle to gain agency and power.
19
 
This post-revisionist emphasis on how political identity was defined through 
processes of representation and debate has recently been developed to such an extent that we 
can now, I think, see what could be called a ‘process turn’ in the study of seventeenth-century 
history.  Many historians have recently taken the post-revisionist method beyond a focus on 
the content of publications and the processes of debate in the public contest for power and 
identity.  They are now beginning to explore a wider range of processes, outside of just 
debate, which led up to and resulted from people’s engagement with political, religious and 
social ideas and issues.
20
  An excellent case has now been made for not only studying which 
ideological statements were made, which issues they related to and how they played out in 
debate, but for also exploring the processes by which those statements were made and the 
reasons for them being brought into existence how they were.   
So, recent works have drawn an important distinction between polemic and 
propaganda to explore how political culture was shaped, not only by publications which 
advocated a specific political line or ideology in relation to a contemporary debate, but by 
works which, by appearing how, when and through whom they did, attended to specific 
political, religious or social designs.
21
  Others have shown how people, both within and 
outside of the political elite, contested and shaped the processes of publication, petitioning, 
protest, and public speaking as means of representing their ideas and making ideological 
statements.  They have begun to explore how early modern people recognised that the 
processes through which political, religious or social statements had to pass, or which they 
had to bypass, before becoming public were an important part of them being able to influence 
                                                 
19
 In his introduction to Bad Queen Bess?, Peter Lake persuasively suggests that, since contemporary views of 
politics, religion and society ‘can only properly be understood when they are set in a tensely dialogic 
relationship’, we should take contemporaries’ statements about their world seriously.  Lake, Bad Queen Bess?, 
p. 7. 
20
 This method has been most explicitly laid out by Jason Peacey.  See, in particular, the introduction to his 
Politicians and Pamphleteers: Propaganda During the English Civil Wars and Interregnum (Aldershot, 2004).  
21
 Peacey, Politicians and Pamphleteers; J. Raymond, Pamphlets and Pamphleteering in Early Modern Britain 
(Cambridge, 2003); M. Knights, Representation and Misrepresentation in Later Stuart Britain: Partisanship 
and Political Culture (Oxford, 2005); M. Braddick, God's Fury, England's Fire: A New History of the English 
Civil Wars (London, 2008). 
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the course and nature of the political, religious and social cultures in which they lived.
22
  
Others have begun to explore state building and the day to day economics and administration 
of government.  They have challenged the view, put forward in many histories, that 
seventeenth-century governments were laying the foundations for a modern, enlightened, and 
permissive society which allowed big political and religious ideas to meet freely in open and 
public debate as part of an organic process of development and change.  They have shown, 
instead, that politicians and government officials aimed to build a bureaucracy, often based 
more on the principles of renaissance humanism, which was capable of receiving, logging 
and interpreting vast amounts of information, in order better to understand, intervene in and 
control the society which they sought to rule.
23
  And still others have shown how private, 
commercial and local interests exerted their own influences on the state and the state’s ability 
to raise revenue and conditioned how governments could turn their ideas, policies, and claims 
to authority into reality.
24
 
This process turn has shown us, then, that if we wish to understand seventeenth-
century political culture fully, we must look outside of the statements which people at that 
time made about their society, to the range of processes which they used to form their ideas 
and which allowed them practically to turn those ideas into reality.  These historians have 
demonstrated that we must now try to explore, as well, how ideas came to exist, whose 
interest it was in to make arguments in the way they were made, how the way in which 
something was said or done affected what was said or done, how the kind of statement and 
the process which was used to make it was matched to the end it advocated, and then what 
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processes an idea had to pass through once it had been developed in order to have a practical 
impact on society.  And in doing so, the process turn has made a range of source material, 
which has for a long time remained the demesne of book historians, bibliographers, 
economists, sociologists and political scientists, now relevant to the study of political, 
religious and social history. 
Overall, then, there have been a number of important developments in the scholarship 
on the seventeenth century, of which any new study of Restoration period politics needs to 
take note.  Collectively, historians in the last four or five decades, by way of different and 
developing methodologies, have successfully demonstrated the benefit of reducing the scale 
of study to a human level, and examining the Restoration period on its own terms.  They have 
shown that people in the seventeenth century had a clear and intelligent understanding of 
which political issues characterised and shaped their society, and were accordingly able to 
organise themselves into, what were at times, distinct groups and movements in order to 
develop and achieve their aims.  They have demonstrated that people in the seventeenth 
century were capable, on all sides in debate, of developing strong and sophisticated political 
and theological arguments, and that they were aware of how to convert those arguments into 
convincing and persuasive ideological statements through the processes of public debate.  
And they have shown that politicians from all levels of society and in all types of political 
participation had a firm grasp of rhetorical technique and the means of communicating with 
and persuading various public audiences, the gritty business of government administration, 
the complex detail and various uses of accounting techniques, and the politics of economy 
and money’s relationship with the constitution. 
This thesis aims to contribute to this growing scholarship on seventeenth-century 
political history, by focussing on how people in the 1670s made policy and tried to turn their 
ideas into reality in order to make changes in politics, religion, society, and the course of 
events.  It will take a holistic view of political culture in this period, and will explore how 
ideological belief, policymaking and political practice all informed and influenced each other 
through the processes of debate, politicking and statecraft. 
 
 
Conceptual Framework 
 
There was, as historians have demonstrated time and again, a rich and diverse intellectual 
culture underpinning Restoration-period politics, in which an infinite number of ideas were 
10 
 
developed, pitched and debated by a range of political participants and audiences.  
Restoration-period politics advanced, these historians have said, because of a continual 
dialogue about the ideological basis for doing politics, the political, religious and social 
issues which needed to be addressed, and the identities which people formed in political 
participation.  These scholars have examined the content of Restoration-period intellectual 
culture in detail, and have shown how, through an intense dialogic process of representation 
and discussion, people from all levels of society challenged the boundaries of authority, made 
claims and counter-claims to legitimacy, and tested and redefined the orthodoxies in which 
they lived. 
All of these histories have a shared fundamental interest in why people in the 
Restoration period sought to do politics.  They are all still responding, whether explicitly or 
not, to the echoes of the revisionist cry that ‘issues were what mattered during the 
[Restoration period], issues on which the nation was divided with a bitterness and 
intensity’.25  We now have, then, a series of detailed and imaginative accounts of what those 
issues might have been, of how people engaged with, represented and shaped, for example, 
ideas of sovereignty, the polity, the role and nature of the church in politics and society, the 
constitution, the royal succession, gender, ethnicity, localities and central government, or 
dissent and radicalism.
26
 
But this focus on issues, on why politics was done in the Restoration period, at best 
skims over a range of other important tensions which contributed to political change, at worst 
completely ignores them altogether, and in both instances fails to explain fully the changes 
which took place at all.  Change did not happen in political culture just because people’s 
ideas surrounding certain fundamental issues were developing.  The Restoration itself, for 
                                                 
25
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instance, did not take place simply because people began once again to be able to conceive of 
living subject to a monarch.  Out of the intellectual culture described so far by historians, 
there had to be a process by which historical characters’ discussion of issues was turned into 
plans for action and then by which their plans were realised in practice.  There was, they 
recognised, a distinction between politics and policy. 
While they were concerned with presenting sound arguments in discourse, politicians 
in the Restoration period took a practical approach to politics which recognised that even if 
they managed to gain intellectual dominance in debate ‘power without policy is like a ship 
without a helm’.27  They knew that their ability to develop and implement policy effectively, 
and thus to realise their ideas in practice, depended on their command of a series of practical 
and physical systems of state and governance.  They knew, for instance, how their ability to 
exercise power was shaped by their ability to control and distribute wealth.  As William Petty 
put it, in one of the many essays which he wrote on political economy in the last quarter of 
the seventeenth century, ‘power is to be able to take away the commoditys of another … 
[Greatness] is to have power over many men … Sovereignty is to dispose of the power of all 
men and consequently of their commoditys’.28  Or, politicians knew how their command of 
the law and legal processes affected their ability to participate in politics.  If, the duke of 
Buckingham told the house of lords in 1677, ‘[kings] have power by an order of theirs to 
invalidate the statute de tallagio non concedendo, then they may not only, without the help of 
a parliament, raise money when they please, but also take away a man’s estate when they 
please, and deprive everyone of his liberty or life’.29  Politicians’ understanding of how these 
physical and practical processes affected their ability to make their ideas a reality was so 
developed that they recognised that even in the face of ‘strong opposition from mistaken 
opinions, and whilst [it] will remaine almost single in [its] opinion against all others in [the] 
kingdome’, a government could still govern successfully if it could ‘shew upon what 
foundations [it] will build or maintaine [it]self’.30  To get at these more mechanical, day to 
day tensions, then, we need to ask the question of how politics was done in the Restoration 
period.  How did people seek to solve their issues through policymaking and practice? 
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 Patrick Kerr in a letter to William Smith, messenger, regarding Smith’s seizure of some of Kerr’s goods in 
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Where Restoration historians have studied policymaking they have focussed on how 
people sought to shape their own and their opponents’ ability to participate in policymaking 
through the processes of debate.  Collectively they have shown how the lack of a codified 
constitutional settlement in the Restoration period, which clearly set out what everybody’s 
roles in politics were, meant that politicians were able consistently to make strong claims for 
their right to participate in policymaking whilst trying to destabilise the claims of their 
opponents.
31
  They have explored how, out of these claims about the right to participate in 
policymaking, politicians used a range of methods to make competing policy pitches to a 
discerning and legitimating public authority in order to discredit the policies of their 
opponents and to win favour for their own.
32
  In this way, these historians have said, policy 
was developed how it was because politicians in opposition to each other put pressure on 
each other’s plans through creative and skilful use of propaganda, petitioning, protest, and 
polemic.  Changes in political culture then emerged, they have suggested, out of the cracks 
and tensions between politicians’ competing efforts to participate in this discursive process of 
representation and debate. 
By taking this approach, political historians have very successfully been able to draw 
out how Restoration-period politicians thought about how policy should be made and how 
those beliefs were connected to their divergent views of who had a right to participate in 
politics.  The solutions which politicians developed to the problems which they encountered 
in politics were based in an intellectually rigorous process of representation and discussion, 
which was underpinned by ideas of correct practice and legitimate authority.  But while this 
approach has turned out a series of compelling readings of the ideas behind policy decisions, 
these historians’ focus on the content of debate in their explanations of how policy was made 
has left a gap between the point at which different policies came under intellectual pressure in 
discourse and the point at which change in political culture actually materialised.  They have 
overlooked the often mundane and mechanical day to day processes by which governments 
and their opponents tried to implement policy and the tensions which existed around those 
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processes.  And, as a result, they have presented an overly linear explanation of change: 
politicians had ideas, they discussed their ideas and plans for realising them, and then change 
happened. 
Early modern policymaking and implementation has thus been much more 
successfully studied by historians of the late-seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.  These 
historians of the later period have shown much greater willingness to drill past the ideas 
behind policy decisions to the processes through which plans and ideas were actually 
realised.
33
  As a result, they have been able to construct much more detailed explanations of 
how different parties, projects and interests coalesced and forced their agendas into political 
decision making to effect material change on a local, national and even international scale.  
Historians of the eighteenth century in particular now have a much greater understanding 
than their Restoration counterparts of, for instance, how an increasingly industrialised British 
society began to empower a greater number of people through the end of the seventeenth 
century to develop their own political and economic projects within and beyond those which 
they received top-down and centre-out from the government.
34
  They have explored much 
more convincingly how different types of interest groups afforded their members different 
tools with which they could shape their interventions in political, religious and social 
policymaking.
35
  Or they have demonstrated how changing attitudes to constituency politics 
allowed politicians to engineer advantages in general elections or in the development and 
implementation of political designs on both a national and regional level.
36
 
The chief significance of these attempts to study policymaking in the late-seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries for political historians of other periods is that they have shown the 
value of broadening the source base.  Historians of the later period have moved beyond 
reading sources which reveal the content and processes of early modern debate and the ideas 
which contemporaries pitched against each other.  They have recognised that, taken seriously, 
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historical actors’ innovations in, for example, regional employment practices, methods of 
campaigning and lobbying, or the application of direct and indirect taxation were themselves 
tacit expressions of ideological belief and political design.  By studying source material 
which reveals process then, eighteenth century historians have at the same time found a 
different way of accessing the ideas which were the basis for people’s participation in politics 
and of exploring how those ideas practically manifested in day to day political developments. 
But while Restoration historians have managed to study the ideas behind policy 
decisions well, and while historians of the eighteenth century have been better at drawing out 
the means by which policy was implemented in their period, it is not enough for a new study 
of 1670s political culture simply to combine these two approaches and hope that a more 
satisfactory reading of policy will follow.  For the last fifty years political scientists have 
warned against studying policymaking with such so-called ‘high-modernist’ ideals.37  They 
have shown, by now conclusively, that political power is not exercised smoothly between the 
point at which an idea, ambition or design is conceived and the point at which the change that 
that idea is designed to make is realised.  Much as they might like to politicians do not have 
‘an overwhelming … ability to measure and monitor the world’ or a ‘boundless … capacity 
actually to pull off the task of control’.  For political scientists, ‘the limits of authority and 
accountability, of sheer analytic capacity, have borne down upon us’.38 
In the last half a century policy theorists have begun to recognise that policymaking is 
more of an obstacle course, in terms of policymakers’ abilities to detect problems, to 
efficiently develop plans for addressing those problems, and then to administer those plans 
according to their initial aims, to be navigated by governments and their opponents alike.  
Constantly pushing back against policymakers’ desires and abilities to change the world 
around them are the practicalities of actually being able to do so.  By acknowledging that 
political power does not work as a smooth application of will by empowered political 
participants policy theorists have been able to explore more fully the tensions and 
obstructions inherent in everyday political practice, and to understand the conditions that 
make for more successful, and unsuccessful, political planning. 
Among the areas in which the benefits of this more nuanced understanding of 
policymaking have been borne out most, and which allow historians of much earlier periods 
to think about how policymaking worked in the past, has been the study of European federal 
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government in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.  These theorists have shown that 
while federal governments are designed to encourage cross-boundary co-operation and to 
prevent tyranny, by nurturing multilateral decision making and preventing individual interests 
from acting unilaterally, in Europe those governments do not always produce the policies 
which are required for achieving the desired state of peaceful and harmonious co-existence 
which they are supposed to.
39
  This gap in federal systems, between the way in which a 
government is capable of acting or is supposed to act and the way in which it actually acts, 
political scientists have said, is there because this type of government is prone to ending up in 
a ‘joint-decision trap’.40   
That is to say that because power in a federal government is shared across a number 
of levels, and because decisions, planning and problem-solving take place jointly across those 
levels, if there is not a well-defined code of inter-level co-operation and co-ordination which 
can accommodate, compensate for, or release the pressure of the competing interests of each 
level, then when that government comes to turn its ideas into reality through policymaking it 
largely finds itself in one of two scenarios.  Either it undergoes an internal bargaining 
process, wherein policy is developed according to what will receive the least resistance from 
the parties involved and which very often means that policy becomes that which is doable 
rather than that which is required.  Or, if that bargaining process cannot take place because 
the competing inter-level interests cannot be reconciled, a political deadlock emerges wherein 
no policy is developed and no plan is implemented at all.  In both instances, the joint-decision 
trap means that a federal government does not solve problems as effectively as it could do 
because its means of developing policy push back against its efforts to make change. Political 
scientists have therefore been able, with great success, to pick out and explore the tensions in 
systems of governance and the processes by which power is exercised, and how those 
tensions affect the way in which policy is developed and plans realised.  They have 
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contextualised political debate and discussions surrounding policy within a broader political 
system and have shown how power is constrained and shaped by the means available to 
exercise it.  And, importantly, they have shown how political change can occur by the 
physical processes of state and governance feeding back on themselves.  They have 
demonstrated that when a government comes to act unless it can command the means of 
developing and implementing policy effectively it can be forced to change the ideas, designs 
and ambitions which it was originally trying to realise.  They have shown that the end which 
a government ultimately reaches, and the change which ultimately ends up taking place, is 
determined as much by that government’s ability actually to negotiate its plans through the 
physical processes of state and governance as it is by the pressures of competing points of 
view in political debate.   
However, while the political science approach does illuminate a number of tensions in 
political planning and practice which simply studying the content of debate, as Restoration 
historians have done, does not lead us to, we should think carefully about applying a similar 
approach too strictly to the study of seventeenth-century history.  While some political 
scientists have very successfully studied the effects of politicians acting beyond the 
boundaries of convention and acceptability in politics, by far the majority of political 
scientists have not managed effectively to access the kind of human agency in politics which 
post-revisionist historians have by now shown was important in shaping early modern 
political culture.
41
  Since political scientists’ purpose is generally to identify and predict 
problems in contemporary political systems, in order then to address them and to refine the 
system being studied, their models tend to focus on what can be forecast and measured so 
that they can quantify the possible number of outcomes.
42
  As a result, their explanations of 
politics often become a little constitutionally deterministic.  The joint-decision trap model, for 
instance, can really only account for and identify political behaviours and issues which are 
theoretically possible within a federal system.  It finds it very difficult to explain problems 
which have emerged through politicians acting outside of their theoretical constitutional 
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limits, and so would be no good for studying the activities of Restoration-period politicians 
who regularly rewrote laws, rhetorically manipulated the constitution to justify their 
theoretically unconstitutional ends, or made decisions which were just outright illegal. 
This thesis will therefore try to draw from and build upon the strengths of these 
different methods of studying policymaking and practice.  It will make two main 
methodological moves.  Firstly, it will build upon Restoration historians’ attempts to explore 
the ideas upon which people based their policy decisions whilst at the same time looking 
beyond ideological debate to the processes through which politicians tried to turn their ideas 
into practice.  By studying process it aims to reconnect the ideological conflicts and 
constitutional debates which led people to participate in politics, and which have traditionally 
been studied by historians of political thought, with the changes which actually took place in 
1670s political culture.
43
  But likewise, by studying ideas it aims to avoid the risk of 
describing innovations in political process as detached from the broader political agendas for 
which they were made, as some historians of policymaking previously have done.
44
  Overall 
it aims to recognise the knowledge and command which politicians in the seventeenth 
century had over a range of processes and procedures of state and governance, and how they 
manipulated those processes in order to be able to transfer their ideas into reality more 
successfully.  So, it will ask what were the processes of governance through which people 
tried to turn ideas, however popular or unpopular, into reality?  How, in the face of strong 
ideological opposition, could a government still govern effectively?  Who had access to the 
processes of political planning and policymaking, and how did people try to shape and 
improve their ability to develop policy?  Could the processes and practicalities of making and 
implementing policy feed back into debate and change the way in which people viewed and 
conceptualised their society?  And, ultimately, how did the competitions for the ability to 
make policy and to implement plans change the political culture of 1670s England? 
And, in order to explore these questions, the second methodological move will be to 
broaden the source base, to rethink the types of processes which political historians should 
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consider. The thesis will try to recognise how politicians in this period knew how the form 
and function of their interventions in politics could be used to make political statements and 
influence the course of events just as much as the content of their interventions did.  It was, 
very often, as some historians of the process turn have begun to demonstrate, not what people 
said and did in Restoration-period politics, but how they said and did it which was important.  
So, for example, it will explore what the practical differences between a royal proclamation 
and an act of parliament were and how materially those means of intervening in 
policymaking and politics offered their users different ways of exercising power and making 
change.    It will look at how making adjustments to the format of warrants allowed treasury 
officials to move money around the exchequer in ways that would facilitate their political 
agenda.  Or it will explore how reforms in press regulation were designed to adjust the level 
of access which different political interests had to the information on which policy decisions 
were based.   
The method which I have used to study policymaking is thus reflected in the structure 
of the chapters which follow.  Each chapter will first try to pick out the divergent views of 
participants in political debate, in order to establish what different interests in politics hoped 
to achieve and how their visions of the future, or of correct practice, or of legitimate authority 
existed at different times.  Each chapter will then move on to study the methods by which 
those different interests developed plans to realise their aims, and how they tried to go about 
implementing them.  The thesis is broadly split into two halves.  The first half will explore 
the tensions in politics and policymaking in the first seven years of the 1670s, while the 
second half will attempt to draw out how those tensions intensified and developed from the 
reopening of parliament after the long prorogation of 1676 and through the last three 
parliaments of Charles II’s reign.  Roughly speaking, in its entirety it will examine a period 
from the signing of the secret Treaty of Dover at the start of June 1670, to the dissolution of 
the Oxford parliament at the end of March 1681.   
Chapter one will examine how both the king’s and parliament’s abilities to participate 
in politics were based on their ability to control wealth.  It will demonstrate how in the first 
two years of the 1670s Charles’ reliance on parliament for votes of supply inhibited his 
ability to make policy and to exercise power.  And it will explore how from the summer of 
1673 Charles tried to compensate for this constitutional weakness by charging the earl of 
Danby with developing treasury practices in order that the crown could become financially 
independent of parliament.  It was, as this chapter will demonstrate, only in a position of 
financial independence from parliament that Charles could hope to exercise power and 
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achieve any of his aims completely unimpeded.  This chapter will examine the treasury entry 
books and minute books in detail, in order to pick out the innovations which the earl of 
Danby made to the office of lord treasurer in the first years of his tenure in order to improve 
the king’s ability to move wealth from private hands centrally into the hands of the crown.  It 
will argue that, very quickly, Danby’s understanding of political economy and how to reform 
treasury practice led him to become a central figure in Charles’ government, and a leading 
influence over the shape and direction of political culture for the rest of the decade. 
Chapter two aims to assess how the rifts which emerged in parliament during the 
tense and fragmented sessions of 1675 led Charles to prorogue them for over a year, and to 
move even closer to a personal style of rule.  It will explore how throughout this long 
prorogation the king sought to engage with and command a political culture which had 
moved almost exclusively into the public sphere for want of a parliamentary session in which 
to engage with politics.  As the summer of 1675 turned to autumn, and as a slew of new 
publications began to criticise both the king and proceedings in parliament, Charles 
redoubled his efforts to control the effects which the press was having on public discourse, 
both through pre-publication regulation and through a network of post-publication regulation 
officials.  It will study the form and content of a series of proclamations which the king made 
at the end of 1675 and beginning of 1676, and will then use a specific instance of press 
regulation at this time to identify the system of control through which Charles tried to engage 
with the public challenges to his government and policies.  It seeks to examine these 
measures to explore how Charles tried to stem the flow of public information in order to limit 
his opponents’ knowledge of and access to policymaking, and to reduce the transparency of 
his own government and increase his ability to implement his policies himself. 
Chapter three will explore how by the end of 1677 the relationship between king and 
parliament was rapidly deteriorating and how by the spring of 1678 parliament moved from 
simply opposing the king’s policies to actively trying to deconstruct his means of developing 
policy at all.  Throughout 1677, Charles tried to safeguard England’s position in Europe in 
the face of continuing French and Dutch war, by seeking to strengthen relations with France 
whilst keeping Dutch aggression at bay through a marriage between his niece and William of 
Orange.  As the nature of the king’s negotiations in Europe emerged, however, a growing 
number of parliamentarians began to become increasingly frustrated by the expense of the 
king’s policies and their lack of return and, even worse, by what the king’s approach to 
Europe demonstrated about his view of how power should be distributed in domestic politics.  
By May 1678, then, the king’s opposition in parliament began to unite behind the idea of 
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regaining their ability to participate in policymaking and politics by attacking that most 
important of influences over the king’s decisions, the earl of Danby.45  This chapter will 
examine the Commons’ debates in the run up to their decision to try to remove Danby from 
office, in order to explore their reasons for wanting to attack one of the most powerful 
politicians in the country.  And it will assess how the Commons then went about trying to 
remove him from office, and how their impeachment created tensions between the king and 
parliament, between both houses, and within the house of commons itself. 
And chapter four will explore how in the last three parliaments of Charles II’s reign 
the competition for control of policymaking grew to a height never before seen in the 
Restoration period.  It aims to examine how parliament persisted in trying to remove the 
king’s ability to make policy independently of them, by refusing to renew the 1662 Printing 
Act when it was due and continuing to attack his ministers and government officials.  It will 
explore the reasons for the temporary lapse of licensing in 1679 and how that lapse was not 
just the contingent side-effect of other political, religious and social debates, but was in fact 
designed by politicians in opposition to the king to reduce his ability to control and 
implement policy.  So it will study the case which politicians made in print and parliament 
for a freer press.  And it will try to suggest how, once the statutory basis for pre-publication 
censorship had disappeared, one of the main ways by which Charles had been able to exert 
his will over his subjects and to limit their ability to exert theirs over him, the king tried to re-
impose his control over the movement and availability of information and to regain his ability 
to turn his ideas into reality.  And finally, the thesis will explore how parliament sustained 
their attacks on officials in the king’s government and state and how those attacks contributed 
to the final dissolution of parliament and the breakdown in the Restoration constitution. 
This thesis hopes, out of the policies, practices and processes of the main participants 
in Restoration-period political culture, to be able to read into the ideologies which drove 
those politicians to practise politics how they did, and which were the basis of the changes 
which occurred in the period.  Rather than becoming tangled up in contemporary rhetoric, or 
imposing overly-neat or even anachronistic readings of ideas, issues and identities onto the 
past, the thesis hopes to let the actions of the actors in Restoration-period political culture 
speak for themselves.  In the first five years of the 1670s Charles II was able to enjoy a 
relatively stable period of government, largely assisted by his ability, for the most part, to 
control the means of developing and implementing policy independently of parliament.  But 
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by the spring of 1678, as his negotiations in Europe began once again to take a downturn, his 
ability to rule personally in domestic politics began to disappear.  By the end of that year, 
parliament were beginning consistently to present a real threat to Charles’ ability to develop 
policy and to exercise power at all.  So much so, that in March 1681, after only a week of 
sitting, the king dissolved the Oxford parliament and did not call another one for the rest of 
his reign.  This thesis will study, and hopes to do some justice to, this most interesting of 
periods in English political history. 
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Chapter 1: The king learns government 
 
By the start of his second decade as king, Charles II had been at war with his European rivals, 
Holland and France, almost constantly for six years.  As the 1670s began, his armed forces 
were broken, his coffers were empty, and his enthusiasm for conflict was waning.  At home, 
the old parliamentary calls for a speedy and decisive redress to ‘the wrongs, dishonours, and 
indignities, done to his majesty by the subjects of the United Provinces … [to] the greatest 
obstruction of our foreign trade’, were becoming an increasingly distant memory.1  So, 
riddled with debt, and facing ever-louder criticism of both his domestic and foreign policy 
decisions in both houses of parliament and in a growing pamphlet literature, in 1672 Charles 
reached crisis point. 
For a long time, the ordinary royal revenue had not been enough to cover the king’s 
expenditure, and any extraordinary supplies voted to him by parliament for the purposes of 
the war had quickly been spent.  As a result, Charles had had to take on more and more 
private loans, at crippling interest rates, and was starting to sink to an impossible level of 
public and private debt.  On 2
nd
 January 1672, then, in a desperate attempt to try to recover 
his revenue, he made A proclamation announcing the stop of the exchequer.
2
  The 
proclamation, ‘considering the great charges that must attend [the lingering likelihood of 
war]’ and ‘not finding any possibility to defray such unusual expenses by the usual ways and 
means of borrowing moneys’, postponed all warrants and orders for the payment of the 
crown’s debts to its creditors, the London bankers, until the end of the following December.3 
The stop was designed to allow Charles to retake control of his cash flow.  Before his 
proclamation, the treasury’s income was automatically, and immediately, paid back out of the 
exchequer to the crown’s creditors.  The theory was then, that, by stopping the exchequer 
Charles would be able to free his revenue from the payment of his debts, and instead use the 
money which would ordinarily have been paid straight to the bankers to invest in the state 
and to shore up the system of royal revenue collection.  He told the bankers that, as 
compensation for the stop, the debts which he owed them would accumulate at an annual rate 
of six per cent, which he would pay to them in the following years as compound interest.  But 
Charles’ plan did not quite work.  In the short-term, he seriously injured the bankers and their 
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trade, and left them facing lawsuits and even gaol sentences on their own transactions which 
they could now no longer honour.
4
  The goldsmiths believed the situation to be so bad that 
‘no man will ever hereafter run the like hazards when he shall consider upon what 
contingency he puts moneys into goldsmiths’ hands’, and as a result they remained cagey 
about lending money to the crown for some time.
5
  But, even worse for the king, was that, in 
the months after the stop, he began to slide back into conflict in Europe.  By April 1672 he 
was at war again with the Dutch, once more accruing all the expense and parliamentary 
opposition which he had hoped his proclamation earlier that year would rid him of.  As 
Charles’ new war with the United Provinces continued, his debts accumulated, his foreign 
and domestic policies became more and more desperate, and his ability to exercise power 
both at home and abroad became more precarious. 
This chapter seeks to explore the important relationship, underlined during the stop of 
the exchequer, between the crown’s ability to raise revenue and its ability to develop and 
implement policy.  It will argue that as the 1670s began, Charles II tried to achieve his 
political ambitions by cultivating a personal monarchy, and that his attempts to do so were 
based around, and flawed by, his need to maintain a financial independence from parliament. 
It will ask three main questions.  Firstly, it will examine how Charles’ financial 
position and his ability to realise his political aims were connected.  It seeks to explore how 
problems in his revenue were used by his opponents in parliament to turn their own ideas into 
policy, and how he began in response to try to build a ministry and state which was capable 
of compensating for his constitutional weaknesses and improving his ability to govern.  And 
in doing so, it will focus on the influence which the earl of Danby began to have on Charles’ 
government and style of governance and will discuss the solutions which Danby presented to 
the king and which led him to being promoted to lord treasurer.  Secondly, it will ask how 
Danby shaped the office he acquired in order to improve the king’s ability to develop and 
implement policy effectively.  The chapter aims to investigate how Danby interpreted his 
responsibilities and developed both his own practices and those of the treasury officials 
beneath him, to create a machinery of state which was capable of realising and enhancing the 
king’s ambitions.  So, it will closely read the treasury records, which so far have received 
relatively little, and often perfunctory, scholarly attention.  While, as we will see, Danby was 
careful to avoid leaving a paper trail which explicitly revealed the political intent behind his 
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innovations in the treasury, and while he often obscured the details of certain transactions by 
running them through the ambiguously-named secret service budget, read in the correct way 
the treasury records contain a wealth of information about how Danby shaped the king’s 
economic policy and how that policy related to ideas of kingship and Charles’ ability to 
govern.  And thirdly, it aims to indicate, given the answers to the first two questions, what it 
was in Danby’s practices that eventually made his opponents want to remove him from 
office.  It will ask why, since in many respects Danby clearly performed well as treasurer, he 
provoked such opposition to himself and the crown and such interventions against the king in 
policymaking and statecraft.  Overall, this chapter seeks to explore how parliament and the 
crown tried to build, shape and contest the processes of state in order to be able to develop 
and implement policy more effectively and to make their ideas become reality.  It aims to 
bridge the gap between the history of ideas, allowing us to think about why historical agents 
wanted power and what they based their claims to legitimacy on, and economic history, 
allowing us to take a process-based look at how power was exercised and constitutional 
functions contested through finance. 
 
I 
 
The restored king had, for a decade, been trying to establish an English presence in Europe, 
and had involved himself throughout the 1660s in a series of wars within the wider conflict 
between Holland and France.  As Louis XIV and the United Provinces had contested the 
balance of power on the continent, Charles had been drawn into a number of treaties with his 
European neighbours which had contradicted each other, and which had eventually left him 
obliged to offer military and financial aid to both the French and Dutch at the same time.  So, 
as the first decade of his reign had come to a close, Charles had repeatedly asked parliament 
to ‘take my debts effectually into your considerations’, because ‘the uneasiness and 
straightness of my affairs cannot continue without very ill effects to the whole kingdom’.6  
But these continual appeals to parliament had begun to create tension in both houses about 
why the king was not following a more affordable and sustainable policy in Europe, and 
what, by taking the approach he had done, he was trying to achieve.  Parliament had therefore 
only partly supplied their king’s ambitious plans.  Charles had found himself then, as the 
1660s became the 1670s, with no clear foreign policy, with a growing opposition in 
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parliament, and increasingly unable to influence a conflict which was costing his country a 
fortune. 
 After years of struggling to sustain war, therefore, and in light of parliament’s 
dwindling financial support, in May 1670 Charles negotiated and signed the Treaty of Dover 
with Louis.  In the Treaty both the English and French kings promised to declare war on 
Holland, at which point Louis would pay Charles an enormous three million livres a year for 
the war’s duration.  The French king would then make an additional payment of two million 
livres when Charles converted to catholicism.  Both kings agreed to uphold the Treaty of Aix-
la-Chapelle, which meant that Charles could observe the terms of the triple alliance and 
therefore not draw Dutch attention to his new Anglo-French agreement.
7
  And Charles tried 
to avoid suspicion at home by keeping the terms of the Treaty of Dover secret, and allowing 
the cabal ministry to sign their own treaty with France the following December.  Theirs 
turned out to be virtually the same as the one their king had made, except for the promises of 
Charles’ conversion.8 
Charles tried to use the Treaty of Dover to develop a personal style of monarchy.  By 
negotiating the Treaty in secret and deciding what approach to take in Europe by himself, 
Charles cut both parliament and public opinion out of policymaking and removed their 
opportunity to determine the coming course of events.  He also hoped that French subsidies 
would, whilst in large part funding his coming wartime expenditure, enable him still to 
continue supplying his domestic expenses too.  In accordance with the terms of the Treaty, 
and in order to consolidate his relationship with Louis and to safeguard the French king’s 
financial support, in the years after the Treaty Charles developed and pursued two main 
policies.  The first was renewed war in Europe, and the second was religious toleration in 
England.  But as time moved on, and as Charles tried to implement his policies, it quickly 
became clear that the independence from parliament and his subjects which he had tried to 
cultivate through the Treaty was more difficult to sustain than he had imagined.  His efforts 
to redistribute power through the Treaty and to introduce a more personal style of monarchy 
began to feed back against him.  After not much time at all, Charles began to realise that the 
way in which he had begun to try to develop and implement policy did not allow him to 
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achieve his political ambitions, and in the end led him to having to reassess the nature of his 
kingship and his role as policymaker. 
Charles’ attempt at personal rule relied on the success of his first policy of making 
war in Europe.  The king and his minsters had for years favoured an aggressive form of 
political economy, which saw war both as a means of reducing the ability of other countries 
to compete in trade and of improving England’s share of a collective European wealth.  ‘A 
war with Holland’, Charles had written to Louis on 24th January 1670, ‘would in all respects 
suit with the interests of England and be very advantageous to it if the king of Great Britain 
had force ready to be master of the seas: so on the other hand if the Hollanders should be 
strongest at sea nothing in the world could be so pernicious to England as that war.  All our 
trade, being so considerable in many stations and parts in and out of Europe, would be 
exposed as prey to our enemy’.9  Charles’ aim by engaging the United Provinces in what 
became the third Anglo-Dutch war, therefore, was to run their resources down to such a 
degree that he could dictate to them new more favourable trading agreements and gain the 
upper hand in foreign trade and relations.  In early March 1672, he sent orders to his fleet ‘to 
seize and make stay of all such ships and vessels as belonging to the States General’.10  But 
by September that year he wrote to William of Orange in bewilderment that the Dutch had 
not sent ‘the least signification that my offers were acceptable to you’.11  After six months of 
renewed and expensive war, then, Charles’ aggressive approach to European economics and 
his attempts to bully the Dutch into negotiations were clearly not working.  Instead of 
improving his share in the European economy and producing the kind of wealth which would 
sustain his independence from parliament, his first policy actually began to ruin him 
financially. 
In April 1671 Charles had prorogued parliament, since the subsidies he was getting 
from France meant that he no longer needed parliamentary votes of supply to help him fund 
his government and the state.  But by early February 1673, Charles recognised that Louis’ 
money was not compensating for his first policy’s lack of success.  He had no choice, then, 
but to recall parliament from twenty months of prorogation and to ask them to vote him a 
supply which would cover the growing cost of his pursuit of war.  ‘The last supply you gave 
me’, he said, ‘did not answer the expectation for the ends you gave it, the payment of my 
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debts: therefore I must … recommend them again to your especial care’.12  But recalling them 
spelled disaster for his hopes of independent rule.  Not only did he invite them back in to 
politics and policymaking after having ruled without them for nearly two years, but by 
admitting that he was reliant on their money he gifted his opponents the leverage they needed 
to intervene in his plans and gain the upper hand themselves. 
Very quickly, his opposition in the Commons organised the house enough to refuse to 
help the king financially as long as he pursued religious toleration how he was doing.  On 
15
th
 March 1672, during the prorogation, Charles had made a Declaration of Indulgence for 
Tender Consciences, which suspended the penal laws for nonconformists and allowed 
catholics freedom of worship in their own homes.  When he recalled parliament on 5
th
 
February 1673 and informed them of his debts, instead of immediately addressing his 
problems as he had wanted, parliament began to question his Declaration.
13
  Many, 
particularly in the lower house, were anxious that the content of Charles’ Declaration and a 
greater toleration would not, as they said in their first address to the king on the matter, 
‘secure and maintain unto us the true reformed protestant religion’.14  But by far their main 
concern was whether or not Charles’ use of his prerogative powers in making his Declaration 
and the way in which he had bypassed their ability to intervene had been legal.  ‘We own the 
king’s power to dispense with the punishment, by pardon’, Colonel Strangways observed to 
the Commons, ‘but the king cannot dispense with a man to be a papist, or nonconformist’.15  
And Edward Vaughan, leading the king’s opposition in the Commons by example, argued 
that ‘this declaration is a repeal of forty acts of parliament, no way repealable but by the same 
authority that made them’.16  ‘As liberty of the subject consists in his right’, Vaughan said, 
‘so would have it measured by law.  This prerogative is illegal’.17 
Many in the Commons, of which Vaughan was among the most vocal, believed that it 
was part of their privilege and legal right that they had the authority to make acts of 
parliament which would then pass into law.  And legislation which they had passed into law, 
they held, could then only be amended by parliament afterwards.  So, when Charles sought 
by his Declaration to amend laws already passed by parliament relating to the punishment of 
catholics and protestant dissenters, he was undermining the Commons’ privilege and the 
process by which parliament could engage with and participate in politics.  The Declaration, 
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Thomas Meres observed, stood to ‘shake the law and property of the subject, if the king and 
council can suspend and make void a law’.18  When the Commons resolved on 10th February 
1673, therefore, ‘to do in a legal way, as now the declaration does in an illegal’, they were, as 
well as taking measures to see toleration effected properly, ‘now modelling the 
government’.19  By rejecting Charles’ Declaration and negotiating their own legislation for 
toleration, the Commons were reasserting what they saw as their right to participate in the 
development and implementation of policy, a right which, by the king’s Declaration, had 
temporarily been taken away from them. 
It quickly became clear that the king’s opposition in the lower house wanted to use 
Charles’ financial troubles as leverage to re-enter the policymaking process and to regain 
their means of exercising political power.  Two days after Charles had recalled them, the 
house of commons resolved to give him supply of 70,000L a month for eighteen months, but 
they did not pass a bill releasing that money to the king until they had addressed the 
constitutional problems which they thought his pursuit of toleration had created.
20
  Edward 
Vaughan told the house on 4
th
 March that while ‘the bill of supply may have quick dispatch 
enough’, ‘the people expect an account from us of this great affair of religion, and we cannot 
answer the delay of it to them’.21  On 21st March, when the supply bill was finally ready and 
on the table to be read to the house for the last time before passing, the Commons were again 
more concerned, as William Garroway said, ‘to see this bill of popery dispatched’ and 
therefore to ‘have the money-bill, for the present, laid aside’.22  So by adjourning the 
committee to draw up the bill of supply ten times and by concentrating more on the 
legislation with which they hoped to replace Charles’ Declaration, the Commons managed to 
delay the supply bill’s passage through parliament, and to prolong Charles’ agony, for seven 
weeks.
23
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Finally therefore, as his opposition in the Commons had planned, on 24
th
 March 
Charles sent a message to them which signalled that their tactics had worked.  Henry 
Coventry, secretary of state for the northern department, told the Commons that day that the 
king ‘expects an expedition of such bills, as are of most importance; the bill of popery, and 
that of supply, particularly’.24  Charles’ message showed the Commons that he could wait no 
longer for them to give him supply.  And by urging them to finish and deliver to him their bill 
regarding popery, he showed the Commons that he would relent in his push for religious 
toleration, as set out in his Declaration, if they would deliver him the money he had 
requested.  Two days after receiving Charles’ message, on the 26th, the Commons passed ‘An 
act for raising the sum of twelve hundred thirty-eight thousand seven hundred and fifty 
pounds’ for the supply of the king.25  In return, the king assented to parliament’s ‘Act for 
preventing dangers which may happen from popish recusants’, and told both houses that 
‘what you have now left undone, I hope you will finish at your next meeting’.26  He then 
asked them to adjourn until the following October. 
By the time parliament adjourned on 29
th
 March 1673, therefore, Charles had failed, 
as he had been doing for the past decade, to turn his hopes of improving England’s financial 
and political standing in Europe into reality.  But even worse, he had been forced out of 
policymaking, a process which by signing the Treaty of Dover he had tried to take sole 
control of, and was having to listen while his opposition in parliament dictated their plans to 
him.  His design to achieve his aims personally, without parliament, had come crashing down 
as his first policy of trying to fund himself through a new Dutch war began to fail.  At that 
point, his opposition in parliament had managed to expose and exploit the crown’s reliance 
on their votes for supply to great effect, and had managed to turn the king’s attempt to 
exercise power on its head and hold power over him until he relented.  In this way, Charles’ 
attempt to turn his ideological position into reality through a specific, personal type of 
policymaking fed back on itself and eventually forced him to reshape his original idea and to 
put his vision of how he wanted to rule on hold. 
But he could not afford to stop trying for a greater level of independence from 
parliament when they could so easily turn his policies into constitutional deadlock by 
exploiting his financial weaknesses.  His negotiations with France and the events of the years 
which followed demonstrated both to Charles and to his opposition that the king could only 
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achieve his political ambitions either if he could afford to fund his policies himself or if he 
could get parliament to agree with them and to fund them for him.  Neither of those 
requirements could ever be guaranteed, and both meant that the king would never be able to 
rely fully on any policy which he designed himself in order to achieve his ideological aims.  
This constitutional weakness meant that parliament did not need to engage with the king’s 
ideas in debate.  They only had to withhold their money when he asked for it, and his policies 
would become inert.  If he was going to improve the reliability of his policies and realise his 
ambitions, therefore, he had to make himself sufficiently financially independent to allow 
him to make and implement plans without needing parliament’s money to fund them.  He 
tried to regain his agency by promoting the earl of Danby to the office of lord treasurer. 
Danby succeeded to his father’s title of baronet of Kiverton in 1647, and through the 
first decade of the restored king’s reign held a number of public offices, rising from being 
high sheriff of Yorkshire, through other posts, to being made commissioner of the admiralty 
in 1673.
27
  He was made viscount Osborne in Scotland in February 1673, and from that point, 
given that he was, as John Evelyn said, ‘a man of excellent natural parts, but nothing 
generous or gratefull’, was fast-tracked through the English peerage as well.28  Over the 
following summer, between parliamentary prorogations, he was made baron Osborne of 
Kiverton and viscount Latimer.  His first transactions as lord treasurer were made on the 19
th
 
June 1673, and he was first introduced in the house of lords as treasurer on 20
th
 October 
1673.
29
  That day in the upper house, Danby presented his patent, dated 15
th
 August in the 
25
th
 year of Charles’ reign, ‘which being done, he was placed at the lower end of the earls’ 
bench; and afterwards placed near the upper end of the earls’ bench, as lord treasurer of 
England’.30  He became the earl of Danby in late June 1674, and his yearly revenue was 
almost immediately improved by over 720L, by the king granting him several fee farms in 
Wales.
31
 
The office of lord treasurer, at any given time, was an influential institution in Stuart 
politics, since it was responsible for supervising the king’s accounts and managing royal cash 
flow.  In the mid-sixteenth century William Paulet had turned it into the central and efficient 
office which came to dominate government under William Cecil in Elizabeth I’s reign.  And 
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by the end of the Stuart age treasury business rarely came before the rest of the king’s 
ministers but was settled directly between the crown and its treasurer, thus giving anybody 
who held the office a degree of autonomy in government which other ministers did not 
have.
32
  As lord treasurer to Charles II then, the earl of Danby exercised all the privilege and 
influence of the office he held and played an important role in policymaking and governance.  
Historians who have studied Danby’s role in policymaking have so far tended to explore how 
he managed the king’s influence in parliament by bribing and bullying politicians into loyalty 
to the crown.   By extending lines of patronage between the court, parliament and the state 
through the offer of offices and pensions Danby was able, these historians have shown, to 
increase the voting power of the king’s supporters in the legislature and the bureaucratic 
power of his loyalists in the executive.
33
  Other historians have explored Danby’s efforts to 
control propaganda and public politics, and have drawn out how he sought to supplement his 
private attempts to win Charles influence over parliament and the state with a public 
campaign to win the king support among his subjects.
34
    But while these histories have 
revealed Danby to have been a ruthless and talented public and private politician, they have 
left us little idea of how he interpreted and shaped his office.  We do not yet have any real 
sense of how Danby sought to use the mechanics of his role as treasurer in order to make 
interventions in royal policymaking and to develop a specific style of governance for the 
king. 
On the few occasions that political historians have touched on Danby’s financial 
practices, they have missed the significance of the changes he made in the king’s revenue 
because they have focussed only on the debt of over two and a half million pounds which he 
left the king when he was removed from office.
35
  Because this amount was more than the 
crown had to contend with at the stop of the exchequer, these historians have suggested that 
Danby’s effect on the king’s financial position was negative, his fiscal policies must have 
been ‘uncreative’, and his value to Charles’ government obviously lay in other areas.36   
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But there are a number of very basic observations to make about historians’ attempts 
to assign a total numerical value to the effectiveness of Danby’s tenure as treasurer by 
looking at national debt figures.  Firstly, comparing the total of any national debt to a 
previous one does not in itself tell us how effectively a country’s finances were run.  By the 
time he was restored to the throne, the interregnum governments had left Charles with a debt 
of a little over 2,000,000L.
37
  This figure was smaller than the amount which Danby left the 
king at the end of the 1670s.  But since the national debt of twenty-first century Britain runs 
into the trillions, we might just as easily suggest that recent chancellors are less politically 
effective than their counterparts in the 1650s.
38
  All that comparing figures in this way does is 
tell us that the wealth of a country changes over time, without outlining what the reasons for 
that change were. 
 Secondly, citing a single figure of around 2,700,000L for the national debt at the end 
of Danby’s tenure is misleading, because it does not tell us how much of that sum Danby had 
budgeted for and, therefore, what type of debt he left.  An estimate made in the treasury on 
31
st
 March 1679 figured the king’s debt to be 2,720,194L.  However, it also importantly 
suggested that, of that total, 1,490,757L was funded debt in the form of advances and 
tallies.
39
  While the total figure at the end of Danby’s tenure was quite large, it did not mean 
that the crown was necessarily worse off than it had been before he took office.  Danby had 
scheduled over half of the debt he presided over to be repaid, meaning that it did not 
necessarily count against the overall financial position of the crown.  His use of anticipated 
revenues in budgeting a lot of the time actually reflected his sound understanding of the 
relationship between capital and cash flow, rather than a disastrous slide into the red. 
And thirdly, try as any of them might to improve the reliability of the king’s revenue, 
the financial position of the crown was not solely dependent on the treasurer’s actions.  At 
times, the best a treasurer could hope to do by managing treasury practice was to limit the 
damage done to the king’s finances by outside circumstances.  For instance, when parliament 
voted x amount of supply, that sum rarely actually materialised and arrived in to the 
exchequer.  Most significantly, the allowance for the annual ordinary revenue which would 
support the king, which the cavalier parliament voted Charles as part of the Restoration 
settlement at the end of 1661, was only reached twice in the first two decades of Charles’ 
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reign.
40
  And in many other instances the amount received fell short of the amount promised.  
The eighteen months assessment, for example, voted by parliament in February 1673, was 
supposed to raise 1,238,750L, but in the end only yielded 1,166,238L.
41
  Although Danby 
was aware at the beginning of 1674, that ‘att the end of three yeares [the eighteen months 
assessment] ceases’, and so ‘the sinewes of monarchy are to bee recovered in these three 
yeares or niver’, the overall unpredictability of the revenue was out of his hands.42  While, as 
we will see, Danby was very influential over Charles’ economic policy, holding any treasurer 
solely responsible for any level of national debt does not take into account the range of other 
influences acting over a country’s economy at any given time. 
Modern economists have for a long time shown that the way in which a government 
chooses to accumulate national debt tells us much more about how that government is 
seeking to operate than simply whether or not it is governing effectively.  For at least the last 
century economists have explored how economies are stimulated or depressed depending on 
the approaches taken by governments to saving and spending, and it is now widely accepted 
that the accumulation of public debt is not necessarily a bad thing in all circumstances.
43
  
While there is always debate about how governments should treat debt in different 
circumstances, economists are now unified in the understanding that the accumulation or 
reduction of debt is a tool which governments can use to change rates of private consumption 
and saving, influence national exports, adjust levels of foreign investment, or change the 
strength of domestic currency.  In light of these modern economic debates, therefore, it is 
wrong for historians simply to presume that the earl of Danby was an ineffective treasurer 
simply because he presided over a large national debt. 
Rather than assigning a total numerical value to the worth of Danby’s tenure as 
treasurer then, we need to look beyond that final figure to the processes which contributed to 
it.  Having built on the arguments of economists, economic historians have begun to draw out 
a range of influences over the Restoration economy and the changing financial position of the 
king and his governments throughout the period.
44
  While collectively less consolidated than 
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their political counterparts, these economic histories have explored how in the face of periods 
of inflation and deflation, peace and wartime, or crisis and stability politicians and civil 
servants adjusted their fiscal and economic policies in an effort to improve their means of 
generating and collecting revenue for the government.  Crucially, these historians have 
demonstrated the knowledge and creativity with which Restoration statesmen applied 
themselves to their craft, and have shown how contemporaries’ innovations in public 
borrowing, or the customs service, or direct and indirect taxation allowed the British 
economy to develop to the extent that it did in later periods. 
More important still have been the handful of histories which have explored the 
political significance of these innovations.
45
  A few valuable histories have shown how 
Restoration politicians changed their economic and fiscal policies in order to exercise power 
in specific ways and to gain precedence for their cause or interest.  These historians have 
shown us how the details of the daily practice of Restoration government explain the changes 
which took place in political culture at this time.  They have revealed how it was the day to 
day battles between governments and their opponents to identify and secure different sources 
of revenue for different purposes, or the struggle between competing politicians and 
bureaucrats to allocate government funds in certain ways, or the fight for influence over how 
public money was spent and debt accumulated which made or broke politicians’ abilities to 
realise their plans for the world around them and ultimately led to change.   
If we are to assess Danby’s significance in policymaking in the early 1670s, therefore, 
we need to ask how he shaped his office to change the king’s revenue, what innovations he 
made and what they were designed to do, who he empowered in the treasury and who he 
disempowered, how he spent money and how he accumulated debt, and how those smaller 
processes contributed to his overall political project and relationship with the king.  It is only 
through asking these questions that Danby’s significance in Charles’ government throughout 
the 1670s properly emerges.  Danby’s main contribution to Restoration policymaking  was to 
shape the royal revenue and administrative practices in order to create the financial 
independence which the king had lacked for the last thirteen years.  Through his innovations, 
Danby began to construct a system of state which was able to provide the king with the 
financial security needed to be able to develop and implement policy as effectively and 
independently as he wanted and to achieve his broader political ambitions. 
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As the third Anglo-Dutch war rumbled on, a growing opposition pamphlet literature 
recognised that Charles was not managing to force the Dutch into new trading agreements, 
and was therefore extending neither the political nor financial influence of the English crown 
among its European neighbours.  This literature had begun, as a result, to insist upon a more 
peaceful and sustainable approach to European politics.  As public debate of the war grew in 
print, more consolidated views of how England’s interests would best be secured emerged, 
both for and against the conflict.  Much of the material published in opposition to Charles’ 
pursuit of war was Dutch propaganda, which represented the United Provinces as being 
naturally godly in their desire to uphold peace throughout Christendom and panned Charles 
and his ministers for breaking the Triple Alliance.  But many English publications also 
sought to persuade their audience that peace would be more conducive to successful trade and 
commerce and therefore to English greatness.
46
 
Historians have long observed the concurrence of this mounting public pressure on 
the king’s approach to Europe and his gradually diminishing taste for the war, but they are 
yet to give any real sense of how this pressure filtered through into him actually taking steps 
to withdraw from the conflict.
47
  The earl of Danby, on the other hand, as much as a year 
before he was appointed treasurer and whilst still only a member of the house of commons, 
moved beyond hoping, as the contemporary pamphlet culture was doing, that an alternative 
European policy represented in print would create sufficient intellectual pressure on the king 
for him to change his ideas.  In 1672, he recognised, as the intellectual culture thrived around 
him, that to influence royal decision making the ideas represented in public had to be diverted 
inwards to Charles and his ministers’ private conversations about policy.  He therefore sent 
his patron and at the time one of the king’s chief ministers, the duke of Buckingham, one of 
the many opposition publications to try to move him to reflect in council on how beneficial 
the pursuit of war really was for English interests.  Danby had read the pamphlet, written by 
Slingsby Bethel, and now pitched Bethel’s theory at Buckingham to try to get him to consider 
it and act on it in policy.  Instead, however, Buckingham read Bethel’s pamphlet and 
responded, adding to the growing literature on the matter, by publishing his own work on 
England’s interests and continuing to champion the war. 
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Danby and Buckingham agreed that the basis for a nation’s prosperity was success in 
trade.  ‘Trade’, Bethel wrote ‘must be the principal interest of England’, ‘as without trade, no 
nation can be formidable’.48  He said that Britain, of which England was the greatest part, 
was more suited to prospering in trade than other countries, because the younger sons of the 
English gentry were allowed to train in trade and commerce rather than sitting idle as they 
were taught to elsewhere.  And because the gentry were deferential to the king, it followed 
that for the king to increase his prestige and standing, both at home and abroad, he needed to 
nurture trade amongst his subjects.
49
  Buckingham, in response, ‘approve[d] of [Bethel’s] 
stating the true interest of England to be trade, of his observation of some of our customs 
which are useful to it, [and] of his proposals of new laws made for the advance of it’.50 
But where Danby and his predecessors’ theory of political economy differed was in 
their view of how England’s foreign trading interests should be secured.  Buckingham, and 
the old ministry, believed ‘that we ought to keep a good correspondence with Spain, that we 
should hinder the ruin of Flanders, and that we are to use our utmost endeavours to preserve 
the command of the Baltic sea from falling absolutely into the hands, either of the king of 
Denmark, or the king of Swedland’.51  ‘The interest of the Hollanders and ours, as to that 
point, are the same’, he admitted, ‘but why therefore we should be so far transported as not to 
care what prejudice they do us in other matters, is a piece of policy I do not very well 
understand’.52  Buckingham thought that ‘the same reason which should make us endeavour 
the growth of trade in our own country, must by necessity oblige us to do all we can to 
obstruct it in another’.53  Danby, however, in pitching Bethel’s pamphlet at the king’s 
council, advocated a much more co-operative policy in Europe.  While Bethel did not 
encourage trading with France, because the French were catholic and there was ‘a natural 
unaptness for business in that religion’, he sought ‘a firm and perpetual friendship and union’ 
with Holland and the other protestant northern European states.
54
  In contrast with 
Buckingham then, by promoting Bethel’s pamphlet, Danby demonstrated his belief that 
England had, ‘as peace is the advancer of trade, to seek it, and not war, except an inavoidable 
necessity require it’.55 
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Through his pamphlet exchange with Buckingham, Danby insisted, to the highest 
levels of government, a new approach to Europe, which, instead of actively seeking to 
suppress competitors’ shares in a finite European wealth through war, as the king and his 
ministers had tried to do to no gain for years before, asserted that what benefitted one 
European country in trade would benefit all of its partners too.  He had managed to take that 
idea beyond the public debate which was taking place at the same time, and had tried, 
perhaps out of genuine concern for the state of the nation and perhaps in a bid just to be 
promoted in politics, to force it directly into royal policymaking and to influence the king’s 
ideas about foreign politics and political economy. 
But whatever his original motive, once he took office in the summer of 1673, he 
gained a direct channel of communication with the king and became part of the policymaking 
process himself.  As summer turned to autumn, then, and as the fortunes of the war against 
the United Provinces turned from bad to worse, Danby redoubled his efforts and in a series of 
private memoranda implored the king to change his approach to Europe.
56
  In October 1673, 
the new treasurer told the king, in a memorandum which was strikingly reminiscent of the 
pamphlet he had endorsed the previous year, to ‘keep firme to the triple alliance, and to 
indeavour to bring all protestant princes into itt’.57  In December, in another memorandum, 
the new treasurer set out the ‘state of the present condition of the crowne, which cannot bee 
amended but by force or compliance’.  ‘If by compliance’, he wrote, ‘then itt must bee by 
parliament or infinite reducement of expence’.58  ‘If otherwise, and that expedient should bee 
force’, he noted, ‘there must bee a large provision of money to begin with’, which, of course, 
there was not.
59
  Either way, the king would only be able to achieve his aims, Danby told him 
directly in these memoranda, if he got his finances under control.  By the end of the year, 
therefore, Danby had begun, even more than he already had been, to urge the king to 
recognise the relationship between the state of his finances and his ability to exercise power.  
Through the end of 1673, the Commons refused to grant the king any more money to 
continue his war, thus making Charles’ financial situation as bad as it had ever been.60  So 
finally, due to the extent of his debts and under the weight of Danby’s encouragement, 
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Charles signed the Treaty of Westminster for peace with Holland in January 1674, and 
presented it to parliament on 11
th
 February.
61
 
Danby’s advocacy of a co-operative approach to Europe was almost certainly not the 
result of some altruistic preference of peace over war.  Rather, he encouraged Charles to 
withdraw from conflict and to develop a more co-operative approach to trade because he 
recognised how the unpredictability of war inflamed the king’s constitutional weakness.  
Danby showed in his pamphlet exchange with Buckingham in 1672, and then even more 
pointedly in his memoranda to the king of a year later, that he recognised that Charles’ 
pursuit of war was impairing the crown’s ability to exercise political power effectively.  He 
had observed, by the previous ten years of conflict, that war was not an effective means of 
producing the circumstances in which trading agreements could be meaningfully 
renegotiated.  The new treasurer knew that if the king withdrew from war, and practised a 
more peaceful European policy, his expenses would be reduced and his finances would 
become more stable.  Then, if the expense of war was gone, there was less chance that the 
king would have to keep returning to parliament with increasingly precarious requests for 
financial assistance.  And if Charles was less dependent on parliament’s votes of supply, he 
did not have to entertain their interventions in his policy decisions quite so much.  While 
Danby at this stage probably did not know about Charles’ secret negotiations at Dover three 
years earlier, his more co-operative approach to European politics and the political economy 
which he sought to enable had the potential to empower the king to develop and implement 
policy as independently and effectively as Charles had been trying to do for years before.  By 
presenting the king with an alternative approach to European politics, which constituted 
nothing less than an attractive paradigm shift in the theory of Charles’ government, Danby 
positioned himself at the centre of Charles’ attempts to address the instabilities in royal 
finances and domestic politics which had dogged the restored monarchy for the previous 
decade. 
 
II 
 
As lord treasurer, Danby applied himself to building a treasury which was much more suited 
to Charles’ attempts to rule personally than it had been before.  So, he tried to nurture the 
king’s sources of revenue so that they produced more taxable wealth; he attempted to 
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improve the efficiency and reliability of the means of collecting that revenue and moving it 
back centrally to the exchequer; and he developed his own control over the revenue stream so 
that, on the crown’s behalf, he could more effectively apply the king’s wealth to public uses.  
He sought meticulously to produce the reliability and scale of revenue, which he had first 
discussed in relation to Europe, necessary for the king to be able to develop and implement 
policy independently. 
As treasurer, Danby inherited a vast and complicated network of officials and 
processes, in which the lines between the roles and duties of offices were blurred, and 
individual officials and departments commonly removed themselves from responsibility and 
passed it on to others.  As such, it was impossible for Danby to manage the revenue in a 
linear way; problems were barely ever connected in a series which if solved in order would 
lead to the liberation of the king’s finances.  Being treasurer was a difficult and creative 
business which required the development of a range of solutions to a variety of issues.  This 
section will try to preserve the complexity of the job which Danby faced, whilst still 
clarifying the system and the processes he encountered as much as possible.  Hopefully, it 
will give some sense of how the network of revenue officials operated, what their 
responsibilities were, and how Danby tried to manage them.   
Beneath Danby, there were, broadly, two types of revenue officer.
62
  There were the 
administrative officials employed directly by the treasury, who were involved with recording 
and auditing the processes of the revenue.  And there were the collection officials involved in 
receiving the revenue and moving it back to the exchequer.  The most senior administrative 
officials were the masters or treasurers of the major departments and streams of revenue into 
and out of the treasury.
63
  They were responsible for the day to day running of their 
departments, and for turning the policies developed by the treasurer into practice.  They 
received the lord treasurer’s warrants for funds and orders for payment, which often ran into 
the thousands or tens of thousands of pounds, and had to manage the budget assigned to them 
in order to keep the machinery of state in operation.  The next important administrative roles 
in the treasury were the auditors and comptrollers.  Auditors were assigned to different 
departments or sources of revenue, and were responsible for inspecting and managing its 
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accounts.  They were particularly important during disputes or actions for and against the 
treasury, and made sure that the amounts supposed to be coming into or leaving the 
exchequer, from or to a particular source, were actually doing so.  Comptrollers were also 
assigned to specific sources of revenue.  They oversaw the preparation of accounts, and 
certified them to be cleared and delivered in to the treasury.  Similarly important to the 
auditors and comptrollers were the surveyors, who gathered the information which allowed 
states of particular parts of the revenue to be made up, on which the revenue was calculated 
and anticipated.  The surveyors also collated much of the data needed for the treasury to 
create strategy and to decide where to allocate funds.  And under all of these positions, there 
was a vast network of junior or local administrators and accountants, such as port officials or 
town clerks, who performed the day to day tasks assigned to them by the above, more senior 
officers.  These lower-level officials created the records that eventually allowed the treasury 
to document and project the movement of goods and money in, out, and around the country 
through trade and commerce. 
The highest of the other type of officer, the collection officials responsible for the 
receipt and delivery of the revenue to the exchequer, were the revenue farmers and 
commissioners.  The farmers leased the right to collect taxes on some of the most profitable 
branches of the revenue, and were a significant part of the collection process because the 
terms of their loans to the king and the yield of their receipts influenced the solutions for 
revenue collection which the treasury could develop and enforce.  The revenue 
commissioners were the managers of collection, like the heads of department, and were there 
to convert the treasurer’s directions on specific branches of the revenue into practice.  They 
received the treasurer’s warrants for payment, saw to the staffing of the offices beneath them, 
and co-ordinated the collection of revenue from their particular source.  Beneath them came 
the revenue receivers and collectors, who performed similar roles to each other but on a 
different scale.  The receivers were area managers who oversaw the receipt of revenue across 
a series of smaller, regional areas, and who took direction from and fed back to the 
commissioners.  The collectors were the local officials at the point of contact with private 
trade and commerce, and were generally, therefore, the first of the revenue officers to handle 
the king’s money.   
There was, then, a well-developed theory of revenue collection, which incorporated a 
number of officials and processes.  If it operated in its perfect form, if, for example, in April 
1674 a merchant imported a shipment of wheat into Plymouth, he was obliged, according to 
the 1670 ‘Act for improvement of tillage and the breede of catle’, to pay sixteen shillings per 
41 
 
quarter sold at market, where that quarter did not exceed a sale price of fifty three shillings 
and four pence.
64
  At that time, the ship bringing the wheat into port might have been met by 
George Jackson, recently appointed tidesman at Plymouth, who would have directed the 
cargo into the hands of the correct port officials for registration.
65
  Once the wheat had been 
logged, it would have left the port and been taken to and sold at market.  Its price of sale 
would have been established and recorded by the market clerk, and the account would have 
been passed to the comptroller for verification.
66
  The comptroller would then have returned 
the account to the excise office in London, where it would have been received and logged by 
the auditor of the excise.  In the meantime, the collector for Plymouth, at that time William 
Coleman, would have calculated and levied the duty due on the grain according to the Tillage 
Act.  He too would then have passed his account of the duty collected to the comptroller.
67
  
The merchant would then have had a fixed time to pay to the collector the amount of duty 
levied.  Once he had received the duty money, Coleman would then have passed it along to 
the next link in the chain which was the receiver for Devon, a post then occupied by William 
Godolphin.  Godolphin would have checked the payment to make sure the correct amount 
had been levied and passed to him, and then would have paid it, via the country excise 
commissioners, into the exchequer. 
The process is obviously described here in its perfect form, to give a general sense of 
how money was supposed to make it from private hands into the exchequer.
68
  But in reality, 
of course, there were a number of potential blockages, leaks and inconsistencies in the 
system, all of which frequently led to a loss of money and a less reliable revenue overall.  For 
example, the weights and measures used across the country, while in theory having been 
standardised numerous times since the Magna Charta, were still by the 1670s not uniform in 
practice.
69
  As a result, a quarter, for instance, might have been measured differently in 
Bristol than it was in Boston.  Different amounts of tax were therefore levied on what was 
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purported to be the same quantity of goods, depending on which port they passed through or 
which market they were sold at.  These local and regional variations made it very difficult for 
the treasury, being based centrally in London, to anticipate accurately its overall customs and 
excise receipts and, therefore, to budget effectively on its expenditure.  Another major 
problem was that there was no guarantee that the revenue officials would levy the correct 
duty or that the merchant or tradesman would pay the right amount of money once the tax 
had been calculated.  Many of the statutory bases for levying taxes contained, like any 
legislation, imprecisions, ambiguities or contradictions.  And even if the legislation had been 
flawless, the treasury did not always have the resources or infrastructure to enforce it 
completely effectively anyway.  In the instance of grain, for example, the regulations of the 
Tillage Act superseded those of the Tonnage and Poundage Act of a few years earlier, 
meaning that many of the new duties and terms for regulating the trade contradicted the old 
ones and caused confusion among both merchants and revenue officials alike.
70
  And perhaps 
the most significant problem of all was that because the commodities being traded and the 
money collected from them had to pass through so many hands, between the initial 
transaction being made and the correct level of duty arriving in the exchequer, both honest 
and fraudulent mistakes in the movement of revenue could be made at virtually any point.  
Try as any treasurer might, they constantly had to contend with ‘a usual fraud of very many 
thousand pounds hitherto practised year by year’.71 
Danby recognised early on that he had to rectify these inadequacies in the regulation 
and collection of the king’s revenue in order to improve its reliability and efficiency.  He 
realised, and he told the king as much, that previous officers of the revenue ‘have been under 
the dilemma that if they did not lett you undoe yourselfe they were to be undone by making 
themselves uneasy to you’.72  He urged the king to understand ‘that all the [recent] 
miscarriages have been wrong measures in your revenue, and by which all your undertakings 
have still falne for want of money, and all this for want of forecast’.73  From the time of his 
appointment, therefore, Danby characterised his tenure through his constant effort to take a 
central role in the control of the treasury and the processes of revenue collection and to 
oversee and improve the transparency of all of the processes beneath him. 
Once he gained office, Danby began to try to manage the treasury and revenue 
collection system in such a way that the king would have ‘to suffer no diminution nor 
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imbezelment of the revenue either in England or Ireland’.74  His approach demonstrated early 
on that he realised that, for the reliability of the king’s finances to improve, as lord treasurer 
he had to address two kinds of problem in the revenue.  He had to try to address any problems 
in the collection of revenue, or the process by which money passed from the hands of the 
private individuals who owed it to the king into the hands of the officials of state.  And he 
needed to make sure that, once money had been collected by the revenue officials, it passed 
efficiently back through the system to arrive centrally in the exchequer where it could be put 
to public use.  Danby knew that, for the king, ‘while differences continue prerogative must 
suffer, unlesse hee can live without parliament.  [But] the condition of his revenue will not 
permitt that’.75  His practices as lord treasurer demonstrated time and again, therefore, his 
belief that only when the problems in the revenue had been solved, and steps had been taken 
towards improving the efficiency and reliability of the king’s income, could the crown 
achieve a greater financial independence, and compensate to any meaningful extent for the 
constitutional problems which it had been prey to throughout the previous decade. 
 
III 
 
Throughout his tenure, Danby closely managed the practices of both kinds of revenue 
official, from the top of the process to the very bottom.  As his early memoranda showed, he 
intended always to improve efficiency and reliability, to cede more knowledge and control of 
the system centrally to himself, and, wherever possible, to improve the yield and stability of 
the revenue for the crown.  Danby shaped the roles and responsibilities of the administrative 
officials by introducing and re-emphasising a number of accounting and clerical techniques.  
His main priorities through these innovations were to improve royal cash flow, to allow 
officers to audit accounts more effectively, and to force them to keep clearer records of the 
movement of money around the system of revenue collection.  He knew that, in order to 
improve the reliability of the king’s revenue, he needed to clear any blockages and 
miscommunications which were both preventing the king’s debts from being cleared as 
quickly and accurately as they should be and which meant that the treasury was contending 
with unnecessary levels of interest on overdue loans, and which were preventing the state 
departments from being funded as well as they might be and which meant that the king’s 
orders were not being transferred downwards into action. 
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He was particularly concerned with nurturing the crown’s cash flow, as it was that 
which allowed him to clear debts and keep a machinery of state running which was able to 
turn the king’s policies into practice.  To this end, one of the most important innovations he 
made was in the method of issuing and executing orders for payment.  On 14
th
 January 1674, 
Danby identified that the current format of orders was ‘disturb[ing] much the course of 
payments by [him] settled on the said lists’, meaning that revenue officials were being left 
unsure of which money to use to pay which debt or to fund which department.
76
  Danby 
therefore told the auditor of the receipt, Robert Howard, to change how the orders were made.  
He wanted them from then on to record the principal sum to be repaid, the amount of interest 
payable on that sum, the source of revenue from which the interest would be paid, and an 
indication of the stage in the overall schedule of payment at which the order was issued.
77
  In 
a similar instance, on 16
th
 February, Danby noted many irregularities ‘occasioned by orders 
registered on several branches of the revenue’ but so far unassigned (or as yet unpaid).78  So, 
he directed that all unassigned orders should be brought in and deposited with the auditor of 
the receipt, the chancellor, and himself.  The auditor was then to document, in a dedicated 
ledger, all the orders which were returned to him in this way, and to record the name of the 
person to whom the order was payable, the date of the order, the sum for which it was issued, 
the part of the revenue it was being paid out of, and the total amount left on the account it 
was paying.   
By amending the format of orders so that they contained both the sum to be issued 
and the branch of the revenue out of which it was to be paid, Danby was implementing a 
rudimentary form of double-entry bookkeeping.
79
  The most basic aim of this type of 
accounting is to record the effect of each transaction on a corporation’s overall financial 
position.
80
  By making two equal and offsetting account entries for every transaction, one 
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debit and one credit, an ongoing record can be kept of the total value of capital owned.  If, for 
instance, Danby issued a warrant to pay the master of the ordnance 50,000L out of the fifth 
quarter of the eighteen months allowance, the order would show that the ordnance account 
was to be credited with 50,000L, while the eighteen months allowance was to be debited with 
the same amount.  If the master of the ordnance then used part of the 50,000L sent to him to 
buy a quantity of guns for cash, to the value of, say, 1,000L, in his accounts he would credit 
the person from whom he bought the guns with 1,000L, and debit his own cash account with 
that amount.  But, he would also credit another of his accounts with the value of the guns just 
purchased.  The double-entry method therefore shows the bookkeeper how one transaction 
has two different and corresponding effects on the overall capital. 
For Danby, making the amendments which he did to the format of orders for payment 
gave him a number of advantages in managing the king’s revenue which he would not have 
had if he did not use the double-entry method.
81
  This technique allowed him, and his 
administrative officers, more clearly to assess changes to the total value of cash and goods 
held by the king, and therefore to keep track of the effects of each individual transaction on 
the overall financial position of each treasury department.  In theory, therefore, it empowered 
his officials to keep a clearer account of the state of their budget, and Danby to balance 
income and expenditure across the exchequer more effectively.  His use of the double-entry 
method also meant that his accounts regulated and checked themselves for accuracy.  The 
double-entry method meant that, at all times, the total debits across all his accounts had to 
equal the total credits.  If they did not, Danby was able to see that a mistake had been made in 
the account.  By increasing the use of this technique, then, Danby was trying to make it easier 
for his officials to verify the accuracy of their accounts, and easier for himself to check the 
king’s financial position at any given time.  And finally, using this type of bookkeeping 
allowed Danby more effectively to account for payments which were due, but which he did 
not yet physically have the money to meet.  The double entry method allowed him, if he 
knew that a source of revenue was likely to bring in a certain amount of cash in the future, 
accurately to record a transaction which debited an anticipated revenue before the money had 
actually arrived in the exchequer.  Danby’s insistence that use of double-entry bookkeeping 
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was extended is one of the clearest indicators we have that he intended to improve the 
reliability of the king’s revenue and his ability to control it at any given time. 
But as well as double-entry, Danby sought to improve royal cash flow by using tallies 
to improve the treasury’s ability to pay balances on anticipated revenues.  Tallies were struck, 
as one contemporary and anonymous economist wrote, ‘in all cases of necessity, and in 
defect of money’.82  They promised specific sources of revenue to specific payees and 
therefore meant that Danby could avoid straining the treasury’s liquid capital too much 
because he did not have to pay bills or debts all at once which were too large for the sources 
of revenue assigned to fund them.  Tallies were never struck on speculation that at some point 
in the future funds to their value would somehow be found.  They represented, rather, a form 
of good, or funded, debt accumulated in relation to scheduled exchequer receipts, as ‘an 
acquittance or discharge for the same, in order to their quietus’.83 
On 15
th
 December 1673, for instance, Danby forwarded to the customs cashier, ‘to the 
end the persons concerned may see and be satisfied in what course their moneys are to be 
paid’, a list of tallies drawn on the anticipated customs receipts for the following year.84  
Rather than having to pay the list’s full amount of over 200,000L in one go out of the ready 
money in the exchequer, then, which would have left the treasury very little money to fund 
anything else, by issuing tallies Danby was able to spread his payments throughout the near 
future over a sustained and steady source of income.  He was able to appease creditors and 
treasury departments by settling a realistic schedule for payment on relatively secure future 
incomes and at the same time to keep the cash flow of the exchequer up and to sustain the 
treasury’s ability to pay for the processes of state.  Danby’s use of these accounting 
techniques was ultimately designed, then, to improve his ability to manage how money 
moved around the exchequer, and to record changes in the king’s revenue.  And if he could 
do both of those things, he stood more of a chance of stabilising the king’s finances and of 
reducing the likelihood that in ordinary circumstances he would have to appeal to parliament 
and rely on its subsidies. 
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The lord treasurer also tried to improve the accuracy of the records with which he and 
his administrative officials were dealing, so that they represented the king’s rolling financial 
position more precisely.  His main concern was that records submitted to the treasury must 
provide an ‘exact view and inspection of the said revenue and the current cash thereof’.85  So, 
he ordered changes in the format of finished accounts and in the process by which they were 
drawn up, in order to make it easier for both him and his officials to audit records as they 
were being created and at any time after they had been submitted. 
On 22
nd
 January 1674, for example, Danby changed the format of the ordnance 
accounts so that they more accurately reflected departmental transactions.  He noted that 
‘several inconveniencies have heretofore happened for want of a due and exact method in the 
accompts of the lieutenants of the ordnance and of the treasurer and paymaster of the 
ordnance’.86  So, he ordered that the clerk of the ordnance from then on had to draw the 
accounts up as two ledger books, one to be sent to the auditor of the imprests at the treasury, 
and the other to be kept in the ordnance office.  The books were to be submitted to the auditor 
at the end of every June, and they had to contain all the debentures and quarterly payments of 
wages from the past year.  Danby tried to ensure that the clerk made accounts which were an 
accurate record of the department’s holdings and procedures, by instructing the auditor ‘not 
[to] make any allowance for any other payments than what shall agree exactly with the 
debentures and quarter books’.87  Any payment which was not accounted for in the finished 
ledger books would be identified by the auditor and corrected by the treasury as soon as 
possible. 
The treasurer also tried to empower his officers to audit accounts as they were being 
created, to ensure that the records, once submitted, were more reliable.  On 19
th
 August 1674, 
for instance, he instructed his comptrollers to change how they oversaw the production of 
accounts for one of the least dependable branches of the revenue, the excise.  He issued an 
eight-point list of instructions ‘to be observed by the deputy comptrollers of the excise’ while 
regulating the excise commissioners’ accounts.88  He told the sub-comptrollers that they had 
to make sure that the commissioners made their collections in pre-determined public places, 
instead of in private as they often had done before.  Once the sub-comptrollers knew when 
and where the commissioners were collecting money, they had to sit with them so that they 
could ‘carefully and truly enter down all sums of money paid in by every person chargeable 
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with excise’, and to ‘sub-sign all acquittances given [by the commissioners] for all moneys 
received’.89  And the sub-comptrollers were always to inform their senior official, the 
comptroller of the excise, if they were impeded in their duties at any point.   
By changing the format of departmental records and the way in which they were 
made, then, Danby was trying to increase the transparency of the revenue system and the 
accessibility of records and money in the hands of revenue officials.  He wanted to make sure 
that the accounts submitted to him were an accurate record of the money collected and held 
by his officers, so that sources of revenue became more predictable and easier to budget 
against.  And he wanted to increase both his own, and his officers’, control over accounts, by 
making sure that treasury officials had access to the process by which departments compiled 
their records.  He therefore tried to make sure that a range of revenue officials were involved 
in the accounting process and that their records could be cross-referenced at any point during 
production or after submission.  It was, he realised, only accurate records of the system 
operating beneath him which would allow him to manage the king’s revenue effectively, and 
which would mean that the royal revenue was reliable enough for it to be a solid basis upon 
which the crown could create and implement policy. 
Danby also created and managed low-level administrative positions concerned with 
auditing and regulating the day to day operations of trade and commerce.  He constantly 
oversaw the staffing of low-level offices, in order to make sure that their records and 
processes were remaining as conducive to the creation and identification of taxable wealth as 
possible, and that the necessary information for tax collection was being kept.
90
  Throughout 
his tenure, Danby regularly issued warrants to employ and replace searchers, tidesmen, 
surveyors, waiters and other low-level officers on ports as widespread as London, Boston, 
Hull, and Weymouth, and even in the American colonies and the Caribbean.  These officers 
were responsible for meeting ships as they discharged their cargo and for directing goods to 
the correct port officials for registration, or preventing the movement of goods until they had 
been documented in port records, or for registering and managing ships sailing abroad and 
goods marked for export.
91
  Or he sent dozens of warrants directing the employment and 
activities of forest wardens, rangers, keepers and regarders, to make sure their management of 
the forests on the king’s behalf was safeguarding the health of trees, securing logs from theft 
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and decay, or packing logs properly and accurately for their transportation and sale.  Or he 
made regular orders for new leases for fishing, or for the naturalising of boats, or for erecting 
and managing new fisheries in various parts of the country.  And when his customs 
commissioners dismissed officers themselves, he required them to submit a report detailing 
their reasons, which he would then either endorse or investigate.
92
 
One of Danby’s major concerns as treasurer was to preserve the conditions in which 
trade and commerce could carry on effectively.  He therefore created offices aimed at 
preventing the importation and movement of prohibited goods which could not be taxed and 
which damaged legitimate trade throughout the country.  On 23
rd
 February 1674, Danby 
appointed Giles Dowle ‘to implead, sue, and prosecute’ everyone planting, setting and 
sewing tobacco in England ‘to the apparent loss of the king's customs, the discouragement of 
the plantations in America, and the great prejudice of the trade and navigation of the realm’.93  
On 1
st
 June 1674, he appointed Robert Cragg, a haberdasher, and Jeremy Caitlin, a weaver, 
‘to make legal search for all such contraband and prohibited goods, &c., as they shall 
discover to have been imported into this kingdom, and for all other commodities for which 
the due custom has not yet been paid, and to seize the same and deliver same to the 
warehousekeeper of London port’.94  And on 31st July that year, he ordered the customs 
commissioners to appoint John Hobbs and John Thomlyn as officers of the customs, ‘to seize 
and prosecute to condemnation any prohibited or uncustomed goods’.95  Danby’s 
involvement in the employment and administration of the low-level officers revealed his 
desire to improve the overall efficiency of the receipt of the customs and excise.  While he 
focussed heavily on the practices of the more powerful officials involved with the major 
sources of income for the crown, and on the larger administrative processes of the revenue, 
he was still aware that one of the most important points of contact which the treasury had 
with the trade and commerce it taxed was through the lower-level officers in the ports, mines, 
forests, forges and workshops throughout the country.  Without regulating their proceedings, 
Danby knew he could not hope to maximise the reliability, yield and independence of the 
crown’s income and give the king the platform he needed to construct his financial and 
constitutional independence from parliament. 
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Danby’s amendments and additions to the techniques used by the administrative 
revenue officers and to the methods of treasury accounting were designed to improve the 
treasury’s access to and command of the system of revenue collection.  He closely managed 
the ways in which the revenue was audited and administered, in order to empower his 
administrative officers to make better checks and more reliable verification of the king’s 
many sources of income.  And he tried to give himself a greater command of royal funds, at 
whatever stage of the system those funds had reached.  Danby aimed, by making these 
changes throughout his tenure, always to improve the reliability and yield of the king’s 
income and to increase the stability and independence of the royal finances.  In doing so, he 
was slowly trying to build a royal revenue system which could compensate for the 
constitutional weakness which Charles’ financial position had produced in the past.  By 
changing the practices of his administrative revenue officers, then, Danby was aiming to 
reform one half of a system of revenue collection which would sustain independent 
policymaking, and which was, therefore, fit for a personal monarch. 
And the same was true of the way in which he closely monitored the network of 
collection officials responsible for collecting and moving the revenue to the treasury.  
Broadly speaking, respecting the collection officers, the treasurer wanted to improve two 
things.  Firstly, he tried to shape the practices of his officials at their point of contact with 
trade and commerce.  By doing so, he wanted to make it easier for money to pass from the 
hands of the private individuals who owed it to the king into the hands of the officials of 
state.  And secondly, he aimed to improve the processes through which revenue moved to the 
treasury once it had been collected.  He wanted to make sure that when revenue officials 
received money it could then pass efficiently through their hands to the exchequer, where it 
could be put to public use.  As with the administrators and auditors, by constantly shaping 
and enforcing new and existing practices and processes among his collection officers, Danby 
was trying to increase his control over the crown’s income, and ultimately, to make the 
revenue more reliable. 
One of the most important ways in which Danby engaged with the collection officers 
was by managing the roles and activities of the revenue farmers.  While during his tenure the 
majority of branches of the revenue were managed by treasury departments, some of the most 
profitable sources of income, such as the excise, the hearth money, the Irish excise, and the 
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excise in Barbados, were still farmed.
96
  Revenue farming was a basic form of privatisation, 
whereby the government would farm, or lease, the right to collect tax on behalf of the state to 
private individuals.  By the time Danby came to office, farming was a long-established 
method by which English governments could raise revenue and had been used to varying 
degrees of success for hundreds of years.  In principle, it was a sound financial strategy for 
any early modern government, because in this period the state was rarely rich or powerful 
enough to take on fully the responsibility of collecting taxes itself.  Farming was an attractive 
option, therefore, because it was a quick and relatively secure way of raising funds.  It 
provided a large, short to medium-term source of revenue for the crown, because by buying 
the lease, farmers made a high-risk but potentially high-gain investment.  As a result, the 
treasury was able to command both a high annual rental value for the lease and to extract a 
large advance payment as part of the competitive bidding process between prospective 
farmers.
97
  And, since the value of the lease was calculated on anticipated revenues, farming 
also allowed the treasury to move much of the risk and responsibility, inherent in collecting 
taxes on fluctuating and unpredictable sources of income, away from the state and onto the 
leaseholders.  But the system was not perfect and was vulnerable to embezzlement from the 
farmers and all of the agents beneath them.  Danby therefore devoted a lot of his time and 
effort as treasurer to settling the terms of the farms and to shaping the roles and 
responsibilities of those involved with them.  As always, he aimed to improve their efficiency 
and to reduce any abuses or leaks in the system. 
Danby’s main method of exercising control over revenue farming, as it was for any 
treasurer, was the negotiation of new leases and the enforcement of the terms of those which 
already existed.  In 1674 alone, he negotiated new farms for all four of the major sources of 
farmed revenue mentioned above, which amounted to over half of the king’s annual income.  
As treasurer, it was Danby who received the prospective farmers’ proposals for new leases 
before the old farm expired and who brokered the terms of new farms with the successful 
bidders.  The bidders made offers on how much the annual lease should be, how large an 
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advance they would give the crown, and what defalcations, abatements or salaries they would 
expect as compensation for loss of revenue in various unforeseeable circumstances.   
Through his negotiations with prospective farmers, Danby was able to shape the 
king’s income so that he would know what the yield of certain revenues was likely to be at 
specific points in the near future, and could therefore budget against the anticipated revenues 
by using the administrative techniques mentioned above.  For the hearth money, for example, 
Danby accepted one of several proposals for an annual lease of 151,000L and an advance of 
100,000L.
98
  He then negotiated the schedule of payment for the advance from the farmers to 
the crown, and the repayment of that loan from the crown to the farmers.  He agreed with the 
new leaseholders that they would pay their advance in instalments of 10,000L at the end of 
April that year, 20,000L in May, 40,000L in June, and 30,000L in July, ‘and if the king shall 
require itt 25,000L to bee advanced the 20
th
 of November next 1674’.99  If the king took the 
extra advance in November, Danby said, his first instalments repaying the advance money to 
the farmers would be 25,000L in March 1675 and 25,000L in September.  If the king did not 
take the extra, though, the first repayments would only be 12,500L in both March and 
September 1675.
100
  The treasurer also agreed with the farmers that he would add war to the 
list of circumstances in which defalcations would be claimable if there was a loss of 
revenue.
101
 
Having negotiated the farms, Danby tried to ensure that their anticipated yield would 
be met and delivered to the treasury by covenanting with the leaseholders.  His negotiations 
for a farm of the excise, for instance, were settled in November 1674 and set an annual lease 
value of 550,000L and an advance of 65,000L.
102
  The previous June, however, Danby had 
agreed articles with the farmers, later written into the great seal confirming their contract, 
which aimed to secure the terms of their lease and to make sure the anticipated revenue 
actually materialised.  The farmers were to pay the agreed monthly and quarterly amounts 
within forty days of the due date or else forfeit the six per cent interest they commanded on 
their loan of the advance money.
103
  They also had to surrender their lease if they failed to 
pay the full amount of the advance, and then pay any outstanding balances on their account 
immediately.
104
  In terms of inspecting the farmers’ proceedings, as well as being able to 
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apply to them all of the auditing and accounting techniques of his administrative officers, 
Danby made the leaseholders agree to perform all of his future orders and directions.  He 
insisted that the leaseholders had to permit the sub-comptrollers of the excise to inspect and 
take copies of their records whenever he directed and that ‘every six weeks or two months’ 
they had to submit to the comptroller of the excise full accounts of the revenue and duty they 
had collected.  But he also reassured them that if the value of their lease in any way 
diminished because of acts of parliament, he would abate their payments appropriately to 
compensate for their losses.
105
 
Revenue farming therefore presented Danby with a relatively secure and generally 
predictable source of income.  His role in and command of the farming process allowed him 
to make more accurate projections of the king’s income and expenditure, which he would not 
have been able to do as easily if the treasury had collected the revenue itself.  He knew, for 
instance, because he negotiated the schedules for payment, that after May 1674 the Irish 
inland excise, ale and beer licenses, quit rents, chimney money, and wine licenses would be 
paid in quarterly instalments of 27,000L, and that the Irish customs would be paid in 
fortnightly instalments of 3,000L.
106
  He was therefore able to budget against these figures in 
advance, and to secure treasury expenditure against the schedules.  By embedding himself in 
the process by which the treasury anticipated revenue and assigned payments on projected 
incomes, Danby became intrinsic to the management of the exchequer’s cash flow, the king’s 
income and expenditure, and the overall financial position of the crown. 
But he could only anticipate the revenue accurately if he could ensure that the treasury 
was physically capable of collecting the money it was owed from the king’s various sources 
of income.  He worked hard as treasurer to make sure that collection officials at the point of 
contact with sources of revenue could properly calculate the correct taxes and collect them 
once they had been levied.  And he tried continually to make the process of collection more 
reliable or to improve the likelihood that the money to which the king was entitled could be 
collected in the first place. 
There were few instances in which the problem of moving money from private hands 
into the exchequer, and then Danby’s solution to that problem, was more apparent than in the 
collection of revenue from the tin industry in Devon and Cornwall.  Danby’s dealings with 
the tinners continued through the whole of his tenure and were characterised by his 
frustration that the tinners, through their practices, seemed to ‘suppose the king will let this 
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important branch of the revenue lie dead’.107  ‘The king, the whole country and the trade of 
this important commodity’, he wrote to the earl of Bath in October 1674, ‘is abused by the 
interest of a few persons’.108 
The governance of the tin industry was a complicated process, involving a large 
network of local officials, a parliament of tinners, and a convoluted and changeable set of 
bylaws called the stannary laws.
109
  The industry was divided into districts called stannaries, 
each of which had a court in which disputes between tinners could be heard.  Each stannary 
contained a number of coinage towns, wherein the business side of the tin industry took 
place.  By law, tin had to be melted and refined into blocks of a standard weight in an 
authorised public blowing house.  From there, it was taken to a coinage town, where it was 
subjected, in the coinage hall, to assessment by a number of officers.  While each officer was 
important to the process in his own way, the main ones were the peizer, who weighed the tin, 
the assay and deputy assay masters, who tested the tin for its purity and sent it to be 
rewrought if it fell short of the standard, and the numerator, who recorded the number of 
blocks brought in to the coinage hall.  Only when the tin had been passed by all of these 
officials could it receive the king’s stamp and be considered coined and ready for trading.  
For each hundred weight of stamped tin, the tinner had to pay to the revenue collector in his 
area a coinage duty of four shillings. 
By the time Danby came to office, however, the rigours of the coining process were 
often being avoided and coinage duty was regularly going unpaid.  The industry had 
regressed into private and unapproved hands, and tinners had begun illegally to melt the tin 
down into smaller bars than they should, in order to debase the metal and to reduce the tax 
that they had to pay on it.
110
  As a result, cheap, unauthorised tin had flooded the market, 
causing problems for the trade at large because it had driven prices down, and for the king’s 
revenue because of the reduction in his coinage duty receipts.  Danby recognised that the 
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king’s income from tin was an important part of the overall excise receipt, so he worked hard 
to restore it.
111
 
His solution to the reduction of income from tin was to shape the method by which 
the tinners paid the king his share of the revenue from their trade.  The king’s right to receive 
some income from tin, Danby never tendered for discussion.  But he gave the tinners the 
option either to accept the king’s right of pre-emption, or to increase their coinage duty 
payments per hundredweight of tin, in lieu of the pre-emption.  Both of these options would 
mean that the king would not have to suffer any further diminution of income from tin.  And 
crucially, both stood to revitalise the treasury’s control over the tin revenue, by empowering 
the collection officials and the process of collection. 
 Danby developed his offer to the tinners through a long process of consultation with 
the receivers of the revenue in Cornwall and the judges, in order to understand the state of the 
trade better, and to determine what legal power and prerogative rights the king had over it.  
On 3
rd
 July 1673, only weeks after he had come to office, Danby ordered William and 
Charles Harbord, the auditors of the revenue in Cornwall, to send in to the treasury a state of 
the tin trade, along with the leases of the coinage and pre-emption of tin in Cornwall and 
Devon.
112
  Over the following months, Danby, the judges and the receivers found that while 
the king did not have sole exportation rights or the power to set the price of tin (as previous 
monarchs had insisted), he did have the right to pre-emption, which gave the crown the 
opportunity to buy the tin before anybody else and to forbid its exportation when it did not 
bear the king’s stamp.113  Through his consultation with the receivers and judges, Danby 
began to recognise that the revenue from tin had fallen because the tinners had stopped taking 
it to the centres of revenue collection, the coinage halls. 
As a result, by the start of 1674 the treasury had come perilously close, the receivers 
and judges said, to ‘the end of coinage’ altogether, which meant that it had lost the ability to 
check the tin, to regulate it, and to levy and receive duty on it.
114
  Danby made the tinners the 
offer he did, then, because whichever choice they made would reintroduce their obligation to 
take the tin to the coinage halls.  If the tinners chose to accept pre-emption, they would have 
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to take the tin to the coinage halls either so that the king’s officers could assess it and buy it 
themselves or so that it could be checked, stamped and made legal for trading with other 
private individuals.  And if they chose to increase their payments of coinage duty, the tin 
would still need to be brought to the coinage halls so that it could be assessed and have the 
correct taxes levied upon it and collected. 
 In reality, Danby’s negotiation with the tinners did not go as planned.  At various 
points in the years after his offer to the convocation, he issued warrants to the customs 
commissioners to try to force the tinners to take their tin to be coined.  He told his 
commissioners to instruct the customs officials to seize all tin brought to the ports for sale or 
exportation which did not carry the coinage stamp.  He asked the revenue officials, once any 
tin had been seized, to send an account of it to him at the treasury and then to send particulars 
of their seizure to the receiver general so that he could prosecute the offenders.
115
  And he 
told his receivers to presume that if tin was unwrought it was because the tinner was trying to 
avoid coinage duty.
116
  But in spite of Danby’s constant efforts that ‘an effectual course be 
taken that all the tin be brought to his majesty’s coinage houses’, the convocation were able 
to hold off, for years after the treasurer first gave them the choice, on deciding between 
settling pre-emption and an increase in coinage duty.
117
  And even as he, and then parliament 
once he was removed from office, neared a settlement later in the decade, the convocation 
still resisted ceding any of their power at all over the tin to central government.  The 
significance of Danby’s proposition, therefore, rather than how successful or effective it may 
or may not have been, was the end to which it was designed and what it demonstrated about 
Danby’s motivations as treasurer. 
 By trying to force the tinners to take their tin to the coinage halls, Danby was 
attempting to avoid the ‘late great frauds … whereby the revenue is decayed and fair dealing 
merchants discouraged’.118  He wanted to secure and, if possible, to increase the king’s 
revenue from tin, by empowering his revenue officials to be more capable of levying duties 
and receiving payment.  Danby’s proposal to the tinners demonstrated his broader ambition to 
extend the reach of central government and force private individuals into an encounter with 
the officers and processes of state.  If he could enforce this encounter and increase both the 
presence of his collection officials in trade and commerce throughout the country and their 
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ability to collect tax, he could rely more on tax receipts as a source of revenue for the king 
and move Charles closer to the financial independence he desired. 
But empowering his collection officers at the point of collection was only part of the 
problem which Danby faced in trying to improve the king’s revenue.  He was conscious 
throughout his tenure that he still had to get the king’s money back to the exchequer once it 
had been collected.  As we have seen, he made changes to the practices of the auditing and 
administrative staff to give them greater access to the king’s revenue as it moved through the 
revenue system, in an attempt to make the passage of money through that system more 
efficient.  But, to a similar end, he also removed the collection officials’ power to hold money 
in their own accounts once they had collected it.  On 2
nd
 October 1673, for example, Danby 
issued a warrant to the commissioners of the hearth money, observing that there were many 
hearth money receivers who, for a long time, had not sent the treasury their accounts or kept 
to schedule on payments into the exchequer.
119
  Danby noted that before he took office the 
hearth money receivers had been allowed to hold the money they collected until a tally was 
sent to them, instructing them to pay the money on to somebody else.
120
 
But the receivers’ entitlement to hold money created two problems for the king’s 
income.
121
  Firstly, it meant that the money collected by the receivers often did not make it 
centrally into the exchequer, making it that bit more difficult for the treasury to hold them to 
account and to know what contribution their branch of the revenue was making to the 
treasury’s overall receipts.  And secondly, when they received tallies instructing them to pay 
money on, receivers often renegotiated a lower fee with the person to whom they were meant 
to make the payment in order to keep the difference for themselves.  The treasury therefore 
found it difficult to keep an accurate record of which of its debts it had honoured and which 
remained outstanding.  By threatening to prosecute collection officials, therefore, unless they 
quickly paid their receipts into the exchequer and submitted their accounts for approval, 
Danby was trying to divert the flow of revenue out of local officials’ hands and through the 
exchequer at the centre of the state, in order to bring it further under the treasury’s control.   
For all of his scrutiny of the collection officials’ practices, however, and all of his 
effort to make sure that their collections were efficient and their returns speedy and accurate, 
Danby was mindful not to smother private individuals’ ability to make the money which he 
sought to tax.  He believed that ‘[no] mans interest was thought equall to the lord treasurer’s 
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in promoting of trade in England’.122  So, while he made sure that ‘the chief business that is 
to be considered in the regulating the letting of wine licences is the improvement of his 
majesty’s revenue’, or tried to monitor ‘whether [the Irish farmers] have received any more 
mony for the customes then what they have certifyed and returned’, he also wanted to make 
sure he made those kinds of checks ‘favourably as not to interrupt their trade’.123  Throughout 
his tenure, Danby tried to shape his office in order to balance between building the presence 
of an efficient and active revenue collection system within private trade and commerce, and 
doing so sufficiently sensitively as to safeguard the prosperity of those sources of income so 
that they were not impeded in their production of taxable wealth.  He was conscious that if 
his network of revenue officials became too intrusive, bureaucratic or corrupt, they would 
become pernicious to the king’s sources of income and the crown’s overall financial position. 
One of the ways in which he sought to nurture trade and revenue sources was by 
regularly, himself, acting as chief intercessor during disputes in which private individuals 
contested their contact with or payments to the state.  In February 1674, for example, Danby 
presided over the London brewers’ complaint that the excise commissioners were not giving 
them fair tax allowance on exported beer, according to the ‘Act for exporting of beere, ale 
and mum’.  The Act directed excise commissioners to deduct one shilling per ton from the 
excise on exported beer, and then to repay that deduction to the brewers.
124
  The 
commissioners calculated the duty and deductions by gauging the volume of beer at the guile 
stage of the brewing process, which was long before it was ready to be exported.  The 
brewers complained that the beer reduced in volume between the stage at which the 
commissioners made their assessment and the point at which it was settled and ready for 
exporting.  They insisted, then, that, while the commissioners were calculating the rate of 
abatement to be on only three barrels in every twenty three, because of the reduction in 
volume by the time of exportation the abatement should have been made on three barrels in 
every twenty.
125
  The brewers, who represented ‘the main sinew of the excise’, reckoned that 
the miscalculation meant that the commissioners had withheld from them abatements worth 
360L since the Act had passed.
126
 
Danby was quick to address the brewers’ complaint, because through their 
malpractice the commissioners had not tended to ‘the advancement of trade and 
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encouragement of the tillage and manufacture of this realme’ as the Act for Exporting Beer 
required.  He ordered the excise commissioners to submit to him their accounts for the 
previous two years and then took advice from the attorney general and Colonel Birch, the 
auditor of the excise, on how the law should best be applied.  Birch told Danby that while the 
law was clear for the brewers it did ‘not justify the actings of the commissioners’.127  The 
treasurer therefore ordered the commissioners to repay to the brewers, either outright or by 
defalcation, the funds which they had misappropriated.
128
 
Danby’s approach to the collection from beer demonstrated a holistic view of the 
function of the collection officials.  While he was keen to ensure that the yield and reliability 
of the revenue was as great as possible, he was also mindful of retaining the health and 
prosperity of the sources which produced it.  For Danby, the collection officers were a 
conduit between private industry and the treasury, and he tried to balance how he used them 
and how they behaved, in a way which would look after the interests of both.  He tried to 
make sure that, while the state should be able to collect the full and lawful amount from the 
people who owed it, it should do so without ‘vexation likely to prove so great to the subject’, 
and to the detriment of the sources of revenue from which they collected.
129
 
Overall then, Danby tried to manage the king’s revenue in a way which would 
maximise its yield and reliability, and which would therefore provide the king with the level 
of financial independence he needed to develop policy away from the influence of 
parliament.  His tenure was characterised by his constant efforts to create and nurture a 
system in which money flowed as easily as possible from private sources to the point in the 
exchequer where it could be put to public use.  He constantly scrutinised the dealings of his 
collection officers to make sure that they identified the correct sources and levels of income, 
and then collected money and delivered it back to the exchequer in the proper way.  And he 
shaped the techniques and responsibilities of his administrative staff in order that they could 
effectively audit the collection and movement of revenue around the system, and at any given 
point hold the process to account.   
Danby’s practices were based on the principles which he had first tried to bring to the 
king’s attention by sending Bethel’s pamphlet to the duke of Buckingham in 1672.  He aimed 
to maximise cash flow so that the king would remain solvent and could avoid having to rely 
on the goldsmiths or parliament too much as he had done in the run-up to the stop of the 
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exchequer and during the third Anglo-Dutch war.  He wanted always to be able to see where 
the money was which had been collected by his officials and to check that what funds he had 
were correct and sufficient.  He tried to reduce any sources of instability in the revenue, so 
that he could more accurately predict what money would arrive in the exchequer in the future 
and then budget against it.  And he wanted to be able to rely on the flow of money never 
drying up by ensuring that the king’s sources of revenue were secured and dealt with 
consistently by his revenue officers.  By underpinning his practice at every turn with his clear 
desire to improve the yield and reliability of the king’s revenue, Danby placed himself at the 
heart of Charles II’s government and made himself the lynchpin for Charles’ hopes of making 
policy independently of parliament and of achieving his aims in their uncompromised 
fullness. 
 
IV 
 
While Danby’s approach to his office and the royal revenue could not remove the possibility 
altogether that the king might again one day have to rely on parliamentary supply, he was 
able to decrease the likelihood that Charles would have to.  As Danby developed treasury 
practices and his role in Charles’ government, then, parliament became increasingly aware 
that his innovations were marginalising them in politics.  The king’s parliamentary opposition 
knew that if Danby managed to make the crown financially independent of them, they would 
not be able to force the kind of constitutional deadlock which they had done in 1672 so easily 
and their ability to oppose the king’s policies would therefore be dealt a severe blow.   
Up to now, this chapter has tried to demonstrate that many of the bureaucratic and 
procedural innovations contained in the treasury records reveal how the government was 
trying to achieve its political ends through day to day political practice.  But equally 
politically significant is what the treasury records do not contain.  As Danby’s tenure wore 
on, parliament became especially concerned that, at the same time as trying to increase the 
yield and reliability of Charles’ revenue, Danby was deliberately obfuscating his practices 
and making them inaccessible to anybody but himself and a select few of his revenue 
officers.  Not only was he clearly trying to provide the king with the financial basis for 
making policy independently, but he was also destroying the administrative paper trail which 
could show the king’s opposition how he was doing it.  It was this practice more than any 
other which made some members of parliament begin to suspect that Danby was trying to 
give Charles the personal monarchy which he had been aiming for. 
61 
 
The clearest example of Danby deliberately removing information about his 
transactions from the treasury records, and the one which worried the king’s opponents most, 
was his use of secret service warrants to divert money around the exchequer to the benefit of 
the crown.  Throughout his tenure he regularly issued money warrants for secret service, until 
February 1676 to the paymaster of the forces, Stephen Fox, and then after that time to the 
secretary of the treasury, Charles Bertie.
130
  Where Danby made other types of money 
warrant bear the specific purpose for which they were being issued, he did not do so for 
secret service because he wanted to be able to apply large sums of money for the king’s use 
without specifying why or what they were for. 
So, money warrants issued to the goldsmiths were made out specifically for the 
payment of ‘interest on the principal debt’, the value of which was stated in the warrant along 
with the interest to be paid.
131
  Warrants issued to the cofferer of the household were ‘for the 
service of the household’ (meaning the payment of the king’s servants’ wages), or those to 
the treasurer and paymaster of the ordnance were ‘for the service of the ordnance’ (meaning 
the payment of wages and invoices in that department).
132
  Warrants issued for the payment 
of wages and pensions for other offices were made for ‘three months ordinary as ambassador 
in ordinary to the French king’, or for ‘one quarter's pension as gentleman of the 
bedchamber’, for instance.133  Or those issued to local officials were ‘for one year for the 
keeping of the bridge[s] in repair’, or to ‘repair substantially the mounds, gates and stiles of 
the enclosures in forest[s]’.134  But unlike these other warrants, and while he later claimed 
that he had only ever ordered payment for secret service ‘for expedition of publick services 
upon sudden occasions, or to save paying of greater fees’, the warrants which Danby issued 
to Fox and Bertie were rarely made out to be more specific than just ‘for secret service’.135 
These warrants, and the way he issued them, were a cornerstone of the financial 
independence which Danby was trying to create for the king.  They allowed him, on the 
king’s behalf, to move funds around the exchequer in private and beyond the scrutiny of 
auditors or opponents, which meant that if anybody became interested in where the money 
funding a particular royal policy had come from there were little or no records for them to 
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check.  As one well-informed but anonymous commentator wrote after Danby had been 
removed from office, by issuing warrants in the way he did the treasurer made sure that ‘there 
are none in the exchequer that can know what any secret service money is applyed to; for the 
orders are in a us’d name, and no service mentioned’.136  Between Michaelmas 1674 and 
Michaelmas 1678, Danby managed to divert payments for secret service out of the exchequer 
at an average of a little over 100,000L a year, which was around eight per cent of the king’s 
average expenditure in those years and a huge increase on previous administrations.
137
  
Through this technique, then, he was still able to balance the books properly, because each 
warrant told him how much money was being moved, the source of revenue it was being paid 
from, and that it was being paid to either Fox or Bertie.  But by making the warrants no more 
specific than ‘for secret service’, Danby was able to apply money for the king’s use without 
fear of having to justify the expenditure to anybody who began to scrutinise his dealings.
138
  
In doing so, he managed to remove another important way in which Charles’ opposition 
could criticise the king’s use of money in policymaking and obstruct his attempts to rule 
personally. 
By April 1675, a growing number of Commons were becoming sufficiently wary of 
Danby’s practices and what they meant for the nature of Charles’ kingship to allow them to 
go unchecked any longer.  On the 26
th
 of that month, William Russell, who had been in 
opposition to the crown since Charles’ exorbitant spending on the third Anglo-Dutch war had 
emerged, made a speech advocating the removal of the treasurer by impeachment.
139
  Samuel 
Barnardiston seconded Russell’s motion, and brought seven articles of impeachment against 
the treasurer into the lower house, which, he hoped, would make the Commons recognise 
Danby’s ‘ill management of the treasury, and his arbitrary proceedings in it’.140  
Barnardiston’s articles were serious enough for the Commons to resolve to discuss them one 
by one, because, if they turned out to be true, the articles demonstrated that Danby was 
gradually removing the lower house’s ability to participate in politics.  They agreed, 
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therefore, to ‘hear such proofs, instances, and circumstances relating to each article, as are 
requisite to an impeachment’.141  Over the next few days, they took evidence from a number 
of witnesses, and discussed ‘the instruments by which [Danby supposedly] engross’d the 
revenue into his owne hands’ ‘and alter’d the ordinary course of the exchequer’.142   
The first, third and fifth articles complained of the harmful effects of Danby’s practice 
as treasurer.  The remaining four related to Danby’s actions towards the marriage of his son 
to Robert Vyner’s daughter, to the stop of the exchequer which happened before his tenure, to 
gifts he had acquired from the king, and to his part in the banishment of an unnamed member 
of the privy council.
143
  The first article concerned the central and domineering role which 
Danby had fashioned for himself in the treasury, and accused him both of ‘overthrow[ing] 
and violat[ing] the ancient course and constitution of the exchequer, by perverting the method 
of receipts, payments, and accounts, contrary to law’, and of ‘ingross[ing] into his own hands 
the sole power of disposing almost all the king’s revenue’.  The Commons proceeded on this 
article on the 27
th
 and 28
th
, by examining a number of treasury officials, including Robert 
Howard, Stephen Fox, Richard Mounteney and John Duncombe, over how his patents 
empowered Danby to move money on the king’s behalf and how the flow of revenue might 
have changed.  Henry Powle, among the loudest voices in the group opposing the treasurer, 
urged the lower house to recognise that ‘the checks and controls in the [exchequer should be] 
perpetual evidence of what is done, no money being paid or received, but a record is kept of 
it’.144  Danby on the other hand, Powle insisted, ‘has removed the money into other hands, 
that thereby no record may be kept of it’, and had thus disposed of the Commons’ 
opportunity to scrutinise his dealings.
145
  But in spite of Powle and the opposition’s 
vehemence that by the practices described in the first article Danby was undermining their 
right to access treasury proceedings, the lower house voted comfortably that ‘there was no 
matter in [the first] article to ground an impeachment upon’.146  So, in the following days, 
they moved on to discuss the second article about Danby’s son’s marriage. 
Their examination of this article also led to its dismissal, and meant that it was not 
until the 3
rd
 May that the Commons came to discuss the next article relating to Danby’s 
treasury practices.  But by this stage Danby’s opponents had struggled so much to produce 
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both witnesses and evidence for their articles against him that their project had begun to 
falter.  Edward Dering, throughout the debate on the impeachment that week a supporter of 
the treasurer’s, noted in his diary on 30th April that he was ‘very willing to hear [the 
witnesses], yet even then some concideracion was to be had, how farr they were competent 
and credible testimonies’.147   
In their discussion of the third article, which was concerned with the ‘far greater sums 
than ever issued for secret service without account’, and in, what was to be, a final attempt to 
convince the lower house, Lord Cavendish claimed that ‘there has been 2,600,000L spent, 
and little of it gone to the use of the navy’, so ‘by consequence therefore it was wastefully 
spent’.148  ‘Is it not for yours and the nation’s benefit’, Thomas Clarges therefore asked the 
house, ‘that maleversions should be examined of great officers?’.149  The house of commons 
was, Clarges said, ‘the grand jury of the nation, as the freeholders are of a county’, and, ‘for 
decency’s sake’, needed therefore to be able to inspect the treasury’s proceedings in their 
entirety if they saw fit.
150
  But it was to no avail, and the lower house resolved that there was 
nothing in any of the articles upon which to ground an impeachment.  
For the time being, then, the treasurer, his practices and the king’s revenue were safe 
from the Commons’ scrutiny.  At this time, it was only a minority in the lower house who 
were willing to speak out against Danby’s changes in the treasury, and even then they could 
not organise themselves or their impeachment enough for it to gain traction.  In April 1675 
there were many Commons who saw some improvement in the country’s finances due to 
Danby’s practices, and were happy to let him carry on as he had been doing.  For them the 
king’s prosperity bode well for the fortunes of the nation, so anything which Danby did to 
improve Charles’ financial position was alright by them.  And there were others who tested 
the legal basis for the articles through the debate in the week after they had been presented, 
and found that there simply was not enough proof to proceed on them.  They thought that 
while some of Danby’s practices looked suspecious, there was neither enough evidence nor 
enough urgency to start trying to remove him at that time.  So for now, Danby’s supporters, 
who on the night his impeachment was raised had ‘met at Wallingford house with [him], and 
heard what answers he could give to every particular’, were ‘so much too strong for his 
enemies’ and the attack failed.151 
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But in spite of Barnardiston’s articles being defeated so easily in the spring of 1675, 
the fears on which they were founded never fully went away.  A still sizeable portion of the 
lower house, those men, as Thomas Meres described them, ‘who come out of the country, 
and would keep the king’s revenue from ingrossing’, had become increasingly concerned 
that, for example, ‘the patent for the excise runs “to pay the money as the lord treasurer shall 
direct;” this empowers him to give verbal orders, which are never recorded, which is against 
common law’.152  This group, then, in 1675 still a minority, made the startling connection 
between what the treasurer was doing in office to try to stabilise the king’s revenue, and their 
ability to participate in politics and policymaking.  Certain members of the lower house 
strongly suspected that Danby’s practices meant that ‘no enquiry, either for the king or the 
subject, can be made what becomes of the money’.153  As a result, their ability to use the 
king’s financial position to intervene in his broader policy decisions, one of the main methods 
by which they could exercise their political power and prevent Charles from governing 
personally and arbitrarily, was being subverted.  It did not take long for this tension to emerge 
again. 
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Chapter 2: The king does government 
 
As the house of commons debated Samuel Barnardiston’s articles of impeachment against the 
earl of Danby, the house of lords were locked in a similar debate about the nature of their 
house and how they should be trying to make policy and to practise politics.  On 3
rd
 May 
1675, the same day that the house of commons rejected the last of Barnardiston’s articles, the 
upper house read and agreed to a preliminary order ‘to preserve freedom of debate’.1  The 
order was a reaction to the progress of a bill to prevent the dangers arising from persons 
disaffected to the government, which the Lords had been debating for a number of weeks, 
and aimed to safeguard parliament’s ‘just ancient freedom and privilege of debating any 
matters or business which shall be propounded or debated in both or either of the said 
houses’.2  As the upper house had developed the disaffected persons bill, a number of 
powerful Lords, including Shaftesbury, Buckingham and Halifax, had become concerned that 
it sought to impose an oath on them which, if not taken, would deprive them of sitting and 
voting in parliament.  This penalty for refusing the oath, these Lords said, was ‘the highest 
invasion of the liberties and privileges of the peerage that possibly may be, and most 
destructive of the freedom which they ought to enjoy as members of parliament’.3 
Instead of submitting to the terms of the disaffected persons bill, the Lords who 
entered their dissent against it insisted that their role in politics was innate and permanent, 
because, they said, they received their privilege at birth and it could not then be taken away 
‘but what by the law of the land must withal take away their lives, and corrupt their blood’.4  
Since their privilege was not conferred upon them by anybody else, the nature of their 
participation in politics could not be changed or controlled by anybody else either.  Rather, 
their ability to direct parliamentary proceedings themselves was an ‘ancient freedom’, which 
they retained out of a sense of duty for the ‘redressing of any public grievance’.5  And their 
means of addressing these public concerns, they said, should be through the ‘repeal or 
alteration of any old, or preparing any new laws’.6 
The Lords’ debate on the bill dragged on through the second half of April and the 
whole of May, and had still not been resolved by the time parliament was prorogued on 9
th
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June.  As a result, the bill was abandoned, and it never appeared in the house of lords again.  
But while it did feature in the upper house, the debate around the disaffected persons bill was 
important, in one sense because it revealed how the Lords were conceptualising politics and 
their role in policymaking and practice at that time, and in another sense because it was at the 
heart of the disunity in parliament which came to determine the course of politics over the 
ensuing twenty months. 
The way in which the dissenters presented their view of the bill demonstrated a deep 
preoccupation in the upper house with how their status as Lords gave them a constitutional 
privilege which entitled them to participate in politics in a certain way.  Their argument 
during the spring of 1675 revealed that many in the upper house at this time were trying hard 
to think about and shape the relationship between the status which they could claim as Lords, 
the type of power and constitutional role which their claim of status gave them, the means of 
participating in politics which their role allowed them, and the ends to which their 
participation should be directed.  This was, then, a broad and practically-minded conception 
of politics in which the Lords recognised how their ability to manage their constitutional 
position for themselves affected their ability to turn their ideas into reality through political 
process and planning. 
The debate around the disaffected persons bill was one part of a broader competition 
at that time, between different groups in both houses of parliament, between both houses, and 
between both houses and the king, for the ability to intervene effectively in policymaking and 
to be able to realise wider political ambitions.  Through the spring of 1675, as groups within 
the Commons and Lords tried to shape the nature and function of their houses and to compete 
to secure what they saw to be their rightful constitutional position, relations within and 
between the houses gradually broke down.  As these debates continued, the king became 
increasingly frustrated that the growing tensions within parliament were preventing them 
from acting as a single, cohesive legislative unit as he wanted them to be.  By 22
nd
 November 
1675, therefore, he had had enough, and, in a new bid to rule personally, he prorogued and 
ruled without them for over a year. 
This chapter will explore how by the mid-1670s different groups in both houses of 
parliament viewed their status in politics, and how from their diverse positions they derived, 
thought about, and tried to shape or preserve their constitutional role and their means of 
exercising power.  It will examine parliamentary proceedings in the run-up to the long 
prorogation of 1676, and will look at how Charles regarded their discussion and why he 
decided to intervene how he did.  And it will ask how parliament engaged with politics and 
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tried to pressure the king’s policies once he had prorogued them.  Charles’ decision to 
prorogue parliament for over a year forced political debate out into the public sphere in the 
pages of printed material.  This chapter will therefore seek to explore how politicians tried to 
engage with politics and to shape policy publicly, and how Charles attempted to control these 
public attempts to intervene in his decisions through regulating the press and public 
discourse. 
 
I 
 
Through April 1675, the house of lords, in, what they saw as, their capacity as the highest 
equity court in the land, received a number of petitions of appeal asking them to prosecute 
private suits.
7
  As May arrived, they began to call on the disputants to answer their appeals.  
But three of the petitions which the Lords received that spring related to members of the 
house of commons, and, as the Lords called them to answer their appeals, the lower house 
began to resist what they deemed to be a gross breach of their privilege.  By the second week 
of June ‘the differences between the two houses [were] risen to a strange height’, and what 
had begun as a regular series of private disputes had turned into an out and out battle of 
privilege against judicature between the upper and lower houses.
8
   
 On Tuesday 11
th
 May, the Commons received information that an appeal had been 
brought against John Fagg, member for Steyning, by Thomas Sherley, one of the king’s 
physicians in ordinary.
9
  The upper house, the Commons were told, had begun to proceed on 
the petition and had entered ‘an order in their book that no member of either house should 
have priviledge against writs of error or appeales brought before them’.10  Many in the 
Commons were outraged that the Lords would presume to make orders relating to their 
privilege without consulting them first.  So, on the 14
th
, in an attempt to slow the Lords’ 
proceedings down and to catch up with a process which had begun without them, the lower 
house resolved that the appeal which Sherley had brought into the Lords was ‘a breach of the 
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undoubted rights and privileges of this house’.11  But the same day, the lower house was 
informed that two more of their members, Arthur Onslow and Thomas Dalmahoy, both 
members for Guildford, were ‘facing writs of error or appeales in the lords’ house’ as well.12  
The Commons commanded Onslow and Dalmahoy not to proceed any further in the cases 
pending against them in the Lords, and the following day, on the 15
th
, resolved that if 
anybody else appeared in the Lords to prosecute any suit against a member of the lower 
house, they would be ‘deemed a breaker and infringer of the rights and privileges of this 
house’.13 
 In the following weeks, in a series of conferences requested by both houses, relations 
between the Commons and Lords, and between different groups within both houses, 
continued to break down.  By the end of May a deep rift had opened up between the upper 
and lower house, as neither one was willing to accept the other’s claims about the issue in 
hand.  On the surface, the problem they were discussing was whether or not the Lords had the 
right to prosecute petitions of appeal, and then whether, if a petition related to a member of 
the lower house, the Lords’ judicature superseded the Commons’ privilege to sit unhindered 
during a session of parliament.  The Lords insisted, on the one hand, that in them ‘the last 
resort of judging upon writs of error and appeals in equity, in all causes, and over all persons, 
is undoubtedly fixed, and permanently lodged’.14  The Commons, on the other, could not find 
‘by Magna Charta, or by any other law or ancient custom of parliament, that your lordships 
have any jurisdiction, in cases of appeal from courts of equity’.15 
But, underneath all the rhetoric, their discussion was based in a deep concern, on both 
sides, about the effects which the Lords’ prosecution of appeals stood to have on the balance 
of power between the houses and the nature of their roles in politics.  Many in the lower 
house became concerned that if the Lords had the power to draw individual Commons away 
from the proceedings of their house in order to prosecute private appeals, they had the power 
to disrupt the business of the lower house and thereby to obstruct the Commons’ ability to 
participate in politics.  The Commons insisted that ‘it is the undoubted right of this house, 
that none of their members be summoned to attend the house of lords during the sitting or 
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privilege of parliament’.16  They tried to make it clear that it was the public which they served 
and not the Lords.  It was, many Commons thought, against ‘the right of a commoner to be 
sued, without the consent of the house’, since it was impossible for a member to be ‘tied to 
personal attendance publickly to one place, [and yet] called to another’.17 
But for the Lords, if the Commons could resist their power as the highest court in the 
country, they were claiming a political and legal authority equal to that of the upper house 
which undermined the Lords’ rightful constitutional seniority.  When, on 27th May, the 
Commons sent Thomas Lee to the upper house to desire a conference regarding their 
privileges in the prosecution of their member Arthur Onslow, the Lords agreed, but only on 
the condition that the Commons would stick to a discussion of their privilege.  If the lower 
house tried to enter into a debate on the Lords’ judicature, on which the upper house refused 
to allow the Commons to comment, the managers of the conference from the Lords were to 
‘withdraw from the said conference, and resort to the Lords, without further attendance’.18  It 
was, the upper house maintained, their undoubted right ‘in judicature, to receive and 
determine, in time of parliament, appeals from inferior courts, though a member of either 
house be concerned, that there may be no failure of justice in the land’.19  Any attempt by the 
lower house to dispute, obstruct or control the orders or judgments of the upper house, the 
Lords said, ‘tend[ed] to the subversion of the government of this kingdom, and to the 
introducing of arbitrariness and disorder’.20   
The answer which the Lords returned to the Commons’ request for a conference on 
the 27
th
 fractured the lower house into a number of different groups, according to what they 
viewed their role in politics to be, how policy should be made in order to maintain that role, 
and how the issue in hand should be resolved.  Two groups in the lower house maintained the 
Commons’ autonomy and sought to safeguard their ability to participate in politics on their 
own terms, in order that they could better attend to the requirements of the public which they 
sought to represent.  But even these two groups were divided on how to translate their belief 
into action.  The first, which Edward Dering noted in his diary included Thomas Meres and 
Robert Howard, wished to go to conference with the Lords and ignore their proviso of not 
mentioning judicature.
21
  According to this group, such a restriction on the debate would not 
allow the lower house to speak frankly on the matter of their breached privilege, and would 
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therefore not allow them fully and finally to address the imbalance which the Lords’ 
prosecution of appeals had created.  The other of these groups, however, opposed the 
conference altogether, for the broader reason that since the Lords had this time told the 
Commons ‘what they should not say, the next time they might enjoine us what we should 
say’.22  This group was keen to practise their right to intervene in politics on their own terms, 
rather than accommodating the Lords in conference and running the risk of setting a 
precedent which might restrict them to having to submit to the Lords’ will and superiority 
from then on.  Such a submission would not allow the Commons to fulfil their constitutional 
role, which was to serve the needs of the public. 
A third, more moderate, group, of which Dering was a member and which at this time 
was the largest in the house, thought that, while the lower house had been right in their votes 
to be ‘declaratory of the common law of the land’, it would be better for the Commons to 
‘take a little more time for deliberacion than usually we did’.23  For this group, parliament 
was there to discuss possible courses of action and to make the legislation which was 
required to solve any problems which they encountered.  They hoped, therefore, to attend the 
conference, and to persuade the Lords that placing a proviso on such occasions rendered ‘the 
whole conference vaine and indeed dumb’, and undermined the more discursive relationship 
which the two houses should be trying to foster.
24
  Dering himself, always vocal on the matter 
of what role the lower house should be taking in politics, urged the Commons a number of 
times to ‘come to a good understanding with the Lords’, and warned that, if the Commons 
sought total independence from the upper house, parliament risked ‘splitting upon that rock 
we are now very neare striking upon’.25  And two more groups insisted that the Commons 
should be much more compliant in the debate than they currently were being.  One suggested 
that the Commons should prioritise any action which would allow for the more effective 
application of the law and the better preservation of justice.  It would be worse, they said, for 
the right to prosecute petitions to be ‘under the determination of a chancellor or in a judge’s 
breast; much better under so many judges in the lords house’.26  And the other urged the 
Commons not to exceed their privilege and to upset the established balance of power by 
seeking to restrict the Lords’ authority in their current debate.  The Lords should be able to 
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exercise jurisdiction over the Commons, this group said, since ‘the Lords are perpetual, and 
privilege attends them, and they are in parliament for ever.  Privilege here is but accidental’.27 
By the beginning of June, then, the debate between the Lords and Commons had 
become much more than a theoretical discussion about who should have the right to 
prosecute petitions of appeal and whether or not the house of lords should be able to act as a 
court of equity.  Underneath the differences of opinion between the houses on this issue, ran a 
much deeper current of practical concern about the very ‘essence of parliamentary 
proceedings’.28  The Lords’ assumption of a supreme legal authority, which would empower 
them to divert the Commons’ attendance in their own house and to interrupt their 
proceedings, was not acceptable to many in the lower house because, as Edward Vaughan, 
one of the main defenders of the Commons’ privilege put it, ‘the lives, and liberties of the 
people you are to represent, are at stake’.29  It was not the Lords’ insistence that they had the 
authority to prosecute appeals itself, then, which made tensions run as highly as they did, but 
the implications which that authority had for the distribution of political power between the 
houses and their ability to participate in politics and to achieve their political ends. 
The dispute which emerged out of the Lords’ prosecution of appeals was part of a 
broader contest between different groups in parliament and between both houses, to shape or 
maintain the distribution of political power and the correct level of access to policymaking.  
The Commons’ debate of the articles of impeachment against the earl of Danby, the Lords’ 
discussion of the disaffected persons bill, and both houses’ debate of the petitions of appeal 
were all based in a deep concern in both houses for how best to maintain the ability to 
exercise power, to develop political plans, and to realise ideas in practice.  All of these topics 
and the tensions which grew around them hastened a downturn in relations throughout the 
spring of 1675 within and between the two houses, which did not fully recover for the rest of 
Charles II’s reign.  These debates in parliament in the long-run, and as we will see in the 
following chapters, meant that from then on parliament spent much of their time thinking 
about what the practical implications might be of the policies which they were discussing, 
instead of focusing on solving the issues which had required them to develop policy in the 
first place.  As the earl of Shaftesbury was supposed to have replied when the bishop of 
Salisbury at this time asked the upper house whether the hearing of causes and appeals ‘be so 
                                                 
27
 Ibid, p. 171. 
28
 Newdigate, l. c. 189.  I am very grateful to Alex Barber for providing me with an electronic transcript of these 
useful newsletters, which, otherwise, would have remained in an archive beyond the reach of both my student 
budget and growing fear of flying. 
29
 CJ, vol. 9, p. 171. 
73 
 
material to us, that it ought not to give way to the reason of state, of greater affairs that press 
us’, ‘this matter is no less then your whole judicature, and your judicature is the life and soul 
of the dignity of the peerage of England’.30 
But, in the shorter-term, this preoccupation with how policy and practice might affect 
the balance of the constitution and the distribution of power meant that both houses of 
parliament became unable and unwilling to address the issues which Charles had 
recommended to their care on beginning the session.  On 13
th
 April that year, having recalled 
them from over a year of prorogation, the king had asked them to make legislation which 
‘may give content to all my subjects’ in terms of religion, and had laid before them ‘the 
consideration of the fleet’.31  But as the session had continued, those considerations had 
become completely subordinated by the debates surrounding parliamentary privilege.  
Neither the bill for securing the protestant religion, nor the bill for preventing papists from 
sitting in parliament, both being developed in the house of lords, managed to pass through the 
house before Charles prorogued them the following November.
32
  And likewise, the house of 
commons’ bill for raising supply for the navy was read for the first time on 20th November, 
but, again, did not reach a second reading before the prorogation.
33
  As both houses continued 
to clash as the year moved on, opinion fragmented, particularly in the lower house, and their 
ability and will to act as a coherent legislative body, as Charles had asked them to when he 
opened the session, quickly disappeared. 
It was not long, then, before this diversity of opinion within parliament, and which 
was gradually preventing them from acting how Charles wanted them to, incurred the king’s 
displeasure.  As the tensions grew, and as the Lords’ and Commons’ debate moved into June 
without showing any sign of being resolved, Charles became increasingly frustrated with his 
parliament’s inability to address the issues which he had recommended to them, and to attend 
to their constitutional function by making the laws which he asked them for.  On 5
th
 June, he 
called both houses to the banqueting house, and told them that he viewed the differences 
between them to be ‘a most malicious design of those who are enemies to me and to the 
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church of England’.34  Parliament existed, he made no mistake in telling them that day, in 
order to assist him in addressing the issues which he deemed to be most pressing at any given 
time.  As a result, he told them directly ‘that whilst you are in debate about your privileges, I 
will not suffer my own to be invaded’.35  His warning thus issued, he allowed parliament to 
continue sitting, and again told them to consider the problems to which he had previously 
drawn their attention.  But, after only four more days, as they still showed no signs of 
reconciliation, on 9
th
 June he called both houses to him again and told them that because he 
had ‘designed the matter of [the session] for the procuring of good laws’ ‘in the matters both 
of religion and property’, and because ‘those unhappy differences between my two houses are 
grown to such an height, I find no possible means of putting an end to them, but by a 
prorogation’.36  While he then recalled them the following October, it did not take long for 
the same tensions to emerge in parliament, as the Lords renewed their prosecution of appeals 
and the Commons became wary of the same invasion of their privilege as they had done in 
the spring.  By 22
nd
 November that year, then, Charles was ready to suspend them again, only 
this time he prorogued them for over a year, until 15
th
 February 1677. 
Charles intervened in parliamentary proceedings in the summer and autumn of 1675 
in order to bypass the political deadlock which had arisen in and between both houses.  He 
made it clear that he had no intention of suffering a parliament which was more concerned 
with shaping their own means of developing policy, than they were with actually making the 
policies which he had asked for.  So by refusing to wait any longer for them to help him in 
passing legislation on religion and the navy, Charles was once more taking a personal 
approach to rule.  But his prorogations throughout 1675, and their disruption of parliament’s 
ability to participate directly in politics by sitting, had another important effect on political 
culture.  They forced his opponents’ attempts to intervene in politics out into the public 
sphere, in the pages of printed material and popular debate instead. 
 
II 
 
Charles’ decision to suspend the session for fifteen months at the end of November issued in 
a new period of personal rule.  He removed his opponents’ access to the constitutional 
mechanisms by which they could directly participate in policymaking, and thus bypassed the 
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blockages in parliamentary politics which had dogged their previous two meetings.  But in 
doing so, Charles forced his opponents to think of new ways in which they could influence 
his decisions and bring him to rethink any policies which they did not like.  Having removed 
his opponents’ ability to participate in politics directly through a parliamentary session, then, 
the king, perhaps inadvertently, galvanised a public political culture which had for some time 
been growing alongside parliamentary proceedings. 
As the relationship between the upper and lower houses and the king had broken 
down through the summer and autumn of 1675, a growing pamphlet literature began to try to 
draw the issues of privilege and judicature, the nature and constitutional roles of both houses 
and the crown, and the king’s continuing attempts to manage parliament and to rule 
independently, out of the wreckage of the parliamentary session, and to sustain the debate of 
those issues in public.  As the prorogation progressed, the differences of opinion which had 
emerged within parliament in the run up to the deadlock became exacerbated and 
compounded in the pages of printed material, and in the minds of the people who read and 
discussed it.  Within a year of his decision to rule personally, Charles faced some of the 
strongest public opposition which he had yet seen in his reign, and needed once again to 
adjust his style of policymaking accordingly. 
This section will explore how Charles and his opponents sought to use and control the 
publication of information in order to make policy.  How did they conceptualise their role in 
policymaking, and how did they seek to support that role by opening up or shutting down the 
availability of the data upon which political decisions could be based and the details of the 
decisions which were being made?  And how did they seek to use and control publication and 
press restraint in order to make their political and constitutional ideas influence 
policymaking?  The chapter will examine what debates the emerging pamphlet literature was 
seeking to shape, and how the authors of those pamphlets were trying to use their audiences 
to influence the policies which Charles was making.  And it aims to suggest how public 
opinion practically made it into the policymaking process.  How, did authors try to make sure 
that their published points of view would come to feature in the conversations of 
policymakers and influence their decisions?  It then seeks to show how Charles tried to 
control public access to information, and to prevent public intervention in his policymaking 
and governance.  What were the processes and procedures by which Charles sought to 
restrain the press and public discourse? And how did he seek to modify and improve this 
system during the long prorogation of 1676, to be able to make policy independently and rule 
how he wanted? 
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Historians have tended to view the long prorogation as a period of relative calm in 
Restoration politics, characterised by a series of ineffectual efforts by Charles’ prorogued 
opposition to put pressure on the king, and equally unremarkable attempts by the government 
to suppress those now unpersuasive opposition voices.  The prorogation has commonly been 
confined, then, to the space of a few paragraphs by scholars impetuous to get to the events 
and themes of the next parliamentary session.
37
  Where the events of the prorogation have 
been studied, historians have treated them as the by-product of a gradually developing 
intellectual culture of opposition to the crown, as a bridging point between the ideas of 
interregnum radicalism and their more mature Restoration counterparts in the last three 
parliaments of Charles’ reign.38  But if we take the efforts of those attempting to participate in 
politics and to shape political culture during the prorogation a little more seriously, we see a 
continuing, and very earnest, desire from a still active royal opposition to influence the 
decisions which their king was making, and the policies which he was seeking to develop.  
Just because the public effort to influence policymaking was not immediately successful, and 
although many of Charles’ measures to regulate public participation during the prorogation 
were ultimately ineffective, does not mean that they do not tell us anything about the way in 
which the personal government of 1676 and its opponents were trying to develop the policies 
which would come to fruition in the following years. 
Most of the pamphlets which sought to publicly sustain the parliamentary debates 
which had led to the prorogation were published anonymously, and it is difficult now to say 
for certain how many of them were authored by the same person, or whether any of them 
were written by groups of people consciously writing together towards a shared goal.  They 
ranged from being relatively well-produced, seemingly well-funded folio pamphlets, which, 
the authorities noted were ‘too well printed for a private press’, to manuscript doggerels 
scribbled over single sheets of paper.
39
  What is clear, though, is that many of their arguments 
were based on the same conceptualisation of the constitution and the nature of the roles of 
each political institution.  It is also striking how closely many of those arguments resembled 
addresses and debates which had taken place in the upper house in the run up to the 
prorogation.  In particular, they drew heavily from, or even fully reproduced, the speeches of 
the earl of Shaftesbury and the duke of Buckingham.  So much so, in fact, that when, for 
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instance, one of the pamphlets came to the attention of the upper house in early November 
1675, shortly before Charles prorogued them, ‘some of their own members [became] 
suspected for it’.40  And it is also noticeable that, as the authorities investigated these 
publications and began to make arrests and prosecutions, many of those whom they identified 
were known associates of Shaftesbury and Buckingham, or were even members of groups 
such as the Green Ribbon Club.  But at any rate, whether or not the swell of publications 
through the long prorogation was the result of a truly organised propaganda campaign, co-
ordinated by a single central party or interest, we should still read them as the authorities 
came to; as a coherent body of political opposition to the crown and Charles’ now personal 
government. 
As parliament lurched from one fragmented meeting to another through the second 
half of 1675, and then as the prorogation continued, pamphlets emerged which were based on 
the same belief in a collaborative form of government that represented the will and ambitions 
of the English people, which had been so rigorously asserted by many in parliament in the 
months leading up to the prorogation.  The form of government these publications preferred 
was one in which each political estate was at the same time reliant on and supportive of the 
functions of the other two.  ‘You have in our English government’, one pamphlet published at 
the end of 1675 told its readers, ‘the house of commons affording the sence, the mind, the 
information, the complaints, the grievances, and the desires of all those people whom they 
serve … The second estate in this government, is the Lords, who are the councill, the 
wisdom, and judgement of the nation … The last, and supream of all, is the king, one who 
gives life and vigour to the proceedings of the other two’.41  Fairly simply, then, ‘the house of 
commons’ business is to complain’, the house of lords’ ‘to redress’, and the king was there 
‘to seek the welfare of the whole’ by turning ‘the will and desires of the people, approved by 
the wisdom and judgment of the Lords’, into law.42  Within this constitutional structure, as 
‘taken out of the parlement rolls, which declare it throughout from the beginning to the end, 
both in the ancient records, and in the modern journal books’, the roles of each estate were 
absolutely rigid.
43
  It was only through maintaining this correct distribution of power, in 
which each estate made a distinct and unique contribution to the making and implementation 
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of policy, that the grievances of the nation could be addressed, and the laws, liberty and 
property of the subject be protected.  If the structure broke down, ‘all our ancient rights 
[would be] raped from us and our posterity forever; and our living child of liberty and 
property, slily stolen from our side’.44 
More and more as the prorogation dragged on, however, the pamphlets began to insist 
that that structure had indeed started to break down, because of the excessive length of the 
current parliamentary session.  By the end of 1675, Charles had not sought an election for 
fourteen years.  As a result, the pamphlets said, parliament ‘were not the representatives of 
the one half of the people of England’ anymore, because the continuous session meant that no 
politicians ever returned to their constituencies to hear the will of the people.
45
  Even worse, 
the over-length of the session left both houses of parliament open to corruption and faction 
building.  ‘Honours, offices, pensions, money, imployments and gifts’, one pamphlet said, 
could be bestowed and accepted in a lengthy session, in order to service ‘caballs, and parties, 
and the carrying on of private interests and court-factions, rather than the publick good’.46  
And in that instance, ‘the government, as in France, Denmark and other countries, [would be] 
made absolute and at the will of the prince’.47 
The pamphlets almost unanimously agreed, then, that the only solution to the current 
imbalance of power, as a number of Lords including Shaftesbury and Buckingham had also 
insisted in the upper house two days before the long prorogation, was the immediate 
dissolution of the current parliament and the election of a new one.
48
  Only through a policy 
of ‘short and frequent parliaments’ could the correct balance of power be returned and 
sustained.
49
  Only through that policy could the government ensure that the people would 
                                                 
44
 Anon, The Long Parliament dissolved (London, 1676), p. 3. 
45
 The Long Parliament dissolved, p. 4. 
46
 Two seasonable discourses, p. 6; Ibid, p. 4. 
47
 Ibid, p. 6. 
48
 LJ, vol. 13, p. 33; A number of the pamphlets suggested this solution.  For instance, Anon, The causes and 
remedy of the distempers of the times in certain discourses of obedience and disobedience (London, 1675).  Or 
W. Penn, England's present interest discover'd with honour to the prince and safety to the people (London, 
1675).  Or Anon, An account of the proceedings at Guildhall, London, at the Tolke-Moot, or Common Hall 
(London, 1676).  Or Anon, A seasonable argument to persuade all the grand juries in England to petition for a 
new parliament (Amsterdam, 1677).  Or Anon, Some considerations upon the question, whether the Parliament 
is dissolved by it's prorogation for 15 months (London, 1676); And there were a number of other publications, 
now not surviving in print but which Joseph Williamson kept notes on, which criticised the length of the session 
and Charles’ decision to rule personally through 1676.  See, for example, Williamson’s note at CSPD March 
1676-February 1677, p. 215, about a pamphlet entitled Jenkes his case, which recorded his speech at the 
Common Hall of London about a possible dissolution.  There is also a manuscript transcription at SP 29/391 f. 
161, of a pamphlet called The grand question concerning the prorogation of this parliament.  There is also a 
transcription of a letter to an unnamed lord from ‘the officers of the Royal Regiment of Fops’ at SP 29/379 no. 
72, or notes on two satirical verses at SP 29/381 no. 78. 
49
 Two seasonable discourses, p. 7 
79 
 
have ‘a continued assurance and a perpetual satisfaction that their liberties should continue in 
status quo’.50  And only through that policy could they prevent the further slide towards 
personal monarchy and the pursuit of private court interest in the future.   
But it was one thing for the authors of the pamphlets to present this rival vision of 
how government should be done in order to secure liberty and property, and quite another for 
them to implement their policy of regular parliaments.  No matter how rhetorical they got, or 
how many statutes they quoted, the pamphlets could never have hoped to convince Charles, a 
divine right monarch who did not share their desire for collaborative governance, and who 
had shown through the prorogation was not receptive to competing visions of politics, that 
their argument about the imbalances in the constitution was correct and needed addressing 
how they described.  They needed, rather, as politicians in parliament had regularly done 
before, to find some way of forcing Charles to account for their ideas in his policy decisions 
in spite of not agreeing with them himself.  So how did the authors of the pamphlets try to 
implement this plan to return political culture and policymaking to a more collaborative form 
of government through short and regular parliaments?  Alongside their alternative political 
theory, how did the pamphlets hope to drive their calls for dissolution, their solution to the 
problems in contemporary politics, into Charles’ decisions in government? 
At the heart of their attempts to force the dissolution and to re-enter policymaking was 
a clever campaign of defamation, which aimed to induce a popular passive resistance to the 
king’s government and policies and thus to cut off the domestic private sources of money 
which the king had previously used to keep his government independent.  As well as offering 
their vision of collaborative governance, the pamphlets wished to bring their readers ‘within 
these walls for one half day’ so that they may see ‘the strange make and complexion that this 
house is of’.51  Then having transported their readers inside government, they openly 
challenged and criticised the character, motives and decisions of Charles and his ministers.  
They wanted to demonstrate to their audiences that the current threat to liberty and property 
by the over-long session and prorogation was not just the unhappy coincidence of political 
circumstance, but was the responsibility of a king who was more concerned with making 
policy for his own benefit than for his subjects.  The pamphlets sought, therefore, to depict 
the current form of government, in which the king ruled with the assistance of a tight-knit and 
opaque cabal of ministers, whilst spurning all other estates, as so disagreeable to the interests 
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of his subjects that they would begin to resist him and to seek and prefer alternative styles of 
governance.  This defamation represented a problem for Charles, because once his subjects’ 
minds were alienated from him, their pockets could soon follow. 
The king’s more vicious critics attacked him personally, more often than not drawing 
upon his very public preference of wine, women and song over the business of government.  
One such author compared Charles to Timur, the founder of the Timurid empire in central 
Asia, since both kings were renowned for having many different wives and lovers.
52
  But 
many of those seeking to defame the king in this way published their work as manuscripts, 
since that allowed them to circulate their ideas without having to find the assistance of 
printers and publishers who were as disaffected and unscrupulous as they were.  As a result, 
as the surveyor of the press, Roger L’Estrange, told the short-lived Lords committee for libels 
in mid-November 1675, manuscript publications were even more ‘bitter and dangerous’ than 
their printed counterparts, and ‘by the help of transcripts, [were] well nigh as publick’.53  One 
of the most acerbic manuscript verses, written by John Freke, who was a member of the 
Green Ribbon Club and would eventually be among those tried for involvement in the Rye 
House plot, suggested that instead of dealing with affairs of state, ‘other mens’ wives 
[Charles] only swives’.54  Or when the king had decided, another verse said, to turn ‘the 
parliament out of doors’, he had done so whilst ‘red hot with wine and whores’.55  The, not 
very subtle, suggestion which these authors were making to their audiences was that since 
Charles was so pre-occupied with more carnal pursuits he was regularly left with neither the 
attention nor the energy to govern church and state properly.  To the authors of the pamphlets 
and verses, these errors of judgement and the lifestyle which produced them rendered the 
king, at best, the colonel of a regiment of similar fops, and, at worst, an ‘infestious punk’, 
neither serious nor moral enough to make the kinds of decisions needed to do government 
correctly.
56
 
But beyond these more rhetorical complaints of Charles’ libertine tendencies, the 
pamphlets tried to show how his whole personal government was unfit for purpose and 
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willing to make policy only for themselves.  Charles, ‘like a soverraigne wise and holy’, they 
said, had constructed a government in which he had placed ‘very doggs at counsell board’, 
had packed the judiciary with men who were too young to know what they were doing, and 
had made ‘bishops those that love a wench’.57  This new ‘distinct party from the rest of the 
nation’ saw ‘no reason why any of the king’s officers should consult with parliament men’, 
and were thus, for their own ends, making ‘monarchy as well as episcopacy to be jure divino, 
and not to be bounded, or limited by humane laws’.58  Even worse, Charles was supposedly 
trying to extend his court and church party into parliament, and had already recruited ‘several 
papists, fifty outlaws, and pensioners without number’ across both houses.59  This whole 
process was being done, the opposition authors insisted, ‘to leave [parliament] as an 
instrument to raise money, and to pass such laws, as the court, and church shall have a mind 
to’.60  After all, they said, Charles did not consider himself to be ‘made for the people, but the 
people for him’.61 
Having attached the blame for the current insecurity of church and state to Charles 
and his personal government, the opposition authors urged their audiences to resist a king 
who was knowingly and willingly making decisions and policies which were upsetting the 
balance of political power and threatening the liberty and property of the subject.  While very 
few of the pamphlets went as far as moving their readers to ‘pull all British tyrants downe’, as 
John Freke had done in his Chronicle, many others pressed their audiences to practise a form 
of more passive resistance to the government.  Since ‘the laws, and with them the lives, 
liberties and properties of every English-man is at stake’, one pamphlet said, ‘we, with all 
other our fellow English-men, are under the highest obligation to break our guilty silence’.62  
There was now a ‘duty’, another agreed, ‘obliging us to a valiant resistance of impietie 
growing potent’.63 
By the summer of 1676, both the pamphlets’ rally to resist the king and their vision of 
collaborative government had begun to gain traction among the civic elites in London.  On 
24
th
 June that year during the sheriff’s elections, Francis Jenks, a linen draper from Cornhill, 
made an impassioned speech at the Guildhall, in which he urged those then present to put 
their own business aside and to focus instead on ‘first tak[ing] care to remedy those many 
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mischiefs and grievances which the city now groans under’.64  Jenks insisted that London, 
and all other major ports around the country, lay under a great danger of firing, like that 
which, he said, had started the great fire ten years before.  There was, also, such a ‘general 
decay of trade, as if not remedied, must inavoidably bring the whole city to poverty and 
ruine’.65  And, ‘worse than all the rest’, he said, ‘is the just apprehension that is upon the 
minds of good men, of danger to his majesties person, and the protestant religion’.66  Made 
desperate by the diminution of trade and the threat of popery from the growing strength of 
France and the duke of York’s continuing presence at court, and seeing no solutions to their 
problems coming from within the king’s now personal government, Jenks insisted, as the 
opposition pamphlets had for some time also done, that the only solution was a return to 
regular parliaments.  Some members of the corporation, he said, must immediately ‘wait 
upon my lord mayor and the court of aldermen, to desire that a common councel might 
speedily be held, humbly to petition his majesty, that for the quieting and satisfying the minds 
of his liege people … he would gratiously be pleased … to call a new parliament’.67 
Jenks was arrested two days after addressing his peers and hauled before the king in 
council to answer for what he had said.
68
  But his speech had met with widespread approval 
in the common hall, and his calls for a dissolution to redress the grievances of the nation were 
reiterated and debated by the London merchants for the rest of the year.  In an address on 20
th
 
July, later circulated along with Jenks’ speech in a cheap pamphlet, another member of the 
common hall demanded to know what condition the country would be in ‘if we shall wait 
eight or nine months for the parliament’s meeting’.69  ‘What can save this city’, this second 
speaker asked, ‘but laws fitted by a parliament for every grievance?’.70  And on 28th October 
that year, one of Williamson’s informants, Thomas Barnes, told the secretary that the 
previous day at the common council ‘there were many debates about the petition or address 
to his majesty for redress of grievances, and they voted to every paragraph of it’.71   
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The merchants’ calls for dissolution represented a worrying development for the king 
in the growth of public opposition to his continued personal rule.  It was one thing for the 
pamphlets to be publicly casting doubt on the motives and character of Charles and his 
government.  But the merchants’ growing desire for dissolution and a government based on 
parliamentary decisions showed that the ideas being represented in the pamphlet literature, or 
at least ideas very similar to them, were beginning to take hold among some of his most 
powerful and wealthy subjects.  In addition, through 1676 Charles observed a growing link 
between the corporation of London and the strongest opposition Lords in parliament.  In the 
first months of that year, both the duke of Buckingham and the earl of Shaftesbury had 
moved their urban residences from Westminster into the city of London, and had begun 
publicly to ‘vent out all [their] thoughts and designs’ for the government.72  They had also 
begun to associate regularly with some of the more vociferous members of the corporation, 
such as Jenks, Thomas Player, and James Winstanley, who had begun to feel that ‘since they 
cannot be so entirely well with the king, as they could wish, they must take care not to lose 
themselves elsewhere’.73  How much these different groups coordinated their opposition to 
the king is difficult to say.  And whether this coalition can truly be seen as the ‘developing 
roots of party’, as one historian has recently suggested, or whether their association was a 
more opportunistic arrangement based on shared shorter-term interests, remains to be seen.
74
  
But when Jenks was arrested and brought before the privy council in June 1676, Charles and 
his ministers could barely conceal their suspicions that the merchants were receiving 
directions from more powerful men.  ‘Who made you a councillor to dissolve parliament?’, 
the king himself asked.  And the lord chancellor was even more forthright, enquiring of Jenks 
directly by whose advice he had made his speech at the common hall.
75
   
On 4
th
 October, the duke of Buckingham, in the company of several corporation men, 
‘had taken a cup of tea and drunk a health to another parliament or a new parliament, and to 
all those honest gentlemen of it that would give the king no money’.76  By making that toast, 
Buckingham alluded to the problem which public alienation from the king, particularly if it 
was based on a collaboration between opposition Lords and the City, presented to the 
independence of his government and policymaking.  By defaming the king and showing how 
his government was unfit for protecting property and liberty, Charles’ opponents during the 
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prorogation sought to alienate the minds of his subjects from him.  In itself, nurturing 
disaffection was not a means of influencing the king’s policies, because, as a divine right 
monarch, Charles’ kingship was not reliant on the consent of his subjects.  But what he did, 
regularly, rely on, were the sources of extraordinary revenue which parliament and the 
members of the city corporations controlled.  If he lost the affections of those bodies of men, 
Charles would make it even more difficult than it already was to negotiate their packages of 
financial assistance to help fund his government and policies.  As Buckingham had intimated, 
then, it was not popular opinion itself which allowed the king’s opposition to influence his 
policies and to push their own agenda back into the frame.  It was the connection between 
public opinion and the private money which it controlled which meant that it was in the 
king’s interests not to let the affections of his subjects wander too far from him.  By 
supplementing their calls for dissolution with an intense campaign of defamation, then, 
Charles’ opponents threatened to turn his independence in government into outright isolation.  
And as Danby wrote to the king soon after the prorogation came to an end and parliament 
reconvened, ‘when mens feares are growne both so generall and so great as now they are’, 
and when ‘the hearts of the people [are] so alienated from the government, there will bee few 
concerned for the change of itt to whatever offers ittselfe’.77  So how did Charles seek to 
engage with his opponents’ attempts to influence his decisions in government?  Did they 
succeed in forcing him to dissolve parliament and to call a new session?  Or did he find some 
other way of evading their demands and continuing to rule independently? 
As the opposition pamphlets grew in number and became more and more critical of 
Charles’ approach to government, the king, his ministers and government officials began to 
take notice of the public disaffection that the publications were starting to induce.  As early as 
mid-November 1675, while only relatively few pamphlets had been published in opposition 
to Charles’ government, William Denton, physician to the king, wrote to his nephew, Ralph 
Verney, that the court was concerned by how far the recent libels were ‘like to make a great 
disturbance’.78  Within a year of Denton’s letter and Charles’ decision to prorogue 
parliament, however, this apprehension had grown, and local government officials across the 
country were writing to Secretary Williamson to acquaint him with ‘what evil spirits are still 
roving about the world’, and how they were writing ‘papers into the country and to several 
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corporations, whereby people are infected with a belief that our government is in a much 
more sticky condition than it is’.79 
Not long into the prorogation, therefore, the king began to take notice of ‘the great 
complaints that were being made day by day to his majesty of the licence that was taken … to 
utter most indecent, scandalous and seditious discourses’.80  He set about cultivating a system 
of regulation officials whose ‘main and principal duty’ in this time, ‘when faction is so bold 
as to be bare-fac’d; and false and seditious news is openly talk’d, and greedily embrac’d’, 
was ‘to suppress all open force, and private confederacies; not thinking any thing little that 
attempts the publick safety’.81  As the public pressure on his government mounted, then, 
Charles sought to reinvigorate and develop the processes of public restraint, in order to 
prevent information about his government from reaching the public, and his subjects’ ability 
to process that information and to pressurise his policy decisions. 
Since the early 1660s, and the Restoration settlement, Charles had relied on the same 
laws to regulate the publication and public discussion of information.  The 1662 Printing Act 
empowered him to restrain the publication of printed material through a process of pre-
publication licensing and censorship, in which works were submitted to the government for 
approval before being published, and post-publication regulation and censureship, in which 
unlawful and harmful works were investigated and prosecuted.
82
  And the 1663 Excise Act 
empowered him to manage the proliferation of the venues of public discourse, because by 
that Act one of the chief venues for public debate, the coffeehouses, all had to be licensed as 
well.
83
 
According to the Printing Act no books, pamphlets or papers could be published 
lawfully, unless they had first been entered into the Stationers Company register, and 
submitted to be ‘licensed and authorized to be printed by such person and persons only as 
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shall be constituted and appointed to license the same’.84  The Act said that books concerning 
the common laws of this realm were to be licensed by the lord chancellor, the lord keeper of 
the great seal of England, the lord chief justice, or the lord chief baron.  All books of history 
or affairs of state were to be licensed by the principle secretaries of state.  Books of heraldry, 
titles of honour and arms were to be licensed by the earl marshal, or, if there was not an earl 
marshal at a particular time, by the ‘three kings of armes garter’.  And all other books, 
‘whether of divinity, physick, philosophy, or whatsoever other science or art’, were to be 
licensed by the archbishop of Canterbury or the bishop of London.
85
  The Printing Act further 
decreed that a new book should be delivered to the correct licenser so that it could be checked 
for content which was ‘contrary to christian faith, or the doctrine or discipline of the church 
of England, or against the state or government of this realme, or contrary to good life or good 
manners’.86  When the licenser had checked the book he would send it back to the printer or 
owner of the imprint, having made any amendments or additions he felt necessary to bring it 
within the law and to make it agreeable to the interests of church and state.  At that point the 
book could be printed, as long as a final copy was returned to the licenser so that it could be 
kept in the public registries as a record of the licensed, and legal, version.
87
   
If a work was not submitted to the rigours of the licensing process before it was 
published, which, as we will see below, historians have been at pains to point out they often 
were not, the king relied on a centrally controlled network of post-publication press 
regulation officials.  At the centre of the network was one of the two principal secretaries of 
state.  Throughout the Restoration period, neither the secretary for the northern department 
nor the secretary for the southern department necessarily took the lead in co-ordinating press 
restraint.  But from the time of his appointment on 11
th
 September 1674, Joseph Williamson, 
as secretary for the northern department, became the lynchpin of Charles’ system of press 
regulation.  As secretary of state, Williamson was responsible for issuing warrants, 
sometimes at the direction of the king or council and at other times autonomously, for the 
search of, apprehension, prosecution and imprisonment of anybody deemed to have 
contravened the true meaning of the Printing Act.  He took the depositions on oath of 
suspects, and compiled and kept their files on record.  And he presided over a vast network of 
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informants and correspondents, which he nurtured with frequent ‘tokens of kindness’ and 
used in order to monitor public discourse in venues and conversations which the government 
would have struggled to gain access to otherwise.
88
  Williamson was a voracious reader and a 
proficient bureaucrat, who saw his work as secretary of state as ‘the great business of my 
life’.89  He soon gained a reputation for the ruthlessness with which he prosecuted his office, 
which he often did, Andrew Marvell noted, with a ‘plenipotentiary grimass for his majestys 
service’.90 
Beneath Secretary Williamson were the agents of press control.  Outside of London, 
justices of the peace or the liverymen of city corporations were responsible for receiving and 
executing Williamson’s warrants, and for reporting their proceedings back to him and 
keeping him abreast of public discourse in the localities.  But inside the capital, the two main 
agents of press control were Roger L’Estrange, surveyor of the press, and the Stationers 
Company.  In the first couple of years after the Restoration, L’Estrange acted as an informer 
on anti-government publishing and book selling.
91
  He was nominally recognised as surveyor 
of the press on 24
th
 February 1662 in two warrants from the secretary of state for the southern 
department at the time, Sir Edward Nicholas.  One of these warrants empowered L’Estrange 
to search for any ‘seditious, scandalous or unlicensed [publications], to bring away or deface 
the same, and the letter press, taking away all the copies, and to search for and proceed 
against all printers, authors, publishers, or dispersers of the same’.92  The other empowered 
him to seize all those ‘seditious books and libels, and to apprehend the authors, contrivers, 
printers, publishers, and dispersers of them, and bring them, before [the secretary of state], to 
be proceeded against according to law’.93 
L’Estrange was officially made surveyor of the press by warrant on 15th August 1663, 
and was thereby given ‘power to search for and seize all treasonable and schismatical books 
and papers’, made free from the Stationers Company, and put in charge of a number of 
messengers whom he could command to assist him in prosecuting his office.
94
  As surveyor, 
L’Estrange was one of the chief instruments of regulation used by the secretaries of state in 
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exposing and prosecuting seditious material.  As a measure of how useful he made himself to 
the secretaries, in the nine months after officially being made surveyor, he received nine 
warrants to apprehend persons wanted in connection with unlawful publications.  And he 
remained similarly active through the following decade and a half.  Like Joseph Williamson, 
L’Estrange set about making the prosecution and improvement of his office his life’s work, 
and, as a result, soon earned himself the nickname ‘the devil’s bloodhound’.95 
The Stationers occupied a similar role to the surveyor in press regulation, in that they 
received their legitimacy from the government and their direction from the secretaries of 
state.
96
  The Company received a royal charter in 1557, which granted it a monopoly over 
publication, and said that once a member of the Company had entered their ownership over 
copy in the Company register, no other person was lawfully allowed to print that work 
without that member’s approval.  Nobody who was not a member of the Company, unless 
given special dispensation from the crown, was lawfully allowed to print or sell any books, 
pamphlets or papers whatsoever.  And nor was anybody allowed to erect a printing press 
without first telling and gaining the approval of the Company.  The Stationers’ utility in press 
regulation came from this monopoly over the English stock.  If the Company allowed 
material which it did not own to be published, this competition would break their monopoly 
and their profits would suffer.  In theory, then, it was in the Stationers’ interests to keep 
unlicensed, un-entered material off the market, and to inform the authorities when it did 
appear.  The Company’s protection of its monopoly therefore provided the government with a 
valuable source of information about material which had not been printed and published 
legally through the correct channels and an extensive set of agents through which to 
prosecute such material if it appeared. 
The regulation of the venues in which public debate took place was based on the 1663 
Excise Act.  That Act said that, ‘noe person or persons shall be permitted to sell, or retaile 
any coffee, chocolate sherbett or tea without licence first obtained and had by order of the 
generall sessions of the peace’.  If a person wished to sell coffee, they had to enter into 
recognizances of twelve pence with the chief magistrate or justice of the peace in their area, 
before a license would be given.  Only when the license had been received could an 
individual begin to sell the coffee, and even then they could only retail for the duration of 
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their license.  Anybody caught selling coffee without a license would forfeit the sum of fifty 
pounds for every month they continued to retail without it.  The system of excise officials 
described in chapter one enforced the terms of the Excise Act and reported those in 
contravention of the law if they found them. 
This system of public restraint has in recent years received a great deal of attention, 
and criticism, from historians.  The main line of enquiry which they have followed has been 
to ask how effectively the king was able to apply the processes of restraint, in an attempt to 
measure how successfully he was able at any given time to marshal the participation of his 
opponents, and to transfer his own political, religious and social agenda downwards onto his 
subjects.  This question of effectiveness has allowed these historians very successfully to 
reconstruct the physical processes by which Charles aimed to regulate public politics, and 
then how people tried to subvert and circumvent that system in order to continue participating 
in debate.  They have therefore managed to show how people in the early modern period 
creatively used paratextual elements and coded language in their publications, in order to 
mask the intended meaning of their work so that censors would allow it to reach its more 
knowing audience in its uncompromised fullness.
97
  And they have shown how a tight-knit 
society of coffee drinkers nurtured their common interest in maintaining an environment in 
which their diverse and frank political discussions could flourish.
98
  The triumph of 
examining the effectiveness of public restraint has been that these historians have managed to 
describe why publications physically appeared in public with their particular form and 
content and why people’s conversations about that material took place how they did.  But we 
should not relax into assuming that the only way in which policy made a difference was by 
being effective, and that if policies were not implemented totally effectively they were 
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therefore inert.  In fact, focussing too heavily on how successfully the processes of public 
restraint were applied, or for that matter any other measures taken to adjust or enforce the 
processes of governance, can obscure an important set of tensions within political culture and 
which influenced how people tried to make and implement policy. 
People in opposition to each other in the Restoration period did not only base their 
own attempts to participate in politics on which of their opponents’ policies had turned out to 
be successful.  This is because waiting to find out which of their opponents’ policies were 
effective could potentially render any later opposition obsolete.  When some members of the 
house of lords opposed the oath in the disaffected persons bill, for instance, they did not wait 
to find out whether the oath would actually be successful in taking away their liberties and 
ability to participate in politics before they began to resist it.  If they had waited to find out 
whether the oath was effective, and it had indeed turned out to be, their opportunity to resist it 
would have come and gone; the oath would have removed the liberties necessary for them to 
be able to oppose it.  So, the oath’s opponents resisted it at the earliest possible stage, in part 
because of the potential damage it was capable of doing to their ability to participate in 
politics, and in part because of what those pushing the oath revealed about their own political 
ambitions by seeking to introduce it.  In this sense, as one eminent historian has recently 
explained, there are two types of reality in history: ‘most importantly what the averagely 
informed contemporary knew or thought they knew about what had just happened, was 
happening now, and might be about to happen next … [and] what subsequent historians have, 
in fact, found out about what was ‘really happening’’.99  Studying effectiveness goes some 
way to exploring the latter.  But it was the former which at the time influenced people’s 
decisions and the competing policies which they developed and sought to implement. 
We must recognise, then, as some historians of other periods have already begun to, 
that policy could create change whether it was effectively implemented or not.  Politicians, on 
all sides, developed policy, not when the effectiveness of their opponents’ plans became 
apparent, but when their opponents’ plans revealed their broader political ambitions, how 
they viewed their role in politics and the roles of others, how they thought power should be 
distributed and what tools for engaging with politics different people should be allowed to 
use, where they sought to draw their legitimacy for governing from, and who they thought 
should be allowed to make plans and to develop policy.
100
  In this way, Charles adjusted and 
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developed the processes of public restraint during the long prorogation not because his 
opponents were actually successfully removing his ability to develop and implement policy 
how he wanted, but because his opponents had revealed their intention to remove his ability 
to make policy independently and had started trying to do so. 
To explore these tensions in political culture more fully, we need to move beyond 
trying to measure how effective government attempts to control the flow and consumption of 
information were, and to consider instead, as contemporaries did, what those attempts 
revealed about people’s diverging political agendas.  So, we need to contextualise instances 
of press regulation and the suppression of popular politics and to look at the specific reasons 
for why governments tried to take those measures.  And we should read the sources which 
reveal a government’s methods of regulating public participation in politics not only in terms 
of their content, but, more holistically, in terms of their form and function as well.  In doing 
so, the measures which Charles took to restrain public participation in politics through the 
long prorogation not only reveal that he wished to restrain the press and public opinion at that 
time, but also how he aimed to support the role which he was seeking to take in politics and 
the nature of the power which he was seeking to exercise, by trying to develop and 
implement policy in a specific way and through certain processes. 
At the beginning of December 1675, Charles began trying to contain the accumulating 
pamphlet literature and public discourses, by prosecuting the people authoring, distributing 
and discussing harmful publications through a series of small-scale and specific orders in 
council.  On the 6
th
 of that month, Joseph Williamson issued two warrants, on Charles’ 
direction, for the apprehension of Edward Stisted ‘for spreading false and seditious news’.101  
On the 9
th, Charles ordered that the ‘atturney generall should prosecute the authors of that 
false and seditious news about selling of Tangier and the plantations with all vigor’.102  And 
in another case on the same day, ‘one Green was committed to the gatehouse for publishing 
and dispersing seditious and treasonable papers’.103  But by the end of the month, as more 
pamphlets tried in a similar way to defame and destabilise his government and to pressurise 
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his policies, Charles and his ministers began to reflect on the means which he had available 
for regulating this upsurge in public opinion.  He started to reshape and reinvigorate those 
processes in an attempt to match the scale and coherence of the pressure which the pamphlets 
and their audiences were starting to exert on his government.  The innovations which Charles 
made revealed a king trying to retain control of both the information about his government to 
which his subjects had access, and their ability to process that information into political 
opposition, at a time when it looked like that control might be starting to be drawn away from 
him. 
The main way in which Charles sought to adjust his system of public restraint during 
the long prorogation was by shaping the laws on which it was based, through a series of 
proclamations at the end of December 1675 and the beginning of January 1676.  Since 
Edward Coke had advised James I on the legal power of proclamations in the first decade of 
his reign, politicians had largely accepted that they were not equal to the making of new laws 
and nor could they contradict the terms of old ones either.
104
  By the Restoration period many 
in both houses of parliament were confident that ‘all the judges of England were of opinion, 
that the king’s proclamation had not the force of a law’.105  But, written in consultation with 
his judges and ministers, proclamations were the closest the king could get to real legislative 
power.  They enabled him, at times when he did not have a parliament, or when he could not 
rely on the parliament which he did have to give him the legislation which he needed, to 
reshape and reinvigorate the laws which already existed, in a way which he determined 
personally and which suited a particular set of circumstances or a specific requirement in his 
political agenda.    
Two of the proclamations which he made during the long prorogation, on 29
th
 
December 1675 and 8
th
 January 1676, were issued against the ‘very evil and dangerous 
effects’ which coffeehouses were beginning to have on the public consciousness.  ‘For that in 
such houses’, which, his first proclamation said, were the ‘great resort of idle and disaffected 
persons’, ‘divers false, malitious and scandalous reports are devised and spread abroad, to the 
defamation of his majesties government and to the disturbance of the peace and quiet of the 
realm’.106  And the third, issued on 7th January 1676, was made against the ‘divers malicious 
and disaffected persons [who] do daily devise and publish, as well by writing, as printing, 
sundry false, infamous, and scandalous libels, endeavouring thereby, not only to traduce and 
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reproach the ecclesiastical and temporal government of this kingdom, and the publick 
ministers of the same, but also to stir up and dispose the minds of his majesties subjects to 
sedition and rebellion’.107 
By issuing these proclamations, Charles sought to reshape and embellish certain parts 
of the 1662 Printing Act and the 1663 Excise Act, in order to match his growing public 
opposition.  In his proclamation against coffee houses, Charles reshaped Clause XIV of the 
Excise Act.  That clause had prohibited the sale of coffee ‘without licence first obtained and 
had’, and set the penalty for the unlicensed sale of coffee at the ‘summe of five pounds for 
every moneth he or they shall continue selling or retailing the same’.108  In his proclamation 
at the end of December 1675, Charles re-enforced that clause in the Excise Act, by retaining 
the penalty for the unlicensed selling of coffee, while at the same time ‘recall[ing] and 
ma[king] void all licenses heretofore for the selling of any coffee’ and prohibiting the issue of 
‘any such license or licenses’ in the future.  In the week after his first proclamation against 
coffee houses, the coffee house owners complained of the losses that Charles had inflicted on 
them by prohibiting the sale of the large stocks of coffee which they had already bought and 
paid the duties upon.  So, Charles suspended the terms of his first proclamation until 24
th
 
June 1676, and allowed the coffee house owners in the meantime to continue selling their 
existing stocks, provided that they entered into recognisances of 500L.  He also empowered 
his justices of the peace and magistrates to issue new licenses for the sale of coffee until the 
24
th
 June, but only if the coffee house owners gave assurance that they would prevent all 
illegal material from being brought into their establishments, and made the authorities aware 
of any scandalous conversations or the disclosure and discussion of false news reports which 
took place there.
109
  In a similar way, the proclamation against libels retained the terms of the 
1662 Printing Act, but, so that they might be observed more closely, added to them the 
promise of 20L to anybody who revealed the place of publication or the people involved in 
carrying a libel to the place of publication, and 50L if anybody revealed the name of the 
author, printer or publisher of an illegal publication.   
By using proclamations to reshape the law, then, Charles aimed to control what type 
of information was available to his subjects, and the environments in which they encountered 
it.  His proclamations were designed to reduce the publication of information which reflected 
badly on his government and which could incite resistance and to remove the venues in 
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which material of that nature had started to appear, by reinvigorating the means by which 
opposition could be identified, pursued, investigated, apprehended, and prosecuted.  His 
proclamations offered an incentive to his subjects to identify illicit material to the authorities.  
They then empowered the executive, by further codifying, beyond the statutes which already 
existed, the grounds on which opposition could be apprehended and prosecuted.  And, for his 
judges, they laid out the fines and penalties which could be inflicted on transgressors in both 
the existing laws and in the proclamations themselves.  By allowing him to shape laws of his 
choosing, in order to empower the officials of state which he wanted, all on the advice of his 
judges, proclamations offered the king a precise and relatively spontaneous way in which he 
could personally fuse legislative, executive and judicial power together for the service of his 
own ends and towards a single goal.  Since proclamations were developed, issued and 
enforced solely by the king and people of his choosing, they were the perfect tool for him to 
use to try to cultivate and sustain his independence in government. 
Beyond the issue of proclamations, though, Charles also deputed Joseph Williamson 
to improve the methods of pre- and post-publication press restraint.  Since many of the 
opposition pamphlets which were emerging concerned affairs of state, one of the main 
innovations which Williamson oversaw was in the licensing of books of that nature.  On 3
rd
 
February 1676, the two secretaries of state wrote to the Stationers Company regarding the 
licensing of history books and books concerning affairs of state.  By law, this type of 
publication had to be licensed by the secretaries, or by those deputed by them.
110
  Secretaries 
Williamson and Coventry had received reports that ‘dayly many things come out of the 
presse, pretended to be licensed by some person or persons deriving their authority from 
us’.111  But this could not be the case, they said, because they had not yet appointed any such 
deputies.  In their letter of the 3
rd
, then, the secretaries wrote that when they had deputed 
somebody to license this kind of material, they would be in touch with the Stationers so that 
the Company would be aware of who was now responsible.  As promised, three days later, on 
6
th
 February, Williamson sent the Company notice that he had appointed his long-time friend 
and informant, Henry Oldenburg, ‘to license the imprinting of such bookes, or reprintinge 
thereof with any addition or amendments as according to the direction and intent of the 
[Printing Act]’.112 
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 Oldenburg proved a conscientious and committed deputy, completing a great deal of 
work in his post and consulting with Williamson on how best to regulate the press.  
Oldenburg took an intelligent and considered approach to licensing, which was not solely 
based on smashing dissent wherever he saw it, but was designed instead to increase the 
number of books which were passing through the licensing system before reaching their 
audiences.  He aimed, he said, to ‘do my duty to the public by preventing the dispersion of 
scandalous books, and yet shew[ing] myself honest to private men’.113  In doing so, he hoped 
to be able to inform Williamson of the seditiousness of certain publications ‘before they were 
divulged’, so that they could be pursued if the secretary deemed fit, while at the same time 
making sure not to ‘[make] men shy of me by seising and keeping the books they brought 
me’.114  Oldenburg believed that if he prosecuted all controversial material which was 
brought to him without giving its creators time to amend their work, ‘those mercinary men 
would then endeavour particularly to spread them much further than, methinks, they can doe, 
when they bring them to the licenser’.115  After less than three months in his position, 
however, Oldenburg returned the deputation he had received from the secretary, because it 
took up a great deal of time and effort, and the criticism of his more considered approach to 
licensing was becoming too much to bear.
116
 
After Oldenburg’s resignation, the licensing of books ‘of a political nature’ reverted 
to the secretaries of state.
117
  But Oldenburg’s retreat from public office aside, Williamson’s 
deputation of a licenser for political books was designed so that the Stationers would know 
whether a book had been licensed properly.  Before Williamson had deputed Oldenburg, the 
Stationers had not known whether a license was legitimate or not.  After February 1676, 
though, the Stationers knew that if they encountered a publication of a political nature and it 
had not been licensed by Oldenburg or by either of the secretaries, then it had not actually 
passed through the correct channels in government and was not therefore legal for 
publication.  Williamson’s adjustments to the licensing of political books was an earnest 
attempt to salvage some agency for the government from a licensing system which up to that 
point had been ludicrously inefficient, and to improve the king’s means of identifying and 
prosecuting opposition publications. 
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Williamson sought to galvanise the Stationers further in their pursuit and prosecution 
of opposition publications by, throughout the prorogation, seeking to improve their Company 
by-laws.  Until the end of 1675, the Stationers had been notoriously blasé about pursuing 
illegal material, in large part because, as the king recognised in his proclamation regarding 
libels, they had been ‘at considerable charges in discovering and prosecuting’ it.118  At that 
time, Charles had tried to remedy the Company’s inactivity by promising them ‘any penalties 
and forfeitures due to his majesty upon any offence committed against the lawes for 
printing’.119  But as 1676 moved on, the Stationers remained inactive.  Even worse, however, 
was that, Williamson suspected, the Company often seized illegal books but then sold them 
themselves at a higher price.  Or stationers confiscated legal books from individuals whom 
they did not like, or from competitors who were retailing printed material as members of a 
different livery company.
120
  It seemed clear, then, that the Company was more interested in 
protecting its own profits than in actually suppressing illegal material. 
In July 1676, therefore, Roger L’Estrange delivered to the Stationers two by-laws for 
the better regulation of the English stock.  The first suggested that no member of the 
Company should print without a license, or conceal their knowledge of the printing of 
anything without a license, which by law ought to have one.  This first by-law should be read, 
L’Estrange suggested, to every freeman of the Company upon taking the oath, and then 
printed and given to them along with the oath.  And a printed copy should be delivered to 
every existing member of the Company, so that none of them could pretend ignorance.  Then, 
all discoveries according to this by-law should be set down in a book specifically for that 
purpose, so that transgressions were recorded and could be checked if needed.  The second 
by-law suggested that the Company should, as by law they were already meant to, prosecute 
all transgressions and inflict the punishments within their power, such as taking away shares 
in the stock, the levying of fines or the denying of pensions.
121
  The following September, 
having heard nothing from the Company about his new by-laws, L’Estrange enquired after 
his suggestions.  The Company agreed to the first by-law, but said they had already made 
provisions congruent to the second one in other ordinances.  Again, however, in spite of 
promising to make the additions to their by-laws the Company continued without action.   
So, on 26
th
 October, Williamson ordered the Company to draw up an abstract of all 
their by-laws concerning the printing and publishing of unlicensed books and to attend him 
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with it, which they did on 4
th
 December.
122
  He informed them that ‘they should be call’d to 
account before the king and council for their contempt: upon this they promis’d fair, and Mr 
L’Estrange press’d them to call a court, and finish: and forthwith to present the project of the 
by-law to the judges’.123  At the end of December the Stationers, on Williamson’s order, met 
to decide what to do about the by-laws for the better government of their Company.
124
  And 
on 7
th
 February, the Company approved the by-laws and submitted them to the lord chief 
justice ‘in order to the passing and confirming the same’.125  It had taken a long time to 
address the lethargy of the Company in prosecuting unlawful material, and even after 
Williamson had intervened the Stationers were never as diligent as L’Estrange or as their 
charter said they should be.  But the additions to the by-laws were designed to make the 
Company more accountable for their activity.  It had become possible for them to operate in a 
microcosm, in which members protected their own interests and the Company’s monopoly, as 
set out in their charter, but failed to observe the other aspects of the charter which required 
them to execute the law as well.  By threatening to hold them to account before the king, 
which would mean that their charter came under scrutiny, Williamson was trying to re-
energise an important aspect of the king’s ability to identify, apprehend and prosecute illegal 
publications, and to prevent the growth of public opposition. 
 
III 
 
During the prorogation, the opposition literature which emerged and the resistance it sought 
to inspire collectively presented a real threat to the independence of Charles’ government.  
Not only did the opposition authors have a firm idea both of how and why politics should be 
done and a clear plan for realising that vision, but they managed to find a way of forcing the 
king to confront that policy as well.  The pamphlets presented their audiences with a lucid 
argument for how establishing a more collaborative form of parliamentary monarchy would 
better secure the liberty and property of the subject.  And they gave a clear sense of how that 
system should be achieved.  It was only through a policy of short and regular parliaments, 
frequently called and dissolved by the king, which would enable each political estate to solve 
the country’s problems and which would safeguard against corruption and private interest.  
But this policy, and the idea which it was designed to support, was so contrary to Charles’ 
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attempts to build a government which would help him to develop his own policies 
independently, that the king’s opposition could never hope for him to change his method of 
rule simply on their suggestion.  It was, of course, Charles’ prerogative, as a divinely 
appointed monarch, to meet passive resistance from his subjects with active indifference.  His 
legitimacy as head of church and state did not rely on his being popular, and while it had 
happened to his father, and would, in another decade, happen to his brother too, there was not 
much popular desire at this time to remove the king forcefully from the throne.  But the 
wealth which was attached to public opinion did mean that Charles had to countenance his 
subjects’ point of view, and the opposition literature forced him to develop a strategy to 
protect the reputation and efficacy of his government. 
In 1677, Andrew Marvell reflected on what Charles’ solution to the growth in public 
opposition had become.  When the Spartans had adopted Lycurgus’ laws, Marvell said, they 
found a ‘rigid discpline’ in which ‘the world was better ordered’ and ‘the number of virtuous 
men was then greater’.126  But since then, governments had tampered with secular and 
Christian law so much, reshaping it to suppress their enemies and to meet their own ends, that 
they had come to ‘have little else to shew for their Christianity … but a parcell of sever laws 
concerning opinion or about the modes of worship, not so much in order to the power of 
religion as over it’.127  Charles, Marvell thought, was as guilty of that kind of government as 
any other arbitrary monarch.  The king, Marvell said, had revealed his intention in 1672, 
when he had tried to enforce the declaration of indulgence, to set a precedent for 
‘suspend[ing] as well all other laws that respect the subjects propriety, and by the same power 
to abrogate and at last inact what [he] pleased, till there should be no further use for the 
consent of the people in parliament’.128  While Charles had failed on that occasion, his recent 
attempts to render the laws restraining public politics ‘most severe and generall on the 
subject’, Marvell insisted, were symptomatic of the same old ambition.129  By reshaping and 
reapplying the printing and coffee licensing laws, Charles was seeking to reduce both his 
subjects’ access to information about the decisions which were being made in government, 
and their ability through print and debate to process that information and feed it back into 
policy decisions in the form of public opinion.  Of course, Charles’ attempts to regulate the 
press and public participation in politics were not completely effective.  But, to his 
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opponents, his innovations in press policy throughout the long prorogation of 1676 signalled 
his continuing desire to make and implement his own policies independent of parliament and 
his subjects.  They revealed his intention, Marvell insisted, to ensure that the house of 
commons ‘durst not adventure [new laws] either in their own or the lords’ house as they were 
now governed, lest they should be further ensnared by strugling for freedome’.130  And it was 
that perceived intent, coupled with their persistent fears around Danby’s command of the 
king’s finances, which would catalyse opposition politicians’ attempts to re-enter 
policymaking over the next few years. 
Charles’ opponents’ attempts to use public opinion to influence his policy decisions 
during the prorogation were also ultimately unsuccessful.  He did not dissolve the parliament 
and call a new one as they had wanted, and he continued to make decisions himself, with the 
aid of a tight cabal of loyal ministers, to keep government policy heading in the direction 
which he wanted it to.  But during the prorogation, the seeds of public disaffection with a 
personal monarch had been sown, particularly among the members of the corporation of 
London, and political associations which would last for the rest of Charles’ reign had 
developed between those merchants and powerful members of the Lords.  Furthermore, the 
opposition publications which emerged during the long prorogation managed to sustain the 
divisions in parliament which had prompted the king to suspend the session for such a long 
time at the end of November 1675.  When parliament was recalled in February 1677, 
therefore, Shaftesbury and Buckingham, and a number of other Lords, made fiery addresses 
to their house, demanding, as they had done before the long prorogation and with arguments 
which were strikingly reminiscent of those put forward in the recent pamphlet literature, the 
dissolution of parliament and the calling of a new one.  ‘The calling a new parliament’, 
Buckingham crooned to the house on the first day of the new meeting, ‘it is that can only put 
his majesty into a possibility of receiving supplies; that can secure your lordships the honour 
of sitting in this house like peers and your being serviceable to your king and country; and 
that can restore to all the people of England their undoubted rights of choosing men 
frequently to represent their grievances’.131  Buckingham’s speech was met with strong 
approval by Shaftesbury, the earl of Salisbury, and Lord Wharton, but ‘some high and bitter 
clashings was after betweene the duke of Buckingham and the treasurer’.132  The following 
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day, on 16
th
 February, then, Buckingham, Shaftesbury, Wharton and Salisbury, having 
refused to ask the house for pardon, were ordered to be committed to the Tower.
133
 
The long prorogation of 1676, as historians have observed, may well have produced 
some fairly ineffective domestic politicking in England.  But the tensions around 
policymaking which emerged at this time laid the foundations for the problems of the next 
four years of Charles’ reign, and for the eventual dissolution of the Oxford parliament in 
March 1681.  As 1677 turned to 1678, Charles’ opposition would see the seeds they had 
planted in the middle years of the decade flourish into a full-on assault of the king’s means of 
exercising power. 
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Chapter 3: Parliament fights back 
 
By the end of March 1674, Charles’ participation in the war in Europe had left his finances 
worryingly unstable and unpredictable and had made him so reliant on his opposition in 
parliament that he had become incapable of developing and implementing policy.  As we saw 
in the first chapter of this thesis, on Danby’s advice Charles had given up trying to use war as 
a means of financing his government and state, and had turned inwards, taking a more 
peaceful approach to political economy, in order to develop a fiscal and economic strategy 
which would allow him to fund his policies and ambitions independently from the wealth of 
his own kingdom.  In some ways his new approach was a great success.  In the year after 
signing the Treaty of Westminster, Charles was able to cut his annual expenditure from over 
2,500,000L to just over 1,800,000L.
1
  And in the year after that he reduced it back to the level 
of his expected annual ordinary income, thereby removing his dependence on private loans or 
extraordinary taxes raised by parliament to be able to balance his account books.
2
  By 
Michaelmas 1676, then, Charles had retaken control of his finances and had made them much 
more stable, more sustainable, and more suited to independent policymaking.  His change in 
foreign policy and his new approach to political economy undoubtedly contributed in large 
part to the confidence with which he was able to take the initiative in domestic politics at the 
end of November 1675 and to strike once again for personal and independent rule by 
proroguing parliament for as long as he did.  And, it surely contributed to his ability to ride 
the growth of public opposition during the long prorogation, in spite of the connection 
between that opposition and the extraordinary wealth on which he had had to rely so often 
before. 
But regardless of the English king’s newly peaceful approach to political economy, 
the war between his European neighbours continued to rage without him.  In the years 
following the Treaty of Westminster, many of the old alliances between the European princes 
melted away, and new, loose coalitions started to form in the shadow which the Sun King 
was beginning to cast over Flanders and the Holy Roman Empire.  By early 1675, ‘the king 
of Sweden’s army of thirty thousand men were transported into Germany’, at the same time 
‘the Danes stir[red]’, and all the while Holland continued ‘[to] beat the drum’.3  As that year 
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progressed, one by one the German princes moved into the confederates’ party, leaving 
France ‘not one freind in the Empire’.4  But undeterred, by the spring of 1676 the French king 
marched onwards ‘at the head of his army in Flanders’, making the people in that region 
‘publicly declare their wishes to be under the French dominion since Spain is not able to 
protect them’.5 
As spring turned to summer in 1676, it was the old rivalry between Holland and 
France which began to dominate European politics and the course of the war, and which 
swelled the foreign news that had begun to flood back across the Channel and into the streets 
of London.  Those reports, many of which ‘doe very much disagree’, began to capture the 
imagination of news writers, public and government alike, and soon became ‘expect[ed] with 
impatience’ by their English audiences.6  They described a conflict which, as it grew, at once 
threatened the wealth and prosperity of the English nation, the salvation of both protestants 
and catholics on either side of the Channel, and the balance of political power across the 
continent and into the colonies beyond.  As one prophetic pamphleteer wrote, ‘‘tis too sadly 
visible and notorious … how nations have justled with nations, and kingdoms with kingdoms, 
some striveing for glory and conquest, others gasping for liberty and self-preservation; whilst 
to the prejudice (I wish we might not say to the reproach and scandal) of our most holy faith 
amongst upbraiding infidels, the swords of christians have been mutually imbrued and 
distain’d with the blood of their slaughter’d bretheren’.7 
In spite of having signed his treaty and settled on peace, then, Charles still kept a 
close eye, as his subjects had been doing by the foreign news reports, on what was happening 
in Europe.  He soon realised that his ability to abstain from the conflict did not rest solely in 
his hands.  While Danby had managed to stabilise royal finances in the years after his 
appointment, through 1676 the king and his ministers realised that, as long as the war 
continued as it was doing, trade and diplomacy could never be sufficiently secured to make 
sure that the wealth and safety of the kingdom could ever be fully guaranteed.  So, as the 
effects of the conflict continued to exert themselves, Charles became caught between trying 
to avoid recommitting to the war in the manner which he had done before, and yet trying to 
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take sufficient measures so as to reduce the impact which the conflict was continuing to have.  
By 1677, it was clear that he needed to rethink his approach to Europe yet again. 
This chapter will explore in two parts why Charles came in the spring of 1677 to 
rethink his approach to Europe and how that new policy affected domestic political culture 
and his relationship with parliament.  The first section will contextualise his decision to make 
and implement new policy, by exploring the reasons why the approach which he had taken 
after signing the Treaty of Westminster was not completely adequate.  It will ask how Charles 
then developed a new plan, and who he relied upon to make and implement the policy which 
he created.  The second, and larger, section will explore how that new policy played out in 
domestic politics.  As the king developed and sought to implement his new plan, more and 
more politicians in parliament became suspicious of what his changing approach to Europe 
demonstrated about the kind of kingship he was seeking to nurture.  As 1677 became 1678, 
the house of commons in particular began to try once again to intervene in Charles’ policy 
decisions and to redress the imbalances in domestic political power which his foreign policy 
had revealed.  Their solution was one of the most ambitious political assassinations in British 
history; the impeachment of the earl of Danby. 
 
I 
 
As the war in Europe continued, it began to have an adverse effect on the health of both 
domestic and foreign trade, and the customs and excise receipts which Charles could expect 
from them.  Through the first half of 1676, foreign trade began to suffer, because in open 
water merchant vessels were struggling to avoid the conflict between the warring princes’ 
fleets.  In March of that year, news reached England that the Danish king had ordered that ‘all 
Hamburg ships that passe the sound and their goods though in English vessells, to be arrested 
soe that that citty is reduced into great perplexity not dareing to reply on its owne strength’.8  
And throughout the summer, French privateers continued to give English merchants ‘great 
discouragement to our trade in some seizures they have made’ and even raided into and 
around English ports in pursuit of their prizes.
9
  In addition, in order to pay for their 
continuing involvement in the war, the European princes had put massive duties on imports 
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of foreign goods, which had made English commodities uncompetitive abroad.
10
  At home, 
trade was suffering because, unlike the foreign markets which were controlling imports, 
Charles was not imposing any higher duties on goods coming into England.  English 
merchants were therefore struggling to find buyers for their goods abroad, whilst still having 
to cope with the same level of foreign competition in the domestic market. 
Gradually, Charles began trying to address the impact which the war was having on 
his merchants and on domestic and foreign trade at large.  In May 1676, he ordered his 
committee for trade to change the way in which port passes for English and foreign ships 
were issued, so that only ships registered or naturalised in England and manned by English 
sailors were allowed to make port.
11
  The same month, he tried to galvanise the domestic 
weaving trade by ordering his privy council to find ‘some effectuall means to discountenance 
the wearing of ffrench stuffs’ and to ‘consider how they may encourage English weavers’.12  
And in June he issued a proclamation for the security of navigation and commerce, which 
gave protection to ships in and around his ports and encouraged his subjects to prevent 
attacks on merchant vessels wherever they could.
13
 
But in spite of these measures, his subjects and their commerce continued to suffer.  
Through the spring and summer of 1676, petitions about the impact of the war on English 
domestic and foreign trade flooded in to the king and his council.  These entreaties 
complained of a range of issues, from the damage being done to merchants’ profits by the 
sizeable French duties on English imports, to requests for the relaxation of duties on exports 
of certain goods, to descriptions of the damage sustained at the hands of foreign sailors and 
pirates.
14
  And even Charles’ customs officials began to complain that the irregularity and 
disruption which the war was creating in European merchant traffic had begun to make it 
very difficult to control the now relatively unpredictable movement of foreign ships in and 
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out of their ports, particularly since many of those vessels were sailing illegally under English 
colours to avoid the attention of their enemies.
15
  All in all, by June 1676, some of the 
merchants in the corporation of London estimated that because of the war ‘this city and 
kingdom doth lose eleven hundred thousand pounds every year’.16  While it is difficult to say 
for certain if the losses were anything like that large, the continuing disruption which the war 
stood to make in future customs and excise receipts had the potential to make any meaningful 
anticipations on the royal revenue in the future very difficult indeed.  All of Danby’s work to 
stabilise the king’s revenue, therefore, was precariously balanced on the hope that the 
disruption which the war was continuing to make in English trade would not become much 
worse. 
But beyond the continuing economic effects of the war, Charles also began 
diplomatically to get sucked back in to a more active role in the conflict than he had hoped to 
take on signing the Treaty of Westminster.  He had, in early 1675, tried to secure his new 
peaceful approach to political economy by proposing to the foreign princes that they should 
also try to agree terms for peace.  In February of that year, he had suggested that talks could 
take place at Nijmegen.
17
  At first his suggestion seemed to be well received, and throughout 
March, the princes gradually came to confirm that they would send their plenipotentiaries to 
negotiate terms.
18
  But, as the war moved on, the talks were continually delayed by the 
participants’ unyielding attempts to engineer an advantage for themselves in the peace 
negotiations. 
Time and again, the foreign princes either refused to grant the passports necessary for 
their enemies’ plenipotentiaries to pass through their territory to attend the conference, or, 
perhaps purposefully, issued them incorrectly or in the wrong manner for them to be valid.  
By early 1676, reports were arriving in England that ‘severall defects had been likewise 
found in the passeports of the emperor and the Spanyards to the ffrench’.19  English 
commentators were in little doubt that the passports had been left deficient on purpose, ‘to 
gaine [Spain and the Empire] time, that soe the campagne may come on, before the assembly 
at Nimegen can be formed, for every day letts us see more and more the small disposition the 
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partyes have at present to a peace’.20  But the most problematic passports were those issued 
by France to the duke of Lorraine.  In his despatch from Nijmegen on 6
th
 January 1676, 
Charles’ plenipotentiary, Leoline Jenkins, noted that the prince of Orange ‘observes the title 
of duke is wanting in the Lorraine passport’.21  As a result, the Dutch maintained that ‘till this 
be mended on the part of the ffrench, the passes will not be exchanged, and consequently 
their ambassadors will not be able to repaire thither’.22 
Having at first only suggested that the foreign princes meet for peace talks, then, and 
then having suggested the venue, the issue of deficient passports sucked Charles back in to 
the conflict.  In order to solve the disagreement over passports, the European princes began to 
petition Charles to act as arbiter in their peace negotiations.  In mid-February, in his notes of 
proceedings of the committee of foreign affairs, Joseph Williamson wrote that in the matter 
of deficient passports the Dutch ‘seem inclined there to make [Charles] arbiter of the disputed 
points, if France will agree’.23  At first Charles tried to resist the Dutch advances to him.  He 
declared, when asked by his councillors in a meeting of his foreign committee on the 8
th 
February whether ‘he would have any such offer encouraged in this or other cases hereafter’, 
that he did not ‘think fit to encourage any such offers’ since he was still trying to abstain as 
much as possible from the conflict.
24
  But by the 12
th
, as the Dutch persisted in their request, 
Charles had accepted his proposed role as mediator, and Leoline Jenkins was receiving the 
congratulations of the foreign ambassadors at Nijmegen on his king’s behalf.25  By the end of 
February, it was public knowledge that Charles had ‘proposed an expedient to the partyes at 
prsent engaged in the war for the removeing of the difficulties arrisen in the matter of the 
passeports’.26  His solution was that he would issue the passports on the foregin princes’ 
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behalf, and ‘that such papers shall be as valued as they were given out by severall partyes 
respectively’.27   
The congress at Nijmegen did not produce any commitment to peace until August 
1678, and even then it was another year before all the warring parties agreed to terms.  The 
European princes’ prevarication over the issue of passports in 1676, however, dragged 
Charles back in to a much more active engagement with the conflict than he had anticipated 
on signing the Treaty of Westminster.  But even worse, this involvement made it clear to 
English onlookers that all sides in the war ‘doe not desire a peace, till the posture of things 
are soe farr altered by the continuance of the warr, that they may be able to make it on bettr 
termes’.28  It seemed, therefore, that, in spite of Charles’ best efforts throughout the rest of 
1676 to bring them to an agreement at Nijmegen, any peaceful intervention in the war on his 
part was unlikely at that time to produce any lasting terms between the European princes. 
By mid-1676, then, it had become clear that Charles’ policy of withdrawal from the 
war in Europe two years beforehand had not worked how he had hoped.  While his more 
peaceful approach to political economy had removed a great deal of the financial excess and 
instability of the out and out war which he had pursued in the first decade of his reign, it had 
not managed to mitigate against the collateral effects of a war which continued to spill across 
Europe in his absence.  Through 1676, a combination of the impact which the war was having 
on English trade and the potential revenue which he could draw from it, and his neighbouring 
princes’ insistence that he mediate in negotiations which never looked like coming to a 
fruitful end, gradually suggested to Charles that his current approach to Europe was nearing 
the end of its useful life.  
In April 1677, then, the earl of Danby wrote to the king to reflect on the point at 
which Charles and England had arrived.  When Danby wrote his memorandum, parliament 
had been back in session for nearly two months.  In that time, the treasurer had managed to 
disrupt the strongest group of opposition to the king in the house of lords by sending 
Shaftesbury, Buckingham, Salisbury and Wharton to the Tower for their speeches regarding 
the legality of the session.  Danby spared no amount of dignity, therefore, in reminding 
Charles that April of how central to his government and ability to exercise power he was.  
‘The quietnesse of this session’, Danby wrote, ‘has not proceeded from money only, but a 
creditt to which I thinke myselfe to have been a good deal instrumentall’.29  And it was with 
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that level of confidence that Danby positioned himself, once again, at the heart of the king’s 
policymaking and to direct how Charles should proceed now in Europe. 
Charles had, the treasurer wrote, ‘the greatest conjunction of honour, wisdome, glory 
and nationall advantages that ever offered itselfe in any age to any prince or nation’.30  The 
king was poised to be ‘the redeemer of all Christendome’, and ‘the restorer of so many kings 
and princes to theire just rights’.  He was on the verge of becoming ‘not only safe att home 
but great’, and settling himself ‘for the future both in the hearts of [his] people’ and in the 
‘establishments of revenues’.  And, he could soon have all the ‘advantages of trade and 
treaties [which] could bee desired both from Spaine and Holland’.31  But Charles could only 
hope for any of this, Danby said, if he discouraged the growth of French dominance in 
Europe through the improvement of his fleet, and if he could convince parliament to give him 
the money for the refurbishment of old ships and the building of new ones.  Danby had come 
to realise through 1676 that it was only by being ‘in a condition of war’ that Charles could 
hope to intervene in the continuing conflict on the continent, and to secure the more peaceful, 
and profitable, approach to political economy which had begun to stabilise his finances in the 
past three years.  The treasurer was not advocating an all-out return to war, but rather the 
reinforcement of Charles’ existing approach by threatening his European neighbours with the 
possibility of returning to war. 
Through the rest of 1677 and into the first months of 1678, Danby set about executing 
his plan.  He soon made excellent progress, as his influence in parliament was heightened by 
the absence of the four opposition Lords who remained incarcerated in the Tower and by the 
strong lines of patronage which he had cultivated in the lower house through the previous 
years.  What is more, the continuing advance of Louis’ forces across the north of Europe 
through the spring and summer of 1677 scared many in the Commons into agreeing with 
Danby’s suggestions that an army might be necessary.  On 16th April 1677, therefore, 
parliament passed an Act for Raising 600,000L for the Building of New Ships.
32
  The 
Commons also supplemented their votes with a series of addresses to the king regarding the 
continuing threat of the war to the security of the kingdom and urging him to a suitable 
defence of his subjects.
33
  In their address of 25
th
 May 1677, they insisted that Charles should 
enter into a ‘league offensive and defensive, with the States General of the United Provinces, 
                                                 
30
 Ibid. 
31
 Ibid. 
32
 LJ, vol. 13, p. 120.  The Act was entitled An act for raising the sum of five hundred eighty-four thousand nine 
hundred seventy-eight pounds, two shillings, and two pence half-penny, for the speedy building of thirty ships 
of war. 
33
 They made addresses on 30
th
 March and 13
th
 April.  See CJ, vol. 9, pp. 408-409, and Ibid, pp. 419-420. 
109 
 
against the growth and power of the French king’.34  Then, after a summer adjournment, 
which actually ended up extending into the new year, parliament voted the king even more 
money.  They had been persuaded of the king’s intentions to oppose Louis by the marriage of 
William of Orange to Mary, Charles’ niece, in late 1677.35  So, on 20th March 1678, they 
passed a bill for a poll tax, worth 1,000,000L, to enable Charles to have a war with France.
36
 
By spring 1678, then, Danby had managed to engineer a change in Charles’ policy in 
Europe.  He had recognised that the more peaceful approach to political economy which he 
and Charles had begun to take in 1674 was too passive.  While it had addressed many of the 
problems which had created the instability in royal finances through the previous decade, 
Charles’ more peaceful approach to Europe would keep being threatened as long as the war 
continued to move on around him.  He had, therefore, to reinforce his peaceful practices with 
the capability to intervene militarily.  Only through possession of that capacity would the 
English king be able to exercise any influence over his neighbours, and finally ensure a 
consistent and predictable revenue and relationship with the rest of Europe.  And, as we saw 
in chapter one, only through a consistent and predictable revenue could Charles hope to 
maintain any kind of independence in policymaking and governance. 
But as winter turned to spring in 1678, Danby and the king were met with a new 
problem.  Having voted money so that Charles could raise an army for war with France, 
parliament began to grow restless when the king did not deploy that army as quickly as they 
had hoped.  When they returned after the Easter recess in 1678 then, the tension between the 
king and house of commons which had manifested the previous year in the lower house’s 
prickly addresses about how Charles should continue in Europe, grew into strong and 
sceptical opposition to the king and his government.  In the debates of spring 1678, a new 
disagreement on Charles’ European policy grew rapidly in the lower house into some of the 
most intense scrutiny of the distribution of domestic political power and of the king and 
parliament’s ability to turn their ideas into practice through policymaking.  After not much 
time at all, that scrutiny escalated to become an attack on the king’s ability to rule which 
would even eclipse Clarendon’s removal of ten years earlier; the impeachment of his chief 
minister, the earl of Danby. 
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II 
 
Danby’s impeachment has long been regarded by historians as a key moment in the later 
years of Charles II’s reign, and our understanding of this period is now indebted to a number 
of excellent discussions of how and why the treasurer was removed from office.  One of the 
most convincing explanations for why the Commons decided to impeach Danby has been 
that, by proceeding against him, contemporaries hoped to remove a man who would quite 
willingly use the standing army, raised for war with France, against the king’s subjects.37  
There is a great deal of evidence to support this suggestion, and notes which Danby himself 
made in April 1677 indicate that the thought of using an army against the English people to 
achieve the king’s ends had occurred to him.38  Other historians, having focussed on the 
despatches which the French ambassador in London, Paul Barillon, sent back to his king in 
autumn 1678, have made a strong case for the importance of Louis XIV’s influence over 
certain members of the lower house in Danby’s removal.39  The treasurer, these historians 
have suggested, was creating a blockage in the English court which was preventing the 
French king from exercising the influence over Charles which he might otherwise have done.  
Louis, through Barillon, therefore engineered the treasurer’s removal by revealing to Charles’ 
opponents information about Danby’s ongoing negotiations for French subsidies to the royal 
revenue.  Or still other historians have explored how the impeachment was shaped by 
personal tensions in elite politics.
40
  On the one hand, these historians have suggested, the 
treasurer was prosecuted by men whom Danby had frozen out of positions of power and 
influence as he had attempted to construct a court party in parliament in the preceding years.  
And, on the other hand, the treasurer’s defence was built on the affections of a dwindling set 
of court loyalists and churchmen who had benefitted from the wealth and offices which 
Danby had famously distributed during his tenure.  These identities, formed during Danby’s 
impeachment, thus contributed to the emergence of something resembling, though not 
necessarily actually, modern political parties. 
The scholarship on Danby’s impeachment has suggested that these issues, of the 
standing army, Charles’ ambiguous relationship with the French king, and Danby’s 
continuing development of a court party, hastened the disillusionment with the idea of living 
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under a powerful autonomous monarch which had been festering among Charles’ subjects 
since his restoration.  The treasurer, historians have shown, came to symbolise not a strong 
limited monarchy acting in the interests of its subjects but a tyrannous form of government 
which would continue to abuse its power in pursuit of its own arbitrary, and possibly even 
popish, ambitions.  This traditional view of the treasurer’s impeachment has thus portrayed 
his removal as a symptom of the almost hysterical tensions and deep divides created by 
broader political and ideological debates.  To some degree this explanation of the intellectual 
causes and character of Danby’s impeachment is probably true, but historians’ tendency to 
focus on Danby as a symbol of a certain type of absolute monarchy has precluded an 
important set of concerns among politicians who were ideologically and politically opposed 
to the treasurer and king. 
A decisive rebuttal to historians’ tendency to focus on values, discourses, symbols, 
ideologies and beliefs when studying how historical characters came to make decisions and 
choose to act has recently been delivered by William Bulman.  While Bulman acknowledges 
that recovering historical figures’ approaches to decision making requires another look at 
some of the same keywords already familiar to historians of political culture, he has 
demonstrated that that should not be done only as an ahistorical effort to assess whether 
people in the past made decisions which were consistent to their beliefs, and therefore 
whether they were rational and tactically sound, or inconsistent, and therefore emotional and 
tactically incompetent.  Bulman has shown that in order to understand variations in political 
behaviour we need to contextualise decisions and policies made by seventeenth-century 
politicians, and to think more about ‘the manner in which values and interests are employed 
on a daily basis’.41   
For his own work, this approach has allowed Bulman to demonstrate that ‘what 
historians have usually referred to as ‘moderate’ and ‘hardline’ factions within the royalist 
party in this period are perhaps better described … [as] competing styles of prudential 
decision-making, neither more inherently ‘moderate’ than the other’.42  Bulman has taken the 
view that what historians have traditionally described as radical or orthodox ideologies and 
politics are actually only competing sets of, not necessarily contradictory, methods of 
effecting change.  But for the current thesis, reading Bulman’s work makes it clear that there 
is a set of questions to ask of Danby’s impeachment beyond which beliefs, symbols and 
ideologies fed into it.  As Bulman has demonstrated, ‘we need to focus less on the broad 
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intellectual, educational or discursive context of such terms and more on how they were 
employed in practice’.43  If we do so, it becomes apparent that there was more to Danby’s 
impeachment than the personality and identity politics or his symbolism of an abhorrent 
ideology which historians have already studied.  He was impeached because of his style of 
government and his approach to policymaking. 
The rest of this chapter will attempt to ask how Danby’s exemplification of tyrannous 
government actually translated into power and manifested itself in political culture as a 
mechanism for change.  Was it just his symbolism of an idea that the king’s subjects did not 
like which brought them to remove him, as historians have said?  Or did parliament see their 
ability to make policy and exercise power diminished by Danby being in office, and decide 
on these more practical grounds to impeach him?  The following pages will contextualise the 
impeachment in a much longer parliamentary debate about Danby’s role in politics than 
historians have hitherto explored, to show why the house of commons decided to remove the 
treasurer from office and why they took the approach they did.  And it will closely read the 
progress of the impeachment through parliament in order to suggest how the house of 
commons developed their policy to remove the treasurer and what that process revealed about 
their wider political agenda. 
On Monday 29
th
 April 1678, after the Easter recess, Charles called both houses to him 
and commanded the lord chancellor to acquaint parliament with his progress in Europe so far.  
Rhetorically at least, Charles’ aim before proceeding any further in his negotiations with 
Holland and France was, the chancellor said, to ‘take the farther advice of both his houses’, 
‘for the fuller satisfaction of his parliament, and the better securing of his kingdoms in all 
events’.44  It is unlikely that the king really wanted parliament’s help with his negotiations 
and far more probable that he was trying to keep them just sufficiently informed of his 
progress as to be able more easily to return to them for further supply in the near future.  The 
Commons had, after all, told him in their address of 25
th
 May the previous year that they 
would not vote him any more money until he had made a league offensive and defensive with 
Holland and acquainted them with it.
45
   
But whatever Charles’ intentions, he badly mismanaged his relationship with 
parliament by approaching them how he did that day.  Far from prompting their obliging 
advice on the king’s foreign policy, the chancellor’s speech in fact revealed to many in the 
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lower house that there was a gap between how they thought politics should be done and how 
the king was actually doing it.  They soon began to suspect that Charles did not see 
parliament as a valuable and active component of the policymaking process, but instead 
intended to use them only to bankroll the policies which he had already made.  And it was out 
of this suspicion that the Commons’ attention came to turn to the earl of Danby. 
Charles’ first mistake was that the information which he gave to parliament was too 
unspecific and his request for advice was too imprecise either to convince them that he really 
wanted their input or to channel their debate in any particular direction.  Lord Chancellor 
Finch’s speech gave away no real detail about the king’s negotiations with Holland and 
France and instead concentrated on layering superlatives about Charles’ diplomacy over 
excuses about why it had not yet produced any significant results.
46
  Finch told parliament 
that throughout 1676 the king had repaired his fleet, bought stores for the navy and ordnance, 
and had taken steps to secure his colonies.  He had also, in June of that year, sent William 
Temple to negotiate with the prince of Orange, ‘touching those measures which were 
necessary to be taken for the common safety’.  And upon ‘giving’ his niece to William, and 
with all the good intentions which that gesture signalled, the alliance between England and 
the States General was confirmed.  At that point, Finch said, Charles had turned to France, 
and had, in November 1677, despatched the earl of Feversham to the French king with a 
treaty containing conditions for peace.  Feversham had returned with a negative answer from 
Louis, at which point Charles had recalled parliament and proceeded to conclude both a 
league offensive and defensive and a further treaty of perpetual defence with Holland.  Upon 
completion of those treaties, Finch told parliament, Charles had begun to try to set the 
conditions for war with France, but the Dutch were so desirous for peace that all of Charles’ 
efforts came to nothing.  So much so, the chancellor suggested, that whether the prince of 
Orange would stick to the recently made league offensive and defensive ‘depends upon very 
many and very great uncertainties’.  ‘And now’, Finch concluded, ‘the king demands your 
advice, what may be fit for him to do in this difficult conjuncture; and resolves to pursue it’. 
The lack of detail in the chancellor’s speech left many in the lower house confused as 
to what Charles was asking of them.  In the days after his request, prominent Commons on 
different sides of the debate repeatedly asked, in the words of Henry Capel, ‘to know (as to 
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order) to what points we are to advise, to war, or to peace?’.47  And even politicians as senior 
as William Coventry, whom according to Gilbert Burnet had ‘a perfect understanding of 
affairs’ in the lower house, did not think that Charles had supplied enough information for 
‘any man here [to] have light requisite to give advice upon’.48  So because he did not direct 
them any differently, the Commons took Charles’ approach to them that day as an invitation 
to re-enter the policymaking process, to examine and make suggestions about the approach 
which he had begun to take in foreign relations.  The problem which Charles created, then, 
was that by not managing their debate properly, he created a vacuum in the lower house 
which was filled by a debate that he did not wish for them to have. 
In the Commons’ addresses on supply of the previous year, a vocal group of MPs had 
attempted to retain access to the political data upon which future royal decisions would be 
made.  They were aware, as they pointed out in their address of 25
th
 May 1677, that to ‘grant 
supplies for maintenance of wars and alliances, before they are signified in parliament’ could 
set a precedent ‘of dangerous consequence in future times’.49  These Commons recognised 
that unless they knew the details of the intelligence, news and advice upon which Charles was 
basing his decisions in foreign policy they would find it difficult to influence his plans before 
he made them.  They had therefore insisted on attaching a proviso to their votes of supply, 
which said that the king had to keep them acquainted with his negotiations in Europe as he 
made them.  In doing so, they aimed to use the money which they were voting him as a lever 
with which to ensure that Charles kept them within his decision making and factored their 
influence in to his policies.  After the chancellor’s speech at the end of April 1678, this same 
group of MPs came to the fore and urged the house to press the king to reveal his negotiations 
and all the political data upon which they were based, so that they could check that his efforts 
corresponded with their conditions for supplying him and with the interests of the nation. 
Thomas Clarges, Colonel Birch and Henry Powle, all of whom were on the committee 
for the address of 25
th
 May the previous year, and the latter two according to Gilbert Burnet 
among the boldest speakers in the house and ‘very learned in precedents and parliamentary 
journals’, combined to overpower the king’s support in the lower house and to push Secretary 
Williamson for as much information about the treaties as possible.
50
  They rallied the 
Commons to make an order for all the king’s treaties, ‘that we may’, Powle said, ‘be better 
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guided by what we have in writing than what is said’.51  And they insisted that in their request 
for his treaties the house include no mention of the advice which Charles had asked for.  Such 
a promise at this early stage would be too obliging, they thought, ‘and perhaps’, William 
Garraway suggested, ‘we shall have other matter to ground advice upon’.52  Instead, the 
lower house simply ordered that ‘the members of this house that are of his majesty’s privy 
council do attend his majesty; and humbly desire him, that he will be pleased to communicate 
to this house, all such leagues and treaties as are mentioned in the lord chancellor’s speech, or 
relating thereunto’.53 
It only took hours for the king to respond to their request, but when he did he made 
his second mistake that day.  Having been too imprecise in his first approach to parliament he 
now compounded that initial error by saying that he would not allow them to see all the 
treaties which they had requested, thus signalling his desire to keep the intent behind his 
policy in Europe and the information on which it was based to himself.  He quite openly told 
the Commons that, of some of his treaties, he did ‘not think fit, that papers of that sort should 
be produced in publick’.54  In the end, therefore, he only allowed both houses to see the 
league offensive and defensive, the separate article concerning Freiburg, the separate article 
concerning Lorraine, the declaratory article concerning all places of the empire taken, and the 
declaratory article as to the dependences.
55
  He did not allow them access to the terms for 
peace which the earl of Feversham had carried to Louis, on the grounds that that document 
was ‘the same, verbatim, contained in the treaties offensive and defensive, already delivered 
in’.56  He refused to disclose in writing the answer which the French king had returned to 
Feversham, because the French ambassador had told Charles ‘in ordinary discourse, that the 
answer the earl of Feversham would bring, would be a negative’.57  And he told the 
Commons that he would not tell them of the ‘proportions of the ships and men, to be 
provided by England and the States General of the United Provinces, with the answers 
thereunto’.58  Charles’ prevarication between initially asking parliament to assess his 
negotiations and then not fully revealing the substance of his dealings in Europe left many in 
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the Commons suspicious of the contribution which he was expecting them to make to his 
foreign policy.  It seemed to many in the lower house that while Charles had gladly accepted 
their votes of supply through the previous year, votes which collectively amounted to a year’s 
worth of the crown’s ordinary income, he was not honouring the rider which they had 
attached to the supply, that they should be kept informed of his dealings as he made them. 
As they began to debate the content of the treaties which Charles allowed them to see, 
on 4
th
 May, this suspicion grew worse, and many MPs began to believe that he was not 
negotiating the agreements which they had requested in their addresses, and was therefore 
neither correctly applying the money which they had given him nor securing church and 
state.  They compared the terms of the treaties with the directions they had given the king in 
their addresses through the previous year, and questioned whether Charles’ negotiations were 
in the best interests of the kingdom.  Colonel Birch opened debate in the lower house that day 
with a long speech about the value of the treaties.  ‘The Dutch tell us, their poverty is the 
case’, Birch informed the house.  ‘If, by reason of their poverty, they cannot come in with 60 
Ships, I would take them with 20; and take them upon the old league’.  ‘Whether this new 
treaty be a better, or a worse, than that of Nimeguen, I know not’, he continued,  ‘[but] I 
protest I am glad the French king cannot, and will not accept what we proposed to him by 
Lord Feversham; for should he, the next day we are ruined’.  And ‘after all this I have said’, 
he concluded, ‘the question is, whether this league before you be pursuant to the addresses of 
this house?’.  ‘I am for voting presently, “That this league offensive and defensive, is not 
agreeable to the addresses of this house, nor the safety of the nation”’.59  Birch’s speech met 
with widespread approval, and was immediately seconded and thirded by Phillip Monckton 
and John Hotham. 
But Henry Booth went even further than Birch.  ‘I have the heart of an Englishman 
and the courage to declare it’, he began.  ‘I cannot say this [treaty] is for the interest of the 
nation … I am for war, if it can be but for employing these new raised men anywhere.  It is 
strange there should be such haste to raise these men and now we have nothing but towards 
peace’.60  And William Coventry agreed.  ‘I could wish we had clearer lights in this matter’, 
he said, ‘but yet we had better go into a war, than be swallowed up by a peace.  Therefore I 
would address the king “to go into a war, till the safety of the nation may be better provided 
for”’.61  In spite of the protestations of the king’s supporters and more moderate politicians 
                                                 
59
 Grey debates, vol. 5, pp. 319-322. 
60
 Ibid, p. 323. 
61
 Ibid, p. 325. 
117 
 
then, under the weight of such addresses the lower house finally resolved, by just 16 votes, 
that Charles’ ‘league offensive and defensive with the States General of the United Provinces, 
with the articles relating thereunto, are not pursuant to the addresses of this house; nor 
consistent with the good and safety of the kingdom’.62  The house ordered a note to be 
written, ‘not in the usual form [of an address], by reason of the importance of the affair’, to 
advise Charles to enter into further alliances with the Spanish king and States General ‘for the 
vigorous carrying on of the present war against the French king, and for the good and safety 
of his majesty’s kingdoms’.63   
When the lower house met again on 7
th
 May, they moved on to debate how, having 
addressed Charles to advise him to make war with France twice in the last twelve months, 
they were now being asked to consider treaties for peace.  The Commons were concerned 
with the legality and desirability of the maintenance of an army, which still did not have a 
war to fight.  Early on in the debate that day, Secretary Williamson represented the king’s 
point of view.  ‘I know nothing’, Williamson told the house, ‘that can hinder the king from 
raising what forces he pleases, if he pays for them himself.  My argument is, you are the 
paymasters; if the occasion of the forces cease, how can any man think you will pay these 
men that are not employed to the interest you mean they should?’.64  Williamson prevailed on 
the Commons to ‘fall into alliances, and get Holland to come up to it, as highly as ‘tis 
possible’.65  He told the lower house that if Holland did not enter into an alliance with 
England, they should ‘enter into alliances without them’.66  But the secretary met a powerful 
response.  If peace was the king’s priority, why did the standing army still exist? 
‘The Petition of Right is law’, thundered John Hotham, to widespread agreement.  
‘That petition states it thus: ‘there shall be no quartering of soldiers, for continuing them here, 
any longer than in their passage to the place where they are to go; else ‘tis a grievance to the 
people’’.67  John Vaughan agreed with Hotham, and added ‘there can be no justification to 
raise any power without war.  You cannot by law so much as ride armed, in terrorem 
populi’.68  John Mallett was concerned with the expense of the army, which Williamson had 
mentioned, and suggested to the house that ‘there is some reason for Holland’s jealousy of us, 
for a parliament was staved off.  I believe there is no want of money, when they play so much 
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at Whitehall’.69  But as he had done before, Thomas Lee aligned himself more with the king, 
and urged the house not to ‘have war abroad for no other purpose than to employ these 
men’.70  Lee reproached the house, for ‘it was a happy time of day, when you passed those 
censures on the league [for peace] that was communicated to you’.71  And, while not in 
support of Lee and the court, John Swynfen suggested to the house that ‘the question is now, 
whether you will make any farther application to the king’.  ‘The thing being so difficult’, he 
said, ‘we are under vast danger … My opinion is to make no farther address, of this nature, 
but leave it to the king’.72 
Clearly then, the Commons’ debate of the content of Charles’ European treaties 
revealed deep ideological divides between the king, parliament, and different groups within 
parliament, on the issues of England’s position in Europe, the legality of a standing army, and 
how parliament’s money and advice should be put to use by the crown.  But, importantly, 
beyond the decisions which they thought Charles had made about foreign policy, it was the 
way in which he had made those decisions which alarmed many in the lower house most.  By 
negotiating the treaties how he had done, in private and indifferent to parliament’s advice, the 
king had not only jeopardised the liberty and security of his kingdom and subjects, as 
parliament had defined those concepts in their previous addresses, but he had completely 
bypassed their means of doing anything about it.  The chancellor’s speech at the end of April 
and the treaties which the king passed to parliament demonstrated to many in the Commons 
that Charles had no intention of routinely involving them in intelligence gathering, in the 
processing of that information into plans for Europe, or in the implementation of those plans 
in negotiations with the foreign princes.  More than just suspecting that Charles had 
misappropriated the money which they had voted him then, many in the Commons began to 
fear that Charles was trying to manoeuver them into a position of complete impotence, where 
their only role in policymaking was to fund the decisions which he had already made. 
The approach to governance which the chancellor’s speech revealed fomented 
opposition in the lower house among those who wished to see the Commons taking an active 
part in political decision making.  In the days after the chancellor’s speech, having had their 
attention drawn to their absence from Charles’ negotiations, the same group of MPs who had 
pressed the king for as much information about his treaties as possible began to ask how they 
could re-enter policymaking and regain influence over his approach to Europe and the 
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security of the kingdom.  On the afternoon of 7
th
 May, having come so far in their debate, the 
Commons began to ask who was responsible for the treaties and the poor state of the 
kingdom.  ‘You have long advised entering into leagues for the preservation of Flanders, and 
all comes to nothing’, observed William Sacheverell.  ‘The king is pleased’, he continued, ‘to 
prefer the counsels of others before those of this house … If this will not do by our address, I 
believe the king will never hearken to parliaments again’.73  Henry Powle agreed with 
Sacheverell, and said ‘now I will only sum up the ministers proceeding.  In January, they got 
money from the parliament, upon a pretence of a war with France, and they raised an army, 
and now we lie under this unhappy peace … [T]here are some persons about the king, who 
prevent him in what he would do’.74  Thomas Clarges added that ‘the effects of all our 
addresses have been to heighten what we so addressed against.  So, except we go to the root, 
and remove those counsellors who intercept the king’s grace and favour to his people … we 
do nothing’.75  And Thomas Meres was perhaps the most matter of fact of all.  ‘This house 
and these ministers’, he said, ‘cannot stand together.  One or the other, either this house or 
these ministers, must dissolve’.76  So, by a majority of 154 to 139, the Commons resolved in 
the affirmative ‘that an address be presented to his majesty to remove from his presence and 
councils those counsellors who advised the answers to the addresses of this house of the 26th 
of May, or 31st of January last’.77 
The address was read in the Commons on 10
th
 May and delivered to the king on the 
11
th
.  It did not take Charles long to respond.  In the Lords, on the 13
th
, sitting in his robes and 
regal ornaments, he told the upper house  
I have received an address of such a nature from the house of commons, as I cannot but resent 
very highly, from the ill consequences I have lived to see from such addresses.  I intend 
therefore to prorogue them for some short time, in hopes they will consider better what they 
ought to do at their return.  I have chosen to tell this to you first, because I would have you 
know I am very well satisfied with the dutiful behaviour of this house; and you will by that 
time be more enabled to give me your advice.
78
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And with that, the king called the Commons to him as well, the bills which had been passed 
that session were read, and parliament was prorogued until Thursday 23
rd
 May. 
 Charles’ approach to parliament at the end of April 1678 and the debate which 
followed in the lower house allowed opposition to solidify among a significant portion of 
MPs.  Many in the Commons were frustrated that Charles had spent so much time offering 
the French king terms for peace instead of consolidating his ties with Holland and asserting 
himself in Europe militarily.  They were concerned that he had misappropriated the funds 
which they had raised for him, as it had not been to support prolonged negotiations for peace 
that they had voted him supply.  And they were nervous about the continuation of a standing 
army, particularly since Charles’ approach to Europe did not look like producing a war to 
occupy his troops any time soon. 
But these broader concerns were underpinned by a deep uneasiness with the way in 
which the king had developed and was trying to implement his foreign policy.  Charles’ 
negotiations demonstrated to many in the Commons that the terms of their votes of supply 
did not bind him to any particular course of action.  The king had welcomed their votes, had 
accepted their addresses, and had even begun to receive their money into the exchequer, and 
he had still proceeded in Europe how he had wanted.  Through that first week of May, the 
Commons began to recognise that once they had voted the king supply, even if they 
supplemented those votes with clear addresses on how and to what end their money should be 
applied, they still could not effectively direct the king’s decisions and influence his policies. 
It was this realisation which thrust impeachment back into the frame.  A sizeable 
group in the lower house, led by Birch, Powle, Clarges and Sacheverell, understood that 
unless they could gain access to the king’s private discussions about how to spend money, 
knowledge of the information on which he was basing his decisions, and influence over the 
public officials who were helping him to develop plans, they could not direct the fate of the 
kingdom and secure church and state.  It was for this reason that they began to think once 
again about removing those ministers who were directing the king’s decisions and blocking 
their ability to participate in policymaking.  While at this time they did not refer to the 
treasurer by office or name, it was their debates through the first week of May 1678 which 
led the house of commons to another attempt to impeach the earl of Danby. 
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III 
 
Through the summer and autumn of 1678 the Commons’ desire to impeach was suspended by 
the summer recess and the popish plot revelations which dominated the proceedings of both 
houses once they returned.  But by the end of the year the tensions around royal 
policymaking had returned with a vengeance.  On 19
th
 December John Ernly told the house 
of commons that the king had received information that his ambassador to France, Ralph 
Montagu, had held meetings with the pope’s nuncio without Charles’ instruction to do so.  
‘His majesty’, Ernly therefore told the house, ‘to the end that he might know the truth of that 
matter, had given order for the seizing of Mr Montagu’s papers’.79  But almost immediately, 
in a move reminiscent of the privilege versus judicature debates which had taken place 
between the Lords and Commons three years earlier, Henry Powle questioned the correctness 
of the king’s proceeding against Montagu, who was still a member of the lower house.  ‘No 
private man, nor member’s person, can be seized’, Powle said, ‘before the accusation be 
given in upon oath[.] … I would know, whether any legal information has been given against 
your member’.80  If the information upon which Charles was acting had not been given on 
oath, Colonel Birch told the house, ‘forty more members’ papers may be seized … and then 
the game is up’.81  The problem for many Commons at this early stage in proceedings on the 
19
th
 was, as Colonel Titus pointed out, that ‘if there be no information upon oath, then it is a 
breach of [the Commons’] privilege’.82  It was, after all, only the electorate or the lower 
house themselves who could put a member in or out of parliament.  They therefore resolved 
that they could not make judgement on Montagu or the charges against him until they knew 
whether the information which had prompted the king’s investigation had been delivered 
properly, according to the law.
83
  But on attending the king, the delegates of the house were 
told that he was too busy to see them at that time and that they should call back when they 
had finished their business for that day.
84
 
After the delegates returned Ralph Montagu himself finally spoke to the house .  The 
move by the king to acquire his ambassador’s private papers, Montagu said, was intended to 
draw information about his negotiations in Europe away from public access and into his own 
hands, beyond scrutiny.  ‘I believe’, Montagu told the house, ‘that the seizing my cabinets 
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and papers was to get into their hands some letters of great consequence, that I have to 
produce, of the designs of a great minister of state’.85  So, wary that yet more evidence of the 
way in which Charles was making decisions in government was about to slip from reach, the 
house ordered four of its members to ‘take Mr Montagu's directions; and repair immediately 
to the place where the said writings are lodged; and bring the same to the house’.86   
When they returned, Montagu presented the Commons with two letters, written to him 
from the earl of Danby, which revealed the treasurer’s secret negotiations with the French 
and Dutch.  The letters were dated 17
th
 January and 25
th
 March 1678, and they reignited the 
smouldering tensions around policymaking which had burnt in the lower house in the first 
week of May that year.  As the speaker read the letters to the house, the Commons finally 
found the detail about the king’s negotiations in Europe which Charles had denied them when 
he asked them for advice eight months earlier.
87
    According to Anchitell Grey the letter 
written in March was the more significant, and of that letter the passage which gripped the 
Commons’ attention most was:  
In case the conditions of the peace shall be accepted, the king expects to have six millions of 
livres yearly for three years, from the time that this agreement shall be signed betwixt his 
majesty and the king of France: because it will be two or three years before he can hope to find 
his parliament in humour to give him supplies, after the having made any peace with France.
88
 
 Montagu’s letters consolidated opposition to the king in the lower house.  While some 
Commons remained sceptical of the content of the ambassador’s letters, which, they said, had 
been ‘barely given you by recrimination’, for many here, finally, was the detail of the king’s 
dealings in Europe which he had denied them when he had come to them for advice eight 
months earlier.
89
  Montagu’s letters revealed to the Commons that, contrary to their prior 
addresses on foreign relations, Danby had approached the French king both for peace and for 
subsidies to make Charles financially independent of his opposition at home.  Furthermore, 
the treasurer had made no attempt to reveal his negotiations with Louis as parliament had 
required, so that they could monitor and check them, but had proceeded in secret through 
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letters which, it now emerged, he wished to keep ‘as private as is possible, for fear of giving 
offence at home’.90 
The Commons were outraged.  Where in May opinion on the king and his ministers 
had been divided almost equally, now two-thirds of the house fell into opposition to the 
treasurer.  Henry Capel, Colonels Titus and Birch, Henry Powle and Thomas Clarges, all of 
whom had led the calls for the king to be more transparent in his foreign negotiations earlier 
in the year, began to evoke powerful images of the role of the lower house as representative 
of the will and custodian of the liberty of the subject.  ‘The lord treasurer’, thundered Colonel 
Titus, ‘was of one opinion; the parliament and the law of another’.  ‘His crime is great, and 
tends to the subversion of the nation, and so it is, when the king shall have no parliaments.
91
  
By dealing in secret, and occluding the information and rationale on which he was 
proceeding in Europe, Danby had removed the Commons’ opportunity to represent the 
interests of the electorate and compromised the liberty and security of the subject.  Now, with 
clear evidence of their exclusion from policymaking and rallied by the king’s more vocal 
opponents who were convinced that the treasurer’s actions were nothing short of high 
treason, the Commons began to talk impeachment. 
 ‘Now we see who has played all this game’, Thomas Bennett raged, ‘who has 
repeated all the sharp answers to our addresses, and raised an army for no war.  You know 
now who passes by the secretaries of state.  I would impeach the treasurer of high treason’.92  
William Williams told the house that ‘your laws are contemned by a great minister, and they 
miscarry and are laid dead’.93  And ‘whether this person who forbids Montagu to reveal this’, 
Henry Powle reasoned, ‘and concealing it from the secretaries, and by consequence from the 
Lords of the Council … now whether these private advices are not the cause of your ruin, that 
you have been so near and are still in danger of, [is the question]’.94  Through their debate on 
the afternoon of the 19
th
, they arrived at the question of whether there was sufficient 
substance in Danby’s letters to impeach him.  It was resolved in the affirmative by 179 votes 
to 116.
95
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Historians have typically begun their discussions of Danby’s impeachment on 19th 
December, the day of Montagu’s revelations about the treasurer’s negotiations with France.96  
But, as has by now hopefully been demonstrated, the tensions which Montagu’s letters 
exacerbated in the lower house that day had been present among the Commons for at least the 
preceding eight months.  The ambassador’s letters served much more as the evidence which 
certain members of the lower house needed to address existing concerns about Danby’s role 
in policymaking, than they did to provide the Commons with any genuinely new food for 
thought.  As has also been discussed above, historians of Danby’s impeachment have tended 
to present the treasurer’s removal from office as being a product of broader ideological 
clashes between king and parliament; certain members of the Commons disagreed with the 
king on the issues of his relationship with France, the acceptability of a standing army, and 
the propagation of lines of patronage into the lower house, and Danby’s impeachment was a 
manifestation of parliament starting to win the political argument on these topics.
97
  That is, 
however, where the explanation of Danby’s impeachment tends to stop.  The treasurer’s 
removal is depicted, as many other political events have been, as dropping out of the cracks 
between divergent political points of view, and there has been no real discussion of how, 
practically, the treasurer’s opponents went about removing him from office.  What did a 
successful impeachment actually involve?  And how did Danby’s opponents try to navigate 
parliamentary process to try to make their impeachment work?  The rest of this chapter will 
try to answer these questions. 
Having decided that there was enough substance in Montagu’s letters to impeach the 
treasurer, the house of commons ordered that a committee be appointed to draw up articles of 
impeachment against him.  Historians have recently produced excellent work on the 
appointment and roles of parliamentary committees in late-Elizabethan and early-Stuart 
parliaments.  They have shown how chaotic the process of appointing committees was, and 
have described how MPs were elected to a committee by the calling of names from the floor 
of the house, which the clerk would attempt to enter accurately into the journal along with a 
time and place of meeting.
98
  It was hoped in theory that members of parliament who had 
expressed extreme views one way or another on the subject which the committee was 
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convened to discuss would not be admitted membership to the committee.
99
  In practice, 
however, it was common for these more volatile and partisan MPs to be appointed, very often 
through the machination of lobby and interest groups both within and outside of 
parliament.
100
  Any MP could attend a committee meeting to join in and try to direct the 
debate, though only members of the committee could vote on the outcomes.
101
  And very 
often committee members failed to attend committees, on account of having been packed into 
them against their will or without their prior agreement by people with a vested interest in the 
outcomes of the committee’s proceedings.102 
The implications of this work for the study of Danby’s impeachment are significant, 
because it encourages us to start thinking about how the treasurer’s opponents might have 
tried to manipulate the form and function of the committee appointed to impeach him.  
Certainly, important members of the committee for drawing the articles up against the 
treasurer were aware of the advantages of such manipulation, and had previously been 
involved in trying to influence the type and selection of other committees in order that they 
would produce a specific result.  For instance, less than three weeks earlier, on 2
nd
 December, 
Henry Powle and Colonel Birch had tried to prevent the Commons from appointing a private 
committee to draft a ‘representation of the state of the nation’.  Such a representation, which 
Powle, Birch and others in the Commons were hoping would include a discussion of the 
threat posed to the kingdom by popery, the standing army, and the current system of 
government, was, Powle had said, ‘too great a charge for a private committee to draw up’.  
‘For the clearness of the proceeding’ therefore, Birch had insisted, ‘I would go into a 
committee of the whole house’.103  In doing so, Birch and Powle were attempting to use the 
process of appointing committees in order to retain a direct influence over the drafting of the 
representation and, crucially, a vote on whether or not the draft they produced should be 
presented to the house for reading.  
When it came to the committee for drawing the articles of impeachment up, there is 
certainly evidence to suggest that Birch and Powle, among others, sought to shape the way in 
which that committee was appointed too.  The members must have all put themselves 
forward vociferously enough, or had others put them forward, to find themselves on the 
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committee.  Of the twenty two MPs who were appointed to the committee, at least thirteen 
were recorded by Anchitell Grey to have spoken strongly against the treasurer when Montagu 
revealed his letters on the 19
th
.
104
  We can infer, therefore, that as the committee was 
appointed Danby’s opponents either put themselves forward, or they made sure to put men 
forward whom they knew would speak against the treasurer’s interest.  Either way, his 
opponents in the lower house managed to pack the committee appointed to begin the 
proceedings against him with men who did not want to see him stay in office. 
The place and time of the committee’s meeting was not recorded in the journal of the 
house of commons.  This omission could of course have been an honest procedural error on 
the clerk’s part, but it was certainly one which was exploited by the committee members.  
When the committee returned to the house with the drafted articles complaint was made that 
William Williams, the committee chair, had only told members who were opposed to the 
treasurer where the committee was meeting.  Charles Bertie, the treasurer’s brother-in-law, 
protested to the Commons that ‘the committee has put a slur upon the house’, because it ‘did 
sit in holes’.105  But since, as Henry Capel noted, ‘the committee had their liberty to sit where 
they would, and they had no order for place’, their authority to draw the articles up was 
upheld.
106
  The result was that Danby’s supporters on the committee, while outnumbered 
anyway, did not get chance to influence the committee’s work before it was returned to the 
whole house for reading.   
William Williams presented the articles to the Commons two days after the committee 
had been appointed, on 21
st
 December.  The committee produced six articles ‘of high treason, 
and other high crimes and misdemeanors, and offences’ for Danby’s impeachment.107  The 
first three articles attacked Danby’s attempts to keep the details of his negotiations with the 
foreign princes secret ‘by giving instructions to his majesty’s ambassadors a broad, without 
communicating the same to the secretaries of state, and the rest of his majesty’s council’.  
This concealment of the details of the decisions being made in government and the 
information on which they were based was done, these first articles said, to ‘hinder the 
meeting of parliaments’, and was leading to the subversion of ‘the ancient and well 
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established form of government in this kingdom’ and to the introduction of ‘an arbitrary and 
tyrannical way of government’ instead.  Even more worrying, the second article said, was 
that this private form of decision making was being supported by the continuance of ‘a 
standing army within this kingdom’, which was there, the Commons supposed, to allow the 
treasurer if necessary forcibly to prevent the king’s opponents from working their way back 
in to policymaking.  The fourth article made similar complaint about Danby’s concealment of 
information, this time in the investigation of the popish plot.  He had suppressed evidence of 
the plot and ‘reproachfully discountenanced the king’s witnesses in the discovery of it’, in 
order, it said, to subvert the protestant religion.  And the fifth and sixth articles lambasted the 
treasurer for diverting the king’s money around the exchequer, ‘to private uses, without any 
account to be made of it to his majesty’.  These last articles insisted that by not disclosing 
where the king’s money was coming from or how it was being applied the treasurer was 
operating outside ‘of the known method and government of the exchequer’, and ‘even 
contrary to acts of parliament’.  Whereas in 1675 the articles of impeachment had faltered 
before a largely unenthusiastic lower house, unconvinced by the accusers’ rhetoric and 
unpersuaded by the few witnesses which had been brought before them, now they steadily 
marched through the house of commons, each in turn voted fit for purpose.  By the afternoon 
of 21
st
 December 1678 then, the lower house had set its policy and the lord treasurer was to 
be impeached for high treason, and other high crimes and misdemeanours. 
The lord treasurer’s impeachment was therefore based in agile opportunism and 
careful management of parliamentary process.  When Montagu produced his letters certain 
members of the Commons, led by Powle, Birch and Clarges, seized upon them as the 
evidence they needed to address their concerns about Danby’s independent approach to 
policymaking.  Through their speeches, they vividly made the case that the house of 
commons existed to represent the will and interests of the people, but that it was having its 
ability to practise that role undermined by the style of government cultivated by the treasurer.  
They used Montagu’s letters to mobilise the Commons into agreeing that in order to reclaim 
their ability to participate in policymaking they had to remove the treasurer from office.  
Then, having got the votes they needed to proceed against him, they manipulated the process 
by which the articles of impeachment would be produced.  The treasurer’s opponents packed 
the committee appointed to write the articles with MPs hostile to him, by electing themselves 
and members whom they knew would vote against Danby into the committee.  This 
management of the selection process, and their refusal to disclose where the committee would 
be sitting to the members who supported the treasurer, ensured that Danby’s opponents 
128 
 
retained full control of the nature and content of the articles before returning them to the 
house for reading.  For once, then, it was Danby’s opponents who had kept the substance of 
their decisions secret and who sought to develop their policy free from unwanted influence. 
The result of this management of the committee was that the articles which Danby’s 
opponents brought before the house in December 1678 were much more coherent, based less 
on personality politics and loose ideas of morality than they had been three years earlier, and 
much more on a defined understanding of the constitution and how knowledge and power 
should be distributed across different branches of the government in order to secure church 
and state.  Unlike in 1675, therefore, when Danby’s supporters had been able with relative 
ease to sweep the impeachment away for want of witnesses and evidence, in the face of the 
damning revelations made by Montagu, the new coherent articles, and the more consolidated 
opposition to the treasurer, those opposed to the articles struggled to mount a defence.  As 
Grey noted in his record, ‘after divers variations of the question by the treasurer’s party, for 
they could not agree amongst themselves what question they would have put, this was the 
question: “whether the articles of impeachment against the lord treasurer shall be 
recommitted”’.108  It was resolved in the negative by 179 to 135, and, having voted on each 
article in turn, the Commons resolved that their impeachment and means of pursuing it were 
fit for purpose.
109
 
 The articles were not flawless, however, and when, on 23
rd
 December, Henry Capel 
carried them to the upper house to desire that Danby be committed to safe custody the 
treasurer managed to rally opposition to his impeachment.  The articles having been read to 
the house, Danby made a speech which urged the Lords to be wary of endorsing an 
impeachment that condemned him for practices which any of them could themselves be 
accused of in future.  He asked the upper house to ‘both discern the truth of the evidence 
when it shall come before you and in the meantime distinguish truly what the crimes are (if 
they could be proved) and not what they are called’.110  ‘I beg for all your lordships sakes as 
well as my own’, he said, ‘that your lordships will please to use the caution which will be 
necessary for all your lordships safetys and seats in this house’.111  The treasurer’s insistence 
that the Lords should proceed with caution immediately gained traction.  Among the most 
enthusiastic responses to the treasurer came from the earl of Carnarvon who ran through each 
significant political impeachment of the last hundred years to demonstrate that the designers 
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of those impeachments soon met with the same end themselves.  ‘Let me see that man that 
dare run the earl of Danby down’, Carnarvon said, ‘and we shall soon see what will become 
of him’.112 
But although Carnarvon’s speech flourished with rhetoric and was met by the duke of 
Buckingham as having been inspired by claret, and although Danby had a clear interest in 
seeing the impeachment defeated in the upper house before it had got going, both men’s 
speeches highlighted a serious concern among many Lords that day which stretched beyond 
the superficial concern for their own safety which historians have already referenced.
113
  As 
the treasurer urged them to understand, it was not in the Lords’ interest to allow the 
Commons to press through an impeachment of a member of the upper house.  ‘What the 
house of commons may do in such a case’, he said, ‘there is no question but his majesty may 
do the same by his attorney and what either of them may do against one Lord they may doe 
against more’.114  The opposition to the articles which Danby managed to create in the upper 
house then was not merely the product of self-interested Lords seeking to retain their own 
seats in parliament, but was rather about the house retaining its privilege and its ability to 
participate in politics and government.  As Danby observed to the house, ‘were it not very 
precariously then that your lordships hold your seats here when by either [impeachment by 
the Commons or removal by the king] as many of your lordships as for a time might be 
convenient to be removed should be att the mercy of having a thing called treason whether itt 
be so or not.
115
  The upper house therefore asked the question ‘whether the lord treasurer 
shall now withdraw’, and resolved in the negative.116 
Over the following days Danby sought to steer the opponents to the impeachment in 
the upper house towards undoing the articles by questioning whether the Commons’ 
accusation of treason had any basis in law.  While the treasurer’s actions might have been 
unconstitutional, immoral, or even in some cases illegal, many in the upper house refused to 
accept that in the eyes of the law they were treasonous.  This scepticism was certainly 
justified.  Danby’s defence counsel would later explain to him that the first article had ‘no 
crime of soe high a nature as treason comprised in it’.117  ‘For incroaching to himselfe regall 
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power … how greate and extravagant a presumption soever it may be, yet it is no treason.  If 
it be it were good to know within what law’.  Danby’s counsel therefore told him that ‘noe 
clause of [the first] article is felony at comon law nor treason by any act of parliament since, 
nor can be declared treason by parliament’.  The second article was similarly tenuous, 
because its charge ‘being only in endeavours without any overt act imports no charge of 
treason, for that acts, not endeavours, make offences treason’.  And so was the third article, 
on the grounds that while ‘its treason to leavy warr against the king or adhere to his enemies 
… proposing peace is no treason’.  The fourth article, while having insisted that the treasurer 
had ‘traiterously’ concealed the popish plot, actually therefore only ‘contains but the 
misprision of treason’.  And the last two articles, given that ‘there being neither the word 
treason nor traitorously therein’, did not support the Commons’ accusation at all.  Through 
the course of their debate on the 26
th
 and 27
th
, the treasurer managed to convince many in the 
upper house that his actions had, by the Commons, been ‘stiled treason by inserting the word 
traitorously’.118  A significant portion of the Lords agreed, therefore, as one peer observed, 
that the articles were either ‘wholly false, and denyed’, or dismissible because ‘his majesty 
will and must warrant his lordships actings’.119 
There were, however, a number of Lords who, in spite of the treasurer’s best efforts to 
convince them otherwise, recognised the shortcomings of the Commons’ accusation of 
treason and tried to shape the charge to be more effective.  Lords including Buckingham, 
Shaftesbury and Halifax tried to turn the Commons’ accusation from one of treason into one 
of misprision of treason, the concealment of knowledge of traitorous acts.  After a long 
debate thereof, these Lords managed to convince the upper house, on the morning of 27
th
 
December, to ask the judges two questions about how they would proceed if a misprision of 
treason could be proved.  The first question which they asked was whether the judges would 
automatically commit someone accused of misprision while the allegations were investigated 
and a trial prepared.  And the second was whether, if a person was committed for misprision, 
the judges would accept bail.  That day, the Lords seeking to have Danby committed were not 
doing so because they thought he was guilty of treason, but instead were playing on the 
known secrecy of his negotiations in Europe.  Unfortunately for Danby’s accusers, the judges 
told the Lords that ‘the court of King’s Bench may take bail for high treason of any kind, if 
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they see cause’.120  With that advice in mind, the question was again put whether Danby 
should be committed, and again the upper house resolved in the negative.  The Lords gave 
Danby a week to put in his answer to the accusations against him.
121
  However, fourteen 
Lords, including Shaftesbury, Halifax and Buckingham, entered a protest against the vote.
122
   
The course which the impeachment took through parliament between the 19
th
 and 27
th
 
December revealed and exacerbated deep ideological, constitutional and procedural tensions 
within and between both houses of parliament.  When Montagu brought the treasurer’s letters 
into the lower house on the 19
th
, the Commons divided on the issues of how threatened the 
liberty of the subject was by the standing army and Charles’ relationship with France, and 
whether or not the king had misappropriated their votes of supply.  Underpinning these 
ideological differences was a deep concern with the effect which Danby’s negotiations would 
have on the constitution.  While a significant portion of the Commons believed that the king 
and his treasurer retained the nation’s best interests, a powerful group of MPs recognised that 
Danby’s negotiations were designed to improve the independence of the king’s government 
by undermining parliament’s ability to influence royal policymaking.  For these MPs the 
security and liberty of the subject could not be secured if the king continued to exclude 
parliament from discussions about policy.  While many Commons still refused to accept that 
the treasurer should be removed from office, opponents to the king’s desired style of rule 
managed to negotiate parliamentary process well enough to make regaining their ability to 
participate in government through a policy of impeachment a distinct possibility. 
When the impeachment was carried to the upper house it found opposition in Lords 
who would not see their privilege and political agency diminished by a frustrated house of 
commons.  Rallied by the treasurer himself, many in the Lords pushed back against the 
impeachment, voting against committing the treasurer at the Commons’ request and refusing 
to jeopardise their future ability to participate in government by allowing the lower house to 
decide which of them would retain their seats and when.  While a number of powerful Lords 
attempted to reinvigorate the impeachment by shaping the Commons’ accusation of treason 
into the lesser, but much more provable, crime of misprision of treason, the upper house’s 
constitutional opposition to the impeachment meant that on the 27
th
 December Danby still 
held his seat in parliament and his position in government. 
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But in spite of the setbacks which the treasurer’s opponents faced, their insistence that 
Danby be removed and the divisions in parliament which those demands created still put 
enough pressure on the king to force him to intervene in the impeachment and to change his 
approach to governance.  As we have seen, for years Danby had been a central component of 
Charles’ government.  For half a decade he had worked hard to improve the king’s ability to 
rule and to achieve his political aims independently, free from the obstructive influence of 
outside interests.  With the impeachment still pending in parliament, therefore, on 30
th
 
December Charles could suffer the attacks on his chief minister no longer.  In an attempt to 
seize control of the impeachment and to release the pressure which it was piling onto his 
government, Charles called both houses to him and prorogued them until the 24
th
 of the 
following February. 
The king revealed the intent behind the prorogation four days later in a private 
consultation with the judges at council board.  Charles called Chief Justice Scroggs, Recorder 
Jeffreys and Justice North to him that day to ask whether the law would allow him to 
command the attorney general during a prorogation to proceed on prosecutions still pending 
in parliament in a different court.  By asking these questions the king hoped to find a way of 
influencing the end the impeachment brought by the Commons was likely to reach by 
directing how and by whom it would be prosecuted.  ‘Suppose the k[ing] directs the attorney 
to proceed in an inferior court’, asked Chancellor Finch on the king’s behalf, ‘may he not?’123  
The judges agreed that prorogation could not halt the course of prosecutions in parliament.  
Even if the prorogation was a long one, they said, ‘accusation brought in parliament one 
session, has been judged in a following one’.124  Scroggs, Jeffreys and North therefore made 
it clear to the council, that ‘as the case stands’, the king could not hope ‘to go otherwise than 
by parliament’.125  The only way in which Charles stood any chance of taking control of 
prosecutions pending in parliament, the judges said, and thus of relieving the pressure which 
the impeachment was putting on his ability to govern, would be to change the circumstances 
as they stood.  Parliament ‘being prorogued’, Joseph Williamson wrote, would not allow the 
king to halt the Commons’ proceeding against the treasurer and once more to secure his 
independence in government.  ‘But’, the secretary scribbled, ‘if dissolved…’.126 
Charles’ consultation in council that day revealed a king forced by his opponents in 
parliament to adopt a policy which he had avoided for the past eighteen years.  In the 
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Commons’ attempt to impeach the earl of Danby, in spite of the divisions in parliament and 
the still strong support for the crown and its ministers, Charles faced the strongest and most 
systematic attack on his ability to govern which the monarchy had seen in years.  On 24
th
 
January 1679 then, following his consultation with the judges, Charles issued a proclamation 
to turn the current prorogation into a dissolution, and to bring the cavalier Parliament to an 
end. 
 
IV 
 
Historians have very effectively explored the ways in which, both publicly and privately, the 
election of January 1679 was fought.
127
  They have shown how the earl of Shaftesbury and 
duke of Buckingham managed to mobilise electoral support, especially through their 
connections with the corporation of London, in order to make gains in parliament.  And they 
have demonstrated how private wrangling at court between different, though comparably 
powerful, factions produced a new balance of power on the privy council.  These historians 
have shown that the election at the start of 1679 saw a surge in parliamentary power, and 
when the electoral dust settled the king faced a greater number of MPs who were openly 
hostile to the prospect of absolute monarchy.  With more MPs in parliament pressing to assert 
their own political agendas and to oppose the king’s, Charles was forced to reshuffle his 
council and to accommodate some of his most vocal opponents as ministers.  These new 
appointments spread power through the council much more evenly, and much more thinly, 
among his ministers than it had ever been before. 
In the face of these changes to the balance of political power, ushered in by an 
election which had been forced by the Commons’ attempts to impeach the treasurer, Charles 
finally succumbed to the calls in parliament to remove Danby from office.  At the end of 
January, Robert Brent wrote to the treasurer to warn him that ‘there is some great undertaking 
now transacting between my Lord Shaftesbury and that party, and the duke [of York], and 
great endeavours are used to persuade his highness to quit your lordship and your interest’.128  
Shaftesbury’s party, Brent said, were trying ‘to persuade his highness that the Commons have 
resolved to doe nothing for his majestie soe long as your lordship has the staffe’.129  And 
Brent was right.  On 13
th
 March, the king sent for Danby and told him that it would be better 
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for both of them if Danby resigned.
130
  The king, Danby later recalled, hoped ‘parliament 
would forbeare any further prosecution of mee and would both give him money and comply 
with him in what else hee should desire of them’.131   
But after talking to Danby on the 13
th
, the king did not remove him from office 
quickly enough.  On 17
th
 March, the Lords ordered the committee for privileges to examine 
the state of the impeachments from the last session.
132
  Two days later, on the 19
th
, the upper 
house ordered that all impeachments brought up from the house of commons in the last 
parliament would continue ‘in status quo’.133  They sent Danby a copy of his charges and 
gave him until the 27
th
 to put in his answer.
134
  And three days after that, on the 20
th
, the 
lower house sent a message to the Lords to remind them of the impeachment.  The Commons 
told the Lords they desired that Danby ‘be forthwith committed to safe custody’, and they 
appointed a committee to draw up new articles against the treasurer.
135
  The king, however, 
while probably at this stage privately having made up his mind that his treasurer should be 
removed from office, in the face of the Commons’ redoubled zeal, did not want Danby to 
come to harm.  In a speech to both houses on 22
nd
 March, therefore, Charles declared 
Danby’s innocence and granted him a royal pardon, suggesting that he ‘would grant it ten 
times over if his first were defective either in matter or forme’.136   
On the day that Charles declared the pardon, the Commons sent to the Lords to 
remind them of their last message and to demand that Danby be sequestered immediately and 
committed to safe custody.  In the lower house, Francis Winnington, recently removed from 
the office of solicitor general, made an impassioned speech about Danby’s subversion of the 
constitution and insisted that ‘a king should be a santuary of the people from oppressions of 
evill ministers but not a refuge of enemies to the government, the protector of such an 
archtraitor as Danby’.137  William Harbord agreed with Winnington, saying ‘I would have a 
committee to draw up a [new] representation to the king of the miserable estate of the 
kingdom, and that this gentleman is the occasion of it.  ’.138  The Commons accordingly 
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appointed a committee to ask the chancellor about the manner of Danby’s pardon, and to 
decide whether or not to let it stand.
139
 
At the same time that Winnington was speaking to the Commons, the upper house 
proposed a bill to be brought in for incapacitating the treasurer, making him ‘for ever 
uncapable of coming into his majesty's presence, and of all offices and employments’, 
including his seat in parliament.
140
  The Lords, Shaftesbury said, not strictly truthfully, were 
‘willing to doe anything that might save [Danby’s] life and estate, but they could not be for 
supporting the pardon’.141  In reality, the bill for incapacitating Danby included the 
confiscation of all grants of money and land given to him, except his paternal estates.
142
   
The next morning, on 24
th
 March, the Commons committee attended the lord 
chancellor to ask about Danby’s pardon.  Finch told them it was ‘a stamp’t pardon by 
creacon’, and was therefore legitimate.143  Upon the committee’s return to the house, the 
Commons immediately made a humble address to his majesty concerning ‘the irregularity 
and illegality of the earl’s pardon, and the dangerous consequence of granting pardons to any 
that lay under an impeachment of the Commons’.144  They sent to the Lords to demand 
justice against Danby, and for him to be sequestered from parliament and committed to safe 
custody.  The Lords obliged, and voted that the treasurer be committed to the Tower.  The 
same morning, the king sent Danby a note ‘under his owne hand by the earl of Bath to bee 
gone instantly and … to get out of England’.145  Danby went into hiding, and remained there 
until 14
th
 April 1679, when parliament passed a bill of attainder for his appearing before 
them.
146
  Danby surrendered himself to the black rod on 15
th
 April, and appeared before the 
upper house the next day, on the 16
th
.  He gave a brief account of himself, and requested from 
the Lords a new copy of the charges against him.
147
  The Lords assented to his request, and 
adjudged that he be committed to the Tower ‘till he shall be discharged by due course of 
law’.148   
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He appeared before them again on the 25
th
 to deliver his plea and pray that he might 
have his pardon.  In his plea, delivered in writing and read to the house, Danby moved 
through each of the Commons’ articles against him and tried to account for them.  He dwelt 
particularly on the fourth article, which related to his involvement in the plot and its 
investigation.  He could not, he said, ‘possibly imagine the reason wherefore I should be 
charged to be popishly affected’, and he gave a detailed account of the early part of his 
investigation of the plot, directed by the king.
149
  Danby, of course, insisted that he had not 
‘at any time suppressed any evidence, or reproachfully or otherwise discountenanced the 
king's witnesses in discovery of the plot’.150  He described the pardon which the king had 
granted him, and insisted, by quoting at length from the law, that his pardon should stand.
151
  
The now ex-treasurer had made an earnest defence of himself in the plea he delivered to the 
Lords.  But it was all for nothing.  By the end of April 1679, therefore, the Commons had 
managed to remove one of the chief instruments by which the king did government.  They 
had impeached the earl of Danby. 
By April 1679 Charles had lost his advantage in policymaking.  Through the previous 
two years, he had moved from a position of relative strength, where he had been able to make 
policy independently, supported by the financial stability which his more isolationist 
approach to Europe had temporarily given him, to having his key advisor and policy maker, 
the earl of Danby, forcibly removed from office by the house of commons.  Through the 
spring of 1667, it had become clear that Charles’ decision to take a more peaceful approach 
to foreign policy, while having stabilised his revenue and simplified his relationship with the 
foreign princes in the short term, was not a policy which could be sustained indefinitely.  Too 
many factors beyond Charles’ full control, such as the continuing impact of foreign privateers 
on English merchants’ ability to trade and return revenue to the kingdom, and the pressure 
which the European princes were exerting on the English king to intercede in their continuing 
conflict, drew Charles back towards a war which he had worked hard to release himself from 
not long before.  By the summer of 1677, the king therefore sought to adapt his peaceful 
approach to Europe by reinforcing it with the threat of imminent recommital to the conflict.  
Only by threatening war, Charles decided, could he hope to sustain his peaceful policy and 
retain the advantages to his revenue and domestic political circumstances which it gave him. 
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As Charles negotiated and tried to find a more lasting means of asserting himself in 
Europe, the house of commons grew suspicious of what his negotiations would mean for the 
balance of power at home.  In the spring of 1678, opposition to Charles’ government grew in 
the lower house as they realised that he was seeking to manoeuver himself into a position 
where he could make decisions about Europe and his kingdom independently, with the 
support of parliamentary supply but without their directions for how their money should be 
used or the ends to which it should be applied.  Unlike in 1675 however, this time the 
Commons who wished to see the lower house taking a more active part in defining and 
protecting the security and liberty of church and state managed to produce an effective design 
for re-entering government policymaking.  Consolidated around the evidence which Ralph 
Montagu brought to the house, opponents to the king’s growing independence in government 
managed to steer a sufficiently coherent impeachment through parliament to force the king to 
remove his chief minister, the earl of Danby, from office.  By removing Danby, the main 
instrument in Charles’ government, by which the royal revenue was kept stable and the 
information on which government decisions were made kept private, the Commons managed 
to force their way back into an active role in government.  By April 1679 then, Charles’ 
ability to make a policy independently and to rule personally, if not already gone, lay close to 
ruin.   
In this sense Charles’ attempts to make and implement policy fed back on themselves.  
Charles had to revise his approach to Europe, not because he had changed his ambitions to 
improve the power and status of England among his continental neighbours, but because the 
means by which he had tried to do so had become impractical and less fit for purpose.  
Having revised his approach to foreign policy, the king then removed his chief minister and 
the lynchpin of his attempts to rule personally, not because he became more receptive to, or 
began more to believe in, the rights of the house of commons to represent the will of the 
electorate more actively in government, but because he was forced to change his approach to 
governance by a competing interest in the way in which government was done. 
The king’s attempts to make effective European policy through 1677 and the 
impeachment of the earl of Danby demonstrate that seventeenth-century politicians did not 
take a high-modernist view of policymaking, in which they rigidly set their end point and 
linearly worked through a plan to reach their goal.  They recognised that policymaking was a 
fluid process, in which changing and competing outside interests or the day to day 
practicalities of sustaining any given plan could feed back against their ability to make and 
implement their designs. 
138 
 
Chapter 4: The constitution breaks 
 
By the end of 1678 Charles felt that ‘he hath not been used well’.1  As the thirtieth year of his 
reign came to a close a growing number of politicians in both houses of parliament were 
becoming increasingly concerned with preserving their own ability to participate in politics 
and had begun more and more to obstruct the king’s ability to make policy and realise his 
political aims.  On 30
th
 December, therefore, as he struggled to cope with the emerging 
popish plot revelations and fears of a catholic succession, with growing accusations of 
tyrannous and arbitrary practices among his ministers, and with placing England in a Europe 
which was becoming increasingly intrigued by the notion of empire, Charles called both 
houses to him and prorogued them until 4
th
 February the following year.  But before they 
reconvened, in a proclamation on 24
th
 January 1679 ‘the king’s most excellent majesty, 
taking into his serious consideration the many inconveniencies arising by the over-long 
continuance of one and the same parliament’ turned prorogation into dissolution, bringing the 
session to a close for the last time.
2
 
If Charles had begun to struggle to live with parliament, however, he was certainly 
not able to live without them either.  Charles ended the session to halt parliamentary 
intervention in his policies, and prevent his parliamentary opposition from participating in 
politics and obstructing his plans.  With a large army still to pay though and war with France 
and Holland still a distinct possibility, Charles found himself unable to proceed on his 
ordinary revenue alone, and in dire need of parliamentary assistance.  As February wore on, 
therefore, all Charles could do was to recall parliament and hope that constitutional stability 
could be found.  Charles opened his third parliament on 6
th
 March 1679.  The new parliament 
immediately resumed what the second had been prevented from doing through the 
dissolution, instantly justifying the anxieties around the court about the king’s growing 
opposition in domestic politics.  On opening the session, Charles’ rhetoric betrayed his own 
apprehensions about how combative his new parliament was likely to be.  ‘I meet you here 
with the most earnest desire that man can have’, he said, ‘to unite the minds of all my 
subjects, both to me, and to one another.  And I resolve it shall be your faults, if the success 
be not suitably to my desires’.3 
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Charles met his third parliament with a powerful vision of church and state, to which 
he rigidly stuck for the next two years.  Time and again through each of his last three 
parliaments, which sat between the beginning of March 1679 and the end of March 1681, 
Charles set out how both houses should practice politics and to what end and defined what he 
believed were the constitutional roles of the king, parliament, and his subjects.  He left 
parliament in no doubt that he viewed their position in politics as supplementary to the 
crown’s.  Their place was not, as he told them on opening the first session of his third 
parliament, ‘to promote private animosities under pretence of the public’, since the public’s 
interests were not parliament’s concern.  Rather, their function was, Charles said, ‘in order to 
those good ends I have recommended to you’ and to defend him ‘from the calumny, as well 
as danger, of those worst of men, who endeavour to render me and my government odious to 
my people’.4  In this subordinate role, then, Charles believed that parliament was there to 
perform three functions.   
 The first, and simplest, was that parliament was there to vote the king supply, so that 
he might fund the state and the defence of the kingdom.  In two of his three speeches on 
opening parliament between March 1679 and March 1681, Charles recommended his 
financial position to parliament’s consideration, in the hope that they would vote him supply 
‘equal to my necessary expenses’.5   
The second of parliament’s functions in the eyes of the king was to provide him with 
a statutory basis to rule, mostly in the form of laws, particularly at this time on the descent of 
the crown.  The duke of York’s succession had been discussed since the Test Act had 
revealed him to be catholic in 1673.  As historians have already shown at length, once the 
popish plot revelations were made in the autumn of 1678 debate about the duke of York 
turned frantic.  By the time the king recalled parliament in March 1679, therefore, both 
houses had already begun taking serious steps towards diverting the descent of the crown, 
and in the last three parliaments of Charles’ reign there was little that they discussed more 
than the succession.  In his speeches to the last three parliaments, Charles urged them to offer 
him ‘any new remedies which shall be proposed, that may consist with preserving the 
succession of the crown in its due and legal course of descent’.6  By urging parliament to 
create legislation on the succession, Charles was seeking to make sure that ‘religion might be 
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preserved, and the monarchy not destroyed’.7  But he was also trying regulate future 
parliamentary proceedings on the matter, by binding them to a codified set of laws, of their 
own creation, which he could uphold as ‘the rules and measures of all [their] votes’.8 
And thirdly, parliament was there, Charles said, in a more generally advisory 
capacity.  He told parliament in a speech regarding his appointment of a new privy council, 
on 21
st
 April 1679, that he saw parliament and his privy council’s roles in offering the crown 
advice as running parallel to each other.  He said that he intended to take his ministers’ advice 
‘next to the advice of my great council in parliament’.9  But although he encouraged their 
contribution on any subject which he offered them, ‘that which I value above all the treasure 
in the world and which I am sure will give me greater strength and reputation both at home 
and abroad than any treasure can do’, he said, ‘is a perfect union amongst ourselves’.10  For 
Charles, parliament was not there to challenge his rule, but to assist it in any way they could. 
But certain members of the third parliament soon showed themselves to be even more 
concerned with limiting Charles’ independence in government than the second had been at 
the point of its dissolution.  The proceedings of both the upper and lower houses quickly 
began being driven onwards by the political agendas and ideological principles of strong 
individuals, who at different times loosely bound larger groups together as contingent 
moments clashed or corresponded with their shared, deeper constitutional ideals and beliefs 
about sovereignty.  As these groups debated and developed their contrasting, and at times 
incompatible, ideas of where power should reside in domestic politics, and of why certain 
agents or institutions should hold privilege or prerogative over others, they competed for 
access to the processes of policymaking by shaping political practice.  Charles soon replaced 
his third parliament with a fourth, and then a fifth.  Through their short-lived meetings and 
the lengthy periods between sessions, both king and parliament began more and more to 
question the relationship between their ability to influence broader political themes and 
topics, and their ability to access and control information.  As the 1670s became the 1680s, 
therefore, the negotiation of power between the king and his political opponents, and their 
battle to shape political practice, was underpinned by their differing views on how free 
information should be.  In the midst of their intensifying exchanges, and as political theory 
and practice became forced together in debate, the 1662 Printing Act expired. 
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This chapter seeks to examine the lapse of licensing in 1679 as a major instance in 
which different politicians sought to enhance their ability to make policy by controlling both 
the level of access to the decisions being made in government, and the opportunity to discuss 
those decisions outside of the private conversations of the king and his ministers.  It aims to 
draw out how the king’s opponents sought to improve their ability to participate in 
policymaking by removing the legislation which prevented them from acquiring and 
processing the information upon which the government was acting, and how the king tried to 
sustain his ability to control his subjects’ access to knowledge.11 
The chapter will therefore pose two main questions.  Firstly, it will ask why the 
Printing Act lapsed in 1679.  It will use records of parliamentary debate, parliamentary 
journals, and state papers to assess the broader political context around the expiration of the 
Act, and will then read against the grain of contemporary printed sources and more records of 
parliamentary debate, to assess how contingent moments and political beliefs and agendas 
combined to contribute to the lapse.  And secondly, it will ask how the press was regulated 
after the Act expired.  It will use state papers, Stationers Company records and manuscript 
material to explore how the king tried to compensate for the absence of a legal basis for press 
regulation, and to gauge how the lapse influenced and was indicative of the way in which the 
balance of political power changed towards the end of Charles II’s reign. 
In asking these two broader questions, this chapter intends to assess how politicians 
were developing their political agendas and thinking about the ends to which they were 
practising politics.  How did different policy change the way in which people practised 
politics, and how did practice influence policy?  And it aims to draw out how ideas about 
access to and freedom of information shaped and changed the constitutional functions of 
parliament and the king.  Once the Printing Act had lapsed, how did Charles cope with the 
absence of a statutory basis for intervening in print, publication and the circulation of ideas, 
and what effect did his new approach have on the political culture of his last three 
parliaments? 
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The expiration of the Printing Act in April 1679 has received relatively little scholarly 
attention in its own right, and where it has been studied it has largely been treated as a by-
product of much larger processes or topics of debate.  Some historians who have studied it 
have identified the lapse as an important instance in which information and expression was 
temporarily made freer than at other points in the early modern period.
12
  Often spanning 
centuries, their studies have read the temporary lapse in 1679 as an earlier version, in a 
gradual evolution of public opinion, of the modern liberal ideals of freedom of expression 
which would emerge properly and permanently with the final lapse of pre-publication 
licensing in 1695.  In doing so, they have managed to connect the lapse of 1679 with deeper 
and longer currents of change through the course of history and have elevated this commonly 
overlooked event in the latter stages of Charles II’s reign to being an important component of 
the political and intellectual history of England and Britain. 
In other histories, generally written over a shorter chronology, the lapse of 1679 has 
been depicted as another feature of a succession of crisis years at the end of the 1670s, in 
which political power was intensely contested across a diversity of political and religious 
topics.
13
  Historians of this approach have regarded the lapse as a by-product of parliament 
and the king’s combined pre-occupation with other more important topics and their 
subsequent inability to take effective measures to renew the Act amid contingent moments of 
political and religious turmoil.  The Act’s expiration and the lack of renewal, these histories 
have suggested, was one of many aspects of a changing political culture, wherein elite debate 
moved into the public arena and politics was redefined by the search for popular approbation.  
By taking this approach and trying to fix the lapse in a political, religious and economic 
context, these histories, importantly, have taken the first steps to exploring the connection 
between Restoration-period discussions about information and the shape of the political 
culture in which they took place. 
But there is still scope to study the lapse in its own right, to assess whether it was just 
a by-product of other processes and debates, or whether it was itself a meeting ground for 
discussions of state building and the negotiation of power.  In spite of existing histories’ 
many successes so far, there are still questions to be asked of how contemporaries of the 
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lapse thought about freedom of expression, and how they constructed and represented 
arguments about the role of information in society in order to try to change the world around 
them.  So was it the case that licensing lapsed because the idea of less restrained information 
was creeping in to the public consciousness, and so events like this were bound to start 
happening more often, or that the Act expired because politicians pre-occupied with more 
important topics or lacking in opportunity did not manage to renew it?  Or, as the end of the 
1670s approached, was there any intellectual and ideological case being made for less 
restraint, which itself shaped the course of events and led to the lapse?  Was the freedom of 
information something which appeared or disappeared as an end point to other processes?  Or 
should sources concerned with the freedom of expression be read in inversion, to explore 
properly the relationship between people’s statements about the correct role of information 
and broader debates about the balance of power and nature of the constitution.  While 
historians so far have provided a number of interesting positions from which to regard the 
lapse, we need to take contemporary discussion of the event more seriously, and to recognise 
their debates as a method of describing and realising their broader political and religious 
ambitions.  Instead of being the end point, perhaps the lapse of licensing was actually an 
important means to an end instead.
14
 
The 1662 Printing Act lapsed in 1679 for two main reasons.  The first is that the 
Commons committee appointed to renew it as it expired did not get chance to do so amid the 
constant disruption inflicted on parliament by the king.  The second is that there was a vocal 
movement at the time of the lapse for a freedom of information and the liberty of the press. 
The three parliaments which sat between 6
th
 March 1679 and 28
th
 March 1681 hosted 
some of the most intense political debate ever witnessed under a Stuart monarch.  Discussion 
was dominated in both the house of commons and house of lords by open debate on the 
dynamic of power between king and parliament.  This negotiation, and the disruptions in 
parliament which occurred as a result, changed how politics and religion were practised for 
the rest of Charles II’s reign.  Charles intervened so frequently as the 1670s became the 
1680s because the nature and content of parliamentary debate at that time conflicted with 
how he thought parliament should go about ‘securing the true protestant religion, and the 
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peaceable and happy government of this his kingdom’.15  The two main features of the 
parliamentary debate which therefore led to and sustained the lapse of licensing during the 
last three parliaments of Charles II’s reign were exclusion and political impeachment. 
 Parliament hotly debated the exclusion, and similar policies, of the duke of York ‘to 
inherit the imperial crown’ as the 1670s became the 1680s.16  The decision to intervene 
against the duke of York’s succession split both houses, although neither support for it nor 
opposition to it ever really formed into two coherent and distinct groups.  Those who 
supported interrupting the descent of the crown, by whatever means, to the duke of York 
often differed greatly on how it should be done.  And those against such policies often 
opposed them for a diversity of reasons.  But broadly speaking, support or opposition to 
policies intervening in James’ succession was based upon two things.  The first thing which 
informed politicians’ opinions on this topic was the question of whether the balance of 
political power should be tipped away from the king and in favour of parliament, or whether 
a political hierarchy should be sustained with the king at its head and with everyone beneath 
him subject to his judgement.  The second reason why a member of either house might 
support or oppose interrupting the descent of the crown was based on whether or not they 
believed that the established protestant religion would be in danger if James was allowed to 
ascend to the throne.   
The first bill for disabling the duke of York was conceived out of fear for James’ 
perceived ‘zeal for the promotion of the catholic religion, and carrying on the great work’.17  
It was committed to a committee of the whole house in the commons on 21
st
 May 1679, but 
not without dissent.
18
  ‘I desire that there may be no farther proceeding in this bill’, thundered 
Thomas Clarges.  ‘If I did think that the person of the king, laws, or religion were in danger 
without this bill, I would give my consent to it with as great alacrity as any body; but this bill 
seems to me to hazard the king’s life’.19  The king agreed with Clarges, at least in part, and 
parliament was prorogued before the committee could make any consideration of the bill.
20
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The second attempt to disrupt the descent of the crown, this time as a ‘bill to disable 
James duke of Yorke to inherit the imperial crown of England and Ireland’, was read a third 
time in the Commons on 11
th
 November 1680, after only a week-long debate.
21
  The strongest 
endorsement of the bill came from Goodwin Wharton.  ‘Passing this bill is in order to our 
security only, and therefore it is just,’ he asserted.  ‘The duke has done his utmost endeavour 
to ruin this nation, and to destroy us all’.22  William Jones agreed with Wharton’s sentiment, 
and said ‘I have as much respect for the duke as any person, but I must have respect to 
religion above all things … We do not punish the duke as a criminal, but we are preventing 
the evil that is likely to befall us from that religion he professes’.23  But ‘to hear a prince thus 
spoken of’, Lord Castleton cried, ‘I am not able to endure it!’.24  And Colonel Legge 
observed that ‘many Laws have been made about the succession of the crown, but none 
without blood and misery.  My father was twice condemned to die for asserting the right of 
the crown, and I hope I shall never forsake it’.25  Nevertheless, the bill was passed that day.  
Unfortunately for the Commons, however, it was then rejected in the Lords four days later, 
on the 15
th
.
26
   
On 20
th
 December, the Commons made an address to the king which indicated their 
continuing favour of the policy of exclusion.
27
  On 4
th
 January 1681 the king replied, saying 
that he was ‘sorry to see their thoughts so wholly fixed upon the bill of exclusion’.28  Three 
days later, in contradiction to the king’s reply, the Commons resolved ‘that there is no 
security or safety for the protestant religion, the king's life, or the well constituted and 
established government of this kingdom, without passing a bill for disabling James duke of 
York to inherit the imperial crown of England and Ireland’.29  They also resolved that ‘untill 
a bill be passed for excluding the duke of York, this house cannot give any supply to his 
majesty without danger to his majesty's person, extreme hazard to the protestant religion, and 
unfaithfulness to those by whom this house is entrusted’.30  Perhaps unsurprisingly, three 
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days later, on 10
th
 January 1681, the king again prorogued parliament.
31
  He then dissolved it 
on the 18
th
. 
Expedients for securing the protestant religion and the safety of the king’s person 
were again debated in Oxford on 26
th
 March 1681.
32
   Again, policies against the duke of 
York were vociferously supported.  ‘I have been long of opinion’, Lord Russell announced, 
‘that nothing but excluding the duke, &c. can secure us’.33  Sir Francis Russell agreed to an 
extent, but insisted that while ‘a bill for excluding the duke is a good expedient; let both that 
and others, as they are proffered, be considered’.34  The house ordered that a committee be 
formed to draw up a new bill to disable James from inheriting the crown.
35
  The bill received 
its first reading on the 28
th 
March.
36
  But keen for it not to go any further than that, Charles 
called the Commons to him only hours later and dissolved parliament for the last time, never 
to call another during his reign. 
At the same time as debating exclusion, parliament followed a relentless policy of 
political impeachment.  The house of commons in particular attempted to reorganise politics 
by proceeding against a number of individuals who collectively made up Charles’ apparatus 
for rule.  When Charles opened his third parliament after having dissolved the Cavalier 
Parliament six weeks earlier, he immediately warned both houses against ‘fatal differences 
among ourselves’.37  Within a week, on 12th March, the earl of Shaftesbury called for a new 
consideration of the impeachments pending at the end of the last session.
38
  The next day, the 
king prorogued parliament for two days in order to test whether they could ‘take notice of 
what [he] said at the opening’.39  On 26th March the Lords passed a bill to banish and disable 
the earl of Danby and sent it to the Commons for their concurrence.
40
  The Commons rejected 
it and instead passed a bill for Danby’s attainder.41  On 26th May, when the Lords sent a 
message to the Commons requesting a conference on the amendments to the Bill for the 
better securing the liberty of the subject, the Commons committee for that bill replied that 
‘since the Lords have not thought fit to give such satisfactory answers to the propositions 
formerly made by them as they required, they have received instructions from their house to 
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give no answer to the propositions made by the Lords’.42  The next day, on 27th May, Charles 
assembled parliament and announced ‘that there are such differences between the two houses, 
that … very ill effects will come of them’, and he prorogued parliament again, then to 
dissolve it six weeks later on 12
th
 July 1679.
43
  And again, at Oxford on 25
th
 March 1681, the 
Commons sent a message to the Lords asking them to reconsider the lower house’s judgment 
against Danby, made almost two years before.
44
  As a result, on 28
th
 March, Charles noted to 
both houses that ‘we are not like to have a good end, when the divisions at the beginning are 
such’, and dissolved parliament once and for all.45 
The attack on Charles’ apparatus for rule which had begun with the attempts to 
impeach Danby were at their most intense during the second exclusion parliament, of 1680, 
and was one of the main reasons for why parliament was disrupted so much at this time.  
Having already begun proceedings against Danby, parliament began their campaign of 
impeachments in earnest in autumn 1680.  On 10
th
 November 1680 the house of commons 
ordered the committee appointed to examine the journals of the last two parliaments to sit de 
die in diem, and, starting with Lord Stafford, began the process of impeaching the five 
catholic lords in the Tower.
46
  Three days later, on the 13
th
, the house resolved ‘that Sir 
George Jefferyes, by traducing and obstructing petitioning for the sitting of this parliament, 
hath betrayed the right of the subject’.47  A committee was appointed to draw up an address 
for his removal.  On the 17
th
, a similar committee was appointed after it was resolved ‘that an 
address be made to his majesty, humbly to desire his majesty to remove George earl of 
Hallifax from his majesty's presence and councils for ever’.48  On the 19th, after just six days 
of writing, the address regarding Jeffreys was read to the Commons and ordered to be taken 
up to the king.
49
  The next day, after Secretary Jenkins had informed the lower house that 
Charles would consider their address about Jeffreys, Gilbert Gerald then acquainted the 
Commons with articles of ‘high crimes, misdemeanors and offences’ against Edward 
Seymour.
50
  Seymour was accused of mishandling money voted for the upkeep of the navy, 
and for abusing his position by knowingly receiving an over-payment of salary and 
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fraudulently selling the goods of a seized Dutch warship.
51
  Two days later, on 22
nd
 
November, the address on Halifax was read in the Commons.  Halifax was accused of ‘evil 
and pernicious counsels’ to the king, and hence of being responsible for both the prorogations 
of the present parliament and the dissolution of the last, and the ‘manifold dangers and 
mischiefs’ which grew out of the disruption.52  It took the king four days to inform the 
Commons that he did ‘not find the grounds in the address of this house to be sufficient to 
induce him to remove the earl of Halifax’.53  Parliamentary proceedings against Halifax 
therefore went no further. 
 On 24
th
 November, the Commons began their next impeachment, after having 
resolved that there was sufficient evidence to proceed against Francis North, chief justice of 
the court of common pleas.
54
  Then, on the 26
th
, they decided that the articles against Edward 
Seymour were enough to proceed with his impeachment.
55
  The same day, the committee for 
privileges reported in the Lords on the method of Stafford’s trial, and it was decided that the 
trial would begin the following Tuesday, the 30
th
.
56
  The trial lasted for a week, with 
judgement being delivered on 7
th
 December, at which point Stafford was found guilty by a 
vote of 55 to 31.
57
  Stafford was sentenced to be hanged, drawn and quartered.  But, at the 
direction of the king, the Lords later declared that Stafford should only be beheaded, to the 
agreement of the Commons two days later.
58
 
On 17
th
 December, after three weeks of preparation, Edward Seymour’s impeachment 
was read and agreed to in the Commons.
59
  It was sent up to the Lords three days later, and on 
8
th
 of January 1681 the date of Seymour’s trial was chosen.60  On 23rd December 1680, the 
Commons began yet another set of impeachments.  The lower house agreed with the report of 
the committee examining the proceedings of judges in Westminster Hall, and agreed on a 
number of points for action.  The Commons resolved that that there were four instances in 
which the judges’ actions had been arbitrary and illegal, one in which they had acted illegally 
and in ‘high breach of the liberty of the subject’, and one instance of scandal to the 
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reformation which ‘tend[ed] to raise discord between his majesty and his subjects’.61  The 
lower house resolved that William Scroggs, chief justice of the court of the king’s bench, 
Thomas Jones, one of the justices of the court of the king’s bench, and Richard Weston, one 
of the barons of the court of the exchequer, would all be impeached on the strength of the 
report.  The matter was referred to the committee already writing the impeachment against 
Francis North. 
The next day, on 24
th
 December, the committee appointed to examine a complaint 
against the clerk Richard Thompson, for misdemeanours against the privilege of the 
Commons by publishing controversial material regarding the popish plot, reported to the 
house.
62
  After over six weeks of his having been held in custody, the lower house resolved 
that Thompson had, among other things, defamed the king, preached sedition and attempted 
to subvert the liberty of the subject.
63
  He was therefore to be impeached upon the report and 
resolutions of the house.  On 3
rd
 January 1681, the committee appointed to prepare the 
impeachment against Lord Chief Justice Scroggs reported to the Commons, and the articles 
were agreed to and sent up to the Lords on the 5
th
.
64
  The lower house aimed to impeach 
Scroggs on a number of points, amongst which was his obstruction of a ‘bill of indictment 
against James duke of Yorke, for absenting himself from church’.65  While the Lords 
considered Scroggs’ impeachment, the Commons next ordered on 6th January for the earl of 
Tyrone to be impeached for high treason for his involvement in a plot in Ireland, though the 
charges did not come to anything before parliament was dissolved and moved to Oxford.
66
   
On 7
th
 January, the house of lords read the articles of impeachment against William 
Scroggs.  The question was propounded whether he should be committed or not, but it was 
resolved that that should not be asked of the house.  Instead, the Lords decided that Scroggs 
should pay bail of 10,000L, ‘with two sufficient sureties to be bound with him in 5,000L 
apiece; upon condition, that he shall attend upon this court from time to time, till he be 
discharged of his impeachment brought up from the house of commons’.67  The Lords 
decided not to ask Charles to remove Scroggs from office. 
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Overall, therefore, between 10
th
 November 1680 and 24
th
 March 1681 (a period of just 
four and a half months) parliament had begun nine impeachments, six of which were against 
some of the most important political figures of Charles’ reign.  The earl of Halifax was a 
member of the inner privy council and the king’s spokesman in parliament, and had led the 
opposition to the second exclusion bill in the house of lords on the king’s behalf.  George 
Jeffreys was the recorder of the city of London, which was a powerful administrative position 
appointed at the prerogative of the king.  He had also played a prominent role in the 
prosecution of publishers, like Francis Smith and Benjamin Harris, who supported and 
printed the pro-exclusion sentiments of the earl of Shaftesbury and his supporters.  Edward 
Seymour was the speaker of the house of commons and was an at times vocal supporter of 
the monarchy in his opposition to the bills to exclude James from succeeding to the throne.  
He had also been a privy councillor and treasurer of the king’s navy, another position 
appointed by the king.  Francis North, another privy councillor, and attorney general, assisted 
the drafting of the king’s proclamation against petitions of 1679 (to which we will pay closer 
attention shortly).  William Scroggs was lord chief justice of the court of the king’s bench, 
which was yet another position appointed by and answerable to the king.  As lord chief 
justice, Scroggs’ power to interpret (or manipulate, depending on point of view) the law 
meant that the significance and application of legislation passed in parliament could be 
altered in court proceedings according to the king’s direction.  And the other judges, of the 
court of the kings bench and court of the exchequer, whom we will count as one 
impeachment, were again appointed by and answerable to the king.   
The Commons’ campaign of impeachment throughout the winter of 1680-81 was 
undoubtedly, therefore, an attack on the means by which the king could develop and 
implement policy.  By directing themselves against privy councillors and judges, the 
Commons sought to remove both Charles’ main advisors through whom his policies were 
developed, and the main agents by which his policies were implemented.  Although the direct 
effectiveness of the lower house’s impeachments is questionable, since the majority of them 
were rebuffed or sufficiently delayed by Charles’ interventions for them to come to nothing, 
the by-product of the Commons’ policy was very significant.  The Commons’ impeachments 
were one of the reasons why parliament was prorogued and dissolved so often, and therefore 
one of the reasons why licensing lapsed and was not renewed during Charles’ last three 
parliaments. 
Charles had dissolved the Cavalier Parliament on 24
th
 January 1679.  In the following 
two years, and to each subsequent parliament, he outlined his expectations of both houses a 
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number of times.  For instance, on opening the new parliament on 6
th
 March 1679, Charles 
stated his ‘most earnest desire … to unite the minds of all [his] subjects, both to [him], and to 
one another’, through the continuance of a ‘healing parliament’.68  He would not, he 
suggested, tolerate a parliament which would be ‘drawn to promote private animosities, under 
pretences of the public’.69  Charles reiterated these intentions to both houses after the 
prorogations of 1680, when he insisted on ‘a perfect union amongst ourselves’, which, as he 
saw it, would involve ‘preserving the succession of the crown in its due and legal course of 
descent’.70  And again, on 21st March 1681, upon opening his Oxford Parliament, Charles 
urged them to use ‘the example of the ill success of former heats [to] dispose [them] to a 
better temper’, in order that ‘religion might be preserved, and the monarchy not destroyed’.71  
Parliament’s pursuit of the policies of political impeachment and the exclusion of the duke of 
York therefore directly contradicted Charles’ wishes, and forced the king to intervene.72 
Between calling a new session on 6
th
 March 1679 and dismissing the Oxford 
Parliament on 28
th
 March 1681, Charles disrupted debate by proroguing parliament ten times 
and dissolving it twice.  Because they refuted his expectations of them, the king therefore 
allowed three successive parliaments to sit for a total of only 24 weeks in the space of a little 
over 24 months.  Amid all Charles’ intervention, therefore, and because parliament insisted 
on pursuing impeachment and James’ exclusion above all else when they did meet, licensing 
legislation lapsed. 
Clause XXIV of the 1662 Printing Act required that the legislation was considered for 
renewal every two years.  On 13
th
 April 1677, that year’s renewal of the Act, entitled An Act 
for the more effectual suppressing of unlicensed books and pamphlets, was read a third time 
in the Lords and was passed.
73
  Two years later, on 22
nd
 April 1679, the committee appointed 
to consider expiring laws (which included the Printing Act), was ‘impowered to send as well 
for licensed as unlicensed books, in order to be examined and perused by them’.74  However, 
the committee did not get chance to conclude and report their proceedings to the house before 
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parliament was prorogued on 27
th
 May.  Even worse, both houses were dissolved on 12
th
 
July, meaning that the committee considering the renewal of the Printing Act ceased to exist 
and the legislation remained lapsed for the duration of Charles’ reign.75 
There is clearly evidence to suggest, therefore, that licensing legislation expired in 
April 1679 and remained lapsed because parliament was not permitted by the king to meet 
often enough to renew it.  And when they did get chance to meet, they were largely 
preoccupied with the pursuit of other policies.  But was there the will at this time, either 
within parliament or outside of it, for the Printing Act to be renewed?  Or did people act to 
make sure that after the spring of 1679 licensing legislation no longer existed?  Was the lapse 
of licensing merely incidental, as the product of parliament’s preoccupied collective mind?  
Or was a conscious decision ever made to allow it to lapse?    This section will explore how 
the lapse of licensing was based in the efforts of competing political groups to support their 
ability to make policy at the end of the 1670s by trying to control access to the information on 
which policy decisions were based and their ability to debate that information in public.  
Perhaps the two most coherent theories of press regulation at the time of the lapse were 
Charles Blount’s A just vindication of learning, or, An humble address to the high court of 
parliament in behalf of the liberty of the press, and Roger L’Estrange’s The free-born subject, 
or, The Englishmans birthright asserted against all tyrannical usurpations either in church 
or state.
76
  While it would be difficult to claim with any certainty that Blount and L’Estrange 
were directly talking on behalf of anybody else or any other movement, rather than just 
expressing their own points of view, both pamphlets nonetheless epitomised how people at 
the time were connecting the processes of press restraint with their ability to participate in 
politics.  Reading these pamphlets begins to give us a sense of how contemporaries at the 
time of the lapse understood the relationship between their ability to access and discuss the 
information on which government decisions were being based and their ability to achieve the 
correct balance of power, to take an active role in policymaking, and to realise their broader 
politics, religious and social aims.   
At the heart of both L’Estrange’s and Blount’s work was an examination of ideas of 
oppression and liberty, and the structure of the state.  They both considered the value of 
learning and publication within politics and religion.  And they both asked the question of 
how formalised the system of press regulation should be.  In answering these questions they 
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presented two contradictory theories of press regulation, and their differing points of view on 
this subject were the result of their differing politics.  As we shall see, both theories found 
support and subscription as the 1670s became the 1680s, and contributed to the lapse of 
licensing. 
Charles Blount’s A just vindication has been summarised perfectly by David Wilson, 
who suggests that Blount made a ‘partisan intervention into the politics of the late 1670s, 
linking the campaign against press licensing with exclusion and the struggle against popery 
and arbitrary government’.77  Blount’s pamphlet, published in quarto format under the 
pseudonym Philopatris, put forward an alternative to the orthodox theory of press control.  It 
began with an address to parliament.  ‘The parliaments of England’, Blount wrote, ‘have ever 
been formidable to their neighbours, but you above all others seem to have been reserv’d by 
providence, for those great and weighty affairs which are now in agitation as well at home as 
abroad’.78  Blount therefore made the unorthodox assertion that parliament derived its 
legitimacy from god, and he insisted that only parliament was ‘able to preserve that so 
necessary religion, and sacred property of our British Isle, by continuing (as there now is) a 
protestant head, upon a protestant body’.79 
Blount’s pamphlet and politics were overtly anti-catholic.  In A just vindication he 
described the history of books and their uses for learning, and noted that it was a papal court 
which first introduced ‘a stricter policy of prohibiting [publication]’, by licensing ‘under the 
hands of two or three gluttenous fryers’.80  ‘Learning hath of late years met with an 
obstruction in many places’, Blount wrote, by the prohibition of ‘any book from coming forth 
without an imprimatur; an old relique of popery, only necessary for the concealing of such 
defects of government, which of right ought to be discover'd and amended’.81  ‘However, as 
our government is not sick of the same distemper,’ he continued, ‘so need we not the same 
cure, but rather the contrary: for as an ill face cannot be too closly masqued, so neither can a 
good one be too much exposed’.82  Blount’s disdain for licensing was therefore informed by 
English press control’s resemblance to similar systems in ‘those popish places where the laity 
are most hated and despised’.83  Blount associated the theology and all the apparatus of 
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catholicism, which to his mind included press regulation, with tyrannical government.  ‘This 
licensing of books’, he asserted, ‘is one of the most dangerous and mischeivous monopolies 
and oppressions our government is subject to’.84  Blount thought that to combat tyranny and 
popery ‘nothing would be more conducive than the propagating of wisdom and knowledge … 
[and] for the more speedy effecting hereof, there hath never been discover’d any better 
expedient amongst men, than that of the liberty of the press, whereby whoever opposes the 
publick interest, are exposed and rendered odious to the people’.85  And ‘what can be more 
serviceable to the world’, he asked, ‘than that which hurries men into a necessity either of 
acting virtuously, or of forfeiting their so-much-desired honour forever?  And such I take to 
be the consequence of a free press’.86  Blount believed that the reading public were able to 
identify seditious ideas as they encountered them and of judging a work according to a well-
defined measure of religious and political acceptability.  He implied that the public knew 
correct religious and political practice and that harmful works would make themselves plain 
against this standard as they appeared. 
Blount said that the existing licensing system was an affront to creativity and learning.  
He asked 
what if the author shall be of so copious a fancy, as to have many things well worth the adding, 
come into his mind after licensing, while the book is yet under the press, which frequently 
happens even to the best of writers, and that perhaps a dozen times in one book?  The printer 
dares not go beyond his licensed copy; so often then must the author trudge to his leave-giver, 
that those his new insertions may be view’d; and many a journey will he make 'ere that 
licenser, (for it must be the same man,) can either be found, or be found at leisure; in the mean 
while, either the press must stand still, which is no small damage, or the author lose his most 
correct thoughts, and so send forth his book imperfect.
87
 
Blount’s criticisms of the press regulation system here were based on an idealised and 
somewhat extreme reading of licensing.  He built his argument against censorship by 
considering the system in its perfect form, thereby allowing himself to believe, at least in the 
pages of his pamphlet, that every author or publisher consciously subjected themselves to the 
terms of the licensing laws.  In reality Blount probably knew that printers often went ‘beyond 
their licensed copy’, whether intentionally or not, by publishing passages that had not been 
approved and were therefore technically illegal.  But with this perfect system of regulation in 
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mind, Blount was able to criticise censorship’s preoccupation with stifling debate.  He 
observed that ‘if there be found in a book any one opinion that thwarts the licenser's humour 
… the sense of [the author] shall for all posterity be lost’.88 
Blount’s remedy to the problems he saw in the licensing system was therefore born 
out of his bleak outlook on the motive behind press regulation as it had existed up to the time 
of his writing and his desire for a greater freedom of the circulation of ideas.  His preferred 
system would be based solely on post-publication regulation.  ‘Every author writes either 
truth or falshood’, Blount reasoned.  ‘If he writes truth, why should he be oppressed or 
stifled?  And if he delivers what is false, let him be confuted by answer’.89  ‘I am never 
examined before I speak what I am about to say: so let not my book be censured by one 
interested man alone in private, till it hath tryed the publick test; and then if there be any 
thing ill in it, I am ready to answer for it’.90  Blount suggested that although licensing had 
already lapsed, ‘supposing any such authors are taken and discovered; why, we need no other 
new laws for the punishing of them (as I humbly conceive) then what are already in force’.91  
He concluded by asking if ‘any book may be printed without a license, provided that the 
printers and the authors name, or at least the printers be registred, whether or no this will not 
have all the good, but none of the bad consequence of a licenser?’92  And so Blount’s just 
vindication of learning was complete. 
 Roger L’Estrange’s The free-born subject was at the other end of the scale of press 
regulation theory from Blount.  L’Estrange opened his book with a fairly succinct summary 
of his broader conservative worldview.  ‘By a free-born subject’, he began, ‘is meant a person 
that is born under the protection of the law; and thereby entitled to certain known immunities 
and privileges, as his birthright.  But then he is likewise tied up; by the same law, to certain 
rules and measures of obedience to government.  So that he seems to be free in one respect; 
and subject in another’.93  Subjects should not, according to L’Estrange, ‘so far mistake, 
either the force or the intent of Magna Charta, and the Petition of Right; (by which we claim 
to these liberties) as if by being discharged of our vassalage, we were also discharged of our 
allegiance’.94  L’Estrange noted that ‘it is the law that marques out the metes and bounds both 
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of king and people … and teaches us to distinguish betwixt liberty and sedition’.95  To 
L’Estrange’s mind, then, to break the law was not just a base act of civil disobedience, it was 
a contradiction of the correct political hierarchy, with the king at its head, to which men were 
bound in conscience from birth.  ‘We must onely oppose legal remedies to illegal wrongs’, 
L’Estrange insisted, ‘and not think to deliver our selves from one violence by another.  For 
popular commotions are the most criminal and dangerous of all sorts of oppressions’.96   
 When the dignity of government may be vilified gratis, the kings ministers and friends 
bespattered with Billingsgate libels, and his professed enemies supported and encouraged: 
when his majesties title as well as his prerogative and reputation, shall come to be the subject 
of every bawling pamphlet; and the bounds of sovereign power to be debated by porters and 
carmen, over pots of ale: when not onely the reverend and lawful ministers, and the apostolical 
order of the church, shall be derided and despised; but religion it self pass onely for a sham, a 
piece of priest-craft, and be published in print, for no more in effect then a political art of 
getting a hank upon the people: when such outrages, I say, as these come to be daily committed 
over and over, in the very face of the sun, and the laws suffered to sleep, that should repress, 
and punish them: what can be the event of this inhumane license, but confusion, and ruine? 
And if it comes to that once, it was our own fault, for not putting a timely and a legal stop to 
these audacious usurpations.
97
   
L’Estrange then noted that ‘the positions and the methods that brought on our late troubles, 
are now revived and practiced every day afresh: we have our queries, our remonstrances, and 
all things … most manifestly tending to the unhinging of the government; and as certainly 
designing the subversion of the church and of the state’.98  ‘Their escaping punishment’, he 
suggested, ‘looks as if the government were afraid of the rabble; and then their passing 
without answer, gives a kind of credit to their doctrine’.99 
And, in a typically self-referential moment, L’Estrange aimed ‘to lay open this spirit 
of calumny and slander’ and mentioned that certain stationers had pursued his History of the 
Plot.
100
  The Stationers, according to the surveyor, did ‘not complain of any imitation of their 
copy, but take upon them, as if no man else were to write upon that subject’.101  ‘At this rate’, 
he complained, ‘we shall have all sermons forfeited to the kings printers, for descanting upon 
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their bibles; and all books whatsoever, to the Company of Stationers, because they are made 
out of the four and twenty letters; and the ABC is their copy’.102   
Blount and L’Estrange therefore presented two contradictory solutions to the same 
problem, of how more effectively to regulate the press to the better government of the 
country.  They both asked the same three questions in order to construct their theories of 
press control.  The first question concerned the nature of the state and was the basis for the 
rest of their arguments because it informed their reasons as to why the press should be 
controlled, both up to the time of their writing and also as it should be controlled from then 
on.  In answering this question both Blount and L’Estrange focussed on which agent of the 
political system should be most active in government.  For Blount, it was parliament who was 
responsible for securing church and state and for making sure that the political and religious 
hierarchy was maintained to the preservation of protestantism and of the liberty of the 
subject.  L’Estrange, on the other hand, maintained that power lay with the king.  While 
tyranny and oppression should always be avoided, people should bind themselves to the 
king’s judgement through their allegiance to him as his subjects.   
With their view of correct government established, both authors could then ask the 
second question, of the nature of licensing up to and at the time of their writing.  They both 
criticised the pre-lapse system of press regulation for not allowing for the maintenance of 
correct government as they saw it.  Blount was most concerned about pre-publication 
censorship in the form of licensing.  For him, press control as it stood before the lapse was a 
tyrannous oppression of what could otherwise be flowing, worthwhile and constructive 
debate which would benefit the entire political hierarchy and society at large.  But L’Estrange 
insisted that as it stood licensing allowed for too much discussion of the role of government 
and religion, all of which undermined the monarch’s authority and could ultimately lead to 
civil war.  For L’Estrange, the current system was too open to exploitation by individuals 
hoping to destabilise the balance of political power or to make material gains. 
With the reasons for why the press should be controlled and the ways in which the 
previous system had not been managing it established, Blount and L’Estrange both then 
moved on to suggest how the press should be regulated.  Blount suggested that simply by 
removing pre-publication regulation, ideas would be allowed to move more freely and to 
prove their value during public discourse.  The state would then be able to benefit from those 
ideas which proved their worth, while those which were not valuable or were harmful would 
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be identified as such and could be answered.  L’Estrange wanted the opposite.  He said that 
licensing laws were not sufficiently formal. Tighter laws, L’Estrange thought, would both 
allow the government more efficiently to suppress, answer and prosecute anybody spreading 
ideas which were harmful to church and state and to keep the processes of government 
decision making private and away from public scrutiny. 
Blount and L’Estrange show us that a lot of thought was being put into the theory of 
censorship as the 1670s became the 1680s, because people recognised that the regulation of 
the press was a means to protecting and propagating political and religious theory and 
practice.  The second and third answers which Blount and L’Estrange gave to the questions 
described above were manifestations of their answer to the first.  Because Blount believed 
that parliament (an elected body) was the most important agent in politics, his view of the 
value of a press which would allow for relatively freely circulating information and the need 
for debate followed.  By the same measure, because L’Estrange championed inherited, 
divinely-appointed monarchy, his view of the immunity of that institution in debate and the 
danger of dissent was almost guaranteed.  In 1679 the political point of view adopted 
therefore affected ideas of why and how the press should be controlled, and the apparatus of a 
thus politicised regulation served to support the original political point of view.  One 
necessarily fed into the other.  Blount and L’Estrange ultimately show us that political debate 
and theories of censorship were not distinct.  In fact, the theory of press regulation fed into 
the same discussions of the structure of religion and the state with which mainstream political 
debate was concerned.  Certain agents in political debate after licensing legislation lapsed in 
1679 clearly hoped censorship would remain relaxed, because the room for greater debate 
which followed suited their view of the correct structure of the state. 
The conflicting theories in Blount’s and L’Estrange’s pamphlets were mirrored in the 
practice of parliamentary debate.  Amid the constant disruptions of the sitting of parliament 
between the start of 1679 and its final dissolution in March 1681, one of the main ways in 
which politicians tried still to engage the king in debate was by petitioning.
103
  After Charles’ 
proclamation forbidding tumultuous petitioning of December 1679, debates in the house of 
commons focussed heavily on the extent of the liberty of the press and the freedom of the 
circulation of ideas, because politicians were aware of how connected their political ideology 
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was with their ability to express it freely in practice.  Debate in parliament therefore became 
divided in much the same way that Blount and L’Estrange had been divided in their 
pamphlets on the freedom of the press.  Whether the petitions and the responses to them from 
the ‘abhorrers’ of petitioning were presented by two distinct polarised groups, or whether 
there was some flexibility in support or opposition to them, is one of the most enduring 
debates within the scholarship on the Restoration, and the issue of the emergence of political 
parties has for years received a great deal of attention.
104
  But it is clear that at any given 
time, whether or not either block was made up of a consistent roster of individuals, there was 
strong support both for and against the liberty of the press, the sitting of parliament, and 
parliamentary restrictions on the institution of monarchy. 
‘We must come to some conclusion’, Sir William Jones announced to the house of 
commons on 23
rd
 November 1680.  ‘Here lies such a weight upon us, that we must remove it.  
We have “abhorrers of petitioning for sitting of the parliament,” and here is a proclamation 
against petitioning, &c. and a declaration of the law upon it.  I am afraid, that as it has been 
proclaimed in every market town in England, it has so possessed the people, that it will be a 
hard matter to set them right in their minds’.105  The Proclamation forbidding the joining in 
tumultuous petitions to the king had been printed in the London Gazette on 12
th
 December 
1679.  On 27
th
 October 1680, after months of prorogations and only a few days after 
parliament had been recalled, the house of commons came to discuss the proclamation.  ‘It is 
the subjects right to have liberty to petition the king’, began Gilbert Gerrard.106  ‘Whilst the 
parliament is sitting’, he continued, ‘the king's life is safe, and those who advise the contrary 
would give him up’.107  William Sacheverell, one of the most vociferous members of 
parliament throughout the 1670s, agreed with Gerrard, and went even further.  ‘If any man 
makes a question whether petitioning be our right or not’, Sacheverell thundered, ‘he makes a 
question whether we be freemen or not’.108  Sacheverell even knew who was to blame for the 
king’s action against petitioning.  ‘We may’, he said, ‘be more under slavery than France 
itself.  If the judges shall have such power as to persuade the king to [the proclamation], they 
are masters of the whole government’.109  The Commons resolved nemine contradicente that 
it was the ‘right of the subjects of England, to petition the king for the calling and sitting of 
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parliaments, and redressing all grievances’, and ordered that a committee be appointed to 
inquire of anybody who had subverted that right.
110
  Through the next month, the committee 
drew evidence together against those it thought had influenced the king’s intervention against 
petitioning.  Most significantly, Francis Wythens was expelled from the lower house for 
‘promoting and presenting to his majesty an address, expressing an abhorrency to petition his 
majesty for the calling and sitting of parliaments’.111  And George Jeffreys faced an address 
for his removal out of all public offices for ‘traducing and obstructing petitioning for the 
sitting of this parliament’.112 
On 23
rd
 November 1680, the debate around the proclamation peaked again in the 
lower house, almost a month after they had first come to discuss it.  By this point the 
Commons were even more vigorous. ‘You ought to give this business the honour of a hearing 
at the bar’, asserted Colonel Birch.  ‘Send for the attorney, and charge him with it, for 
through his hands proclamations pass.  Let him give you an account who did it, if he did not; 
a thing by which all the people of England have been deceived’.113  The Commons ordered 
that the attorney should attend the house the following day.  The debate then turned to the 
conduct of the judges in discharging the grand jury of Middlesex.  The Commons thought 
that Lord Chief Justice Scroggs had acted illegally when he discharged the jury before the 
end of the term.  ‘The jury was blamed by the chief justice’, William Jones said, ‘and told, 
“that they meddled with matters which concerned them not,” (when they tendered the petition 
for sitting of the parliament)’.  According to Jones, Scroggs had told the jury “that the bench 
were too good men to go of their errands”’.  ‘But’, Jones observed, ‘the petition of abhorring, 
&c. for Essex and Kent, the judges brought very willingly to the king’.114  By contrast, in 
Middlesex when the clerk had informed the court that the petition for the sitting of parliament 
was upon file, according to Jones, Scroggs had replied that ‘[the clerk] is not to give rules to 
the court’ and had discharged the jury.115 
This episode in Middlesex was important to the Commons, because the by their 
actions the judges had sought to remove the Commons’ ability to participate in policy 
making.  The lower house believed that ‘if a grand jury be discharged whilst indictments are 
depending, (under favour) there can be no proceedings of justice’.116  ‘All misdemeanours’, 
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Henry Capel insisted, ‘and what is amiss in the nation, the judges must rectify’.117  Francis 
Winnington agreed, suggesting that ‘the judges are but the great trustees betwixt the king and 
his people … Shall we have law when they please to let us, and when they do not please, 
shall we have none?’.118  Then, ‘would the parliament enquire into the actions of a privy-
counsellor’, Colonel Titus added, ‘they are checked by a prorogation, and then they advise to 
dissolve the parliament’.  ‘We are told by the proclamation’, he continued, ‘“that petitioning 
for the sitting of the parliament is against law”.  And would a jury enquire after popish 
recusants, before they had made their presentments they are sent home’.119  And the 
discussion was summarised and concluded by Henry Powle: 
Printing I take now to be free; after the dissolution of the last parliament, the act for regulating 
the press expired, and the old law remained.  This was referred to the judges to consider, and 
they did agree, “that there was no remedy against the liberty of the press, without a new law”.  
A few days after, some of the judges were removed, and the rest were of another opinion, and 
an extrajudicial judgment passed, by which pamphlets were suppressed.  There are two reasons 
for calling parliaments; one for raising of money, the other for making laws, as the legislative 
power, upon any new emergencies.  But if judges can be found, to make new laws, by their 
interpretation of old ones, and if treasurers can be found, to make such retrenchments in the 
king’s family, you will never have a parliament.120 
The house resolved nemine contradicente that ‘the discharging of a grand jury, by any judge, 
before the end of the term, assizes, or sessions, whilst matters are under their consideration, 
and not presented, is arbitrary, illegal, destructive to public justice, a manifest violation of his 
oath, and is a means to subvert the fundamental laws of this kingdom’.121  They also 
appointed a committee to examine the judges proceedings in Westminster Hall, and from this 
point onward the impeachment of the judges, mentioned above, began in earnest.   
This debate in the house of commons, on 23
rd
 November 1680, demonstrated that 
discussions of the correct means of press regulation were not confined as theories to the 
pages of pamphlets written by those such as Blount and L’Estrange.  In fact, censorship and 
the press were discussed openly alongside and within wider political debate.  While it is 
difficult to know whether or not members of the second exclusion parliament (during which 
the above debate took place) ever read Blount’s pamphlet, the similarities between the 
arguments in A just vindication and those put forward in the lower house are striking.  The 
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Commons, for the most part, saw Charles’ proclamation against petitioning as an illegal 
intervention into the rights of his subjects.  Like Blount, they maintained that the liberty of 
the subject from oppression must be supported by a greater liberty of the press.  Men like 
William Jones, Francis Winnington, William Sacheverell and Colonel Titus, who dominated 
the Commons at this time, evidently hoped that after licensing had lapsed it would not be 
tightened up again.  For the Commons, the lapse of licensing meant, for instance, the freedom 
to debate the conduct of the judges in Westminster and to propose remedies to such problems, 
which otherwise would not have been allowed.  It is therefore understandable that they 
became so alarmed when Charles tried to re-formalise press control and the regulation of the 
circulation of information through his proclamation against petitioning of 1679.  So here 
again, opinions about the freedom of the circulation of information were manifestations of 
and the basis for wider arguments about the structure of the state and the relative roles of king 
and parliament within the political hierarchy.  Licensing lapsed because a vocal portion of 
parliament wanted it to do so.   
 
II 
 
After the expiration of the Printing Act in April 1679, the way in which the government 
engaged with ideas by regulating the press changed.  With the lapse of licensing, the clearest 
expression of the theory of press control and the legal basis for the practice of censorship 
ceased to exist.  At the same time, the disruptions inflicted on parliament by the king meant 
that one of the main agents of press control was inactive for much of 1679, 1680 and 1681.  
So, how did the lapse of licensing affect what was published?  How was the press regulated 
after the lapse?  And what effect did the lapse of licensing have on the way in which the 
authorities engaged with the press?  This section will examine the theory and practice of how 
the press was regulated once the Printing Act had expired. 
After licensing lapsed, there was both a quantitative and qualitative change in 
publication.  Between the start of 1676 and the end of 1678, annual book production in 
London did not exceed 957 titles.  In 1679, that figure rose to 1,448 titles.  In 1680, 1,833 
titles were published.  And in 1681, 1,681 titles appeared.
122
  In addition to this increase, the 
annual number of entries of copy by stationers in the Stationers Company register decreased 
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after the expiration of the Printing Act.
123
  Between 1
st
 May 1677 and 30
th
 April 1678, 110 
single entries of copy were made in the register.
124
  Between 1
st
 May 1678 and 30
th
 April 
1679, 96 entries were made in the register.
125
  But in the same period for 1679-1680 the 
number of single entries decreased to 54, and in the last quarter of that period only four 
entries were made in the register.
126
  Between 1
st
 May 1680 and 30
th
 April 1681, just 12 
entries were made.
127
  And in the same period 1681-1682, 21 single entries of copy were 
made.
128
   
Contemporaries of the lapse were aware of the increase in publication, and many of 
them attributed it to the new liberty of the press.  But they also knew that there had been a 
change in the content of printed material as well.  On 31
st
 May 1679, a little more than a 
month after the Printing Act had expired, Mr Bouell wrote to Mr Watts, enclosing ‘a printed 
copy of the narrative and reasons of the house of commons why the earl of Danby should be 
tried before the five lords in the Tower’.  ‘There has’, Bouell said, ‘been three several 
impressions of it in two days time, and twice seized: once by order of the court and once by 
order of our lord mayor.  But this publication cannot be prevented, they are so thick brought 
up’.129  Similarly, on 5th July, Robert Southwell wrote to the duke of Ormond, saying that ‘I 
am told that now the press is at liberty one Dr Burlace, who lives about Chester, is actually 
printing that narrative of the Irish rebellion, which I sent your grace’.130  On 6th September, 
the judge Henry Hatsell wrote to Thomas Littleton at Plympton, informing him that London 
‘swarms with pamphlets.  Two or three appear each day’.131  On 25th September, John Verney 
wrote to his father Ralph, saying that ‘it’s the custom now of most elected members to be 
libelled.  Yesterday came out one against Sir John Stonehouse and the Abingdon choice’.132   
Such observations on the volume and type of publication sustained into 1680.  On 
22
nd
 January 1680, Thomas Dixon wrote to Daniel Fleming about a controversy between the 
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London booksellers and Oxford University over selling bibles.  ‘Tis verily believed’, wrote 
Dixon, ‘the university booksellers – whereof Moses Pitt is now the cheifest – will carry it and 
will thereby enjoy a liberty of printing the said bibles, the prohibitory act whereby they were 
limited and restrained pro tempore being lately expired’.133  On 24th June, William Denton 
told Ralph Verney that ‘there are most abominable libels that walk in the dark, but no getting 
sight of them’.134  Two weeks later, Verney heard from his son John again, who told him that 
‘there is a terrible answer to the king’s late declaration about the succession come forth of 
about three sheets of paper; they are thrown into coaches, and one of them dropt at the king’s 
feet at Windsor as he was walking in the court’.135  And on 26th August, Secretary Jenkins 
wrote to Laurence Hyde, saying that another libel, called A relation of two free conferences 
between father La Chaise and four considerable Jesuits, had emerged.  Jenkins hoped god 
would protect the king from the malice of such libels.
136
 
The use of quantitative data in this way is not meant to say that the expiration of the 
Printing Act was the only reason for the increase in publication at this time.  There was a 
general increase in the production of printed material under the house of Stuart.  But the lapse 
of licensing certainly led to a disproportionate increase against the general seventeenth 
century trend in the volume of printed material reaching the public.  The licensing laws which 
existed until April 1679 aimed to regulate, and to an extent restrict, the flow of ideas in print.  
Until the lapse of licensing, it had also been a legal requirement for stationers to enter their 
copy in the Company register.  Directly after the expiration of the Printing Act, the number of 
publications disproportionately increased, and stationers stopped registering their copy.  And 
with the growth in volume of publication came a growth in the amount of sedition.  Whether 
or not this increase in harmful material was proportionate to the increase in material overall is 
difficult to say, but to men like John Verney and Robert Southwell it was quite apparent that 
with the lapse of licensing came a noticeable increase in the publication of libels.  The 
contemporaneity of the lapse and the changes described above suggests, therefore, that one of 
the main effects of the lapse of licensing in 1679 was that the volume of unchecked and 
unapproved publication increased dramatically. 
So how did the authorities react to these changes in publication?  Even though the 
Printing Act had disappeared, that is not to say that the authorities’ desire to engage the press 
had expired as well.  As L’Estrange demonstrated in The free-born subject, there was still a 
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strong case being made as the 1670s became the 1680s for the reintroduction of formal press 
regulation.  As it always had done, a more formal press control would mean both legislation 
against sedition, and the prosecution of libels if and when they appeared.  
 As the qualitative and quantitative changes in publication played out, the agents of 
press control still tried to engage the press through a number of new directives and pieces of 
legislation.  On 4
th
 August 1679, the Stationers Company ‘ordered that noe member of this 
company shall hereafter print, publish, sell or expose to sale or cause to be printed, published 
or exposed to sale any book, pamphlet, portraiture, picture or paper unlesse such printer or 
printer [sic] shall thereunto print his and their name and names or the name of such person or 
persons that shall put or cause the same to be printed or published upon paine of forfeiting to 
the master and keepers or wardens and commonialty of the mistery or art of stacioners of the 
citty of London the summe of 20L’.137  That same day, the Stationers also appointed a 
committee to wait upon the lord mayor to ask him ‘to take some effectuall course for the 
putting down of hawkers and bawlers’.138  The lord mayor having obliged them, on 1st 
September the Stationers ordered that ‘the order of sessions for suppressing of the hawkers 
now read by the clerk be forthwith printed’.139  On 31st October, the king issued a 
proclamation offering a reward of 40L to anyone who during the next year should discover 
the author or printer of any of the seditious and treasonable books and pamphlets lately 
published.  Charles also promised a pardon to any hawker or disposer thereof who discovered 
the bookseller or printer who supplied them, and to any bookseller or printer who identified 
the authors.
140
  On 1
st
 December, the Stationers ordered that no assignment should pass the 
table unless drawn up by the clerk.
141
 
The new legislative attempts to regulate the press continued into 1680 and through 
into 1681.  On 12
th
 May 1680, Charles issued another proclamation for suppressing 
unlicensed news books and pamphlets of news.
142
  On 2
nd
 August, the Stationers Company 
made another new by-law which said that stationers must put their name to publications, and 
ordered for it to be ‘printed and one of them to be delivered to every member of this company 
dealeing in books’.143  On 6th December 1680, the Stationers Company ordered, about several 
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printers, ‘that what almanacks they have usually printed shall not be removed from such 
printer without order of the table for that purpose’.144  On 11th March 1681, the king and 
privy council ordered the Stationers to put into execution their by-law of 22
nd
 August 1679 
about printers attaching their names to their publications.
145
  And on 15
th
 March, Secretary 
Jenkins wrote to the lord mayor of London, saying that the king ‘approves very well of your 
lordships searching for armes’, and asks that ‘strict enquiry be made after the authors, and 
dispensers of such seditious papers and letters as are at this time scattered abroad in order to 
amuse the credulous, distract the fearfull and allarme all sorts of men’.146 
There were therefore persistent attempts as the 1670s became the 1680s to create 
legislation which would address the changes in publication after the lapse of licensing.  
However, the legislation which was made after the Printing Act expired demonstrated that, 
unlike earlier in the Restoration period, once licensing had lapsed the theoretical basis for the 
regulation of the press was the king’s prerogative power.  Parliament was completely absent 
from any attempt to legislate against the increase in publication and sedition.  The only time 
that parliament intervened in post-lapse press regulation was either to protect its members or 
to propagate its own policies and dominant ideology.   
On 9
th
 November 1680 the Commons sent for Richard Janeway for printing a 
pamphlet called The popish damnable plot against Sir Edward Dering.
147
  On the 13
th
, after 
having been called in, Janeway told the lower house that the pamphlet he published was 
printed by Everingham, Bradwell, Thomas James, Samuel Lee, and Thomas Symonds, and 
that Andrew Yarington had delivered the copy from which it was printed.
148
  Two days later, 
the printers whom Janeway had mentioned were called into the house and examined.  The 
Commons declared all parts of the pamphlet which reflected on Dering to be ‘false, 
scandalous, and libellous’, and committed all of the printers into the custody of the sergeant-
at-arms.
149
  By the 18
th
 November, all of them had paid their fees and had been released. 
At the end of January 1680, Benjamin Harris had been tried and sentenced for his 
printing and selling An appeal from the city to the country.  By November 1680, Harris had 
been in prison for nine months, and had still not paid the 500L fine levied on him by the court 
of king’s bench.  On 19th November, Harris petitioned the Commons.  The house resolved 
that ‘an humble application be made to his majesty from this house, by such members of this 
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house as are of his majesty’s most honourable privy council, to desire his majesty to pardon 
and remit the fine’.150  Four days later, on the 23rd, the Commons appointed a committee to 
‘prepare a further address to his majesty … humbly to desire his majesty to pardon and remit 
the fine set upon Benjamin Harris’.151  On 24th November, Harris petitioned the Lords, asking 
for ‘their lordship’s compassion on a poor and undone protestant’, but no action was taken in 
the upper house at that time.
152
  The address regarding Harris’ pardon prepared by a 
Commons committee was agreed to in the lower house on 21
st
 December, and was sent to the 
king.
153
  It was read in the privy council committee of investigation on Christmas day, but 
‘the king did not declare his pleasure upon it’.154  Unfortunately for both Harris and the 
Commons, no decision was reached before parliament was dissolved the following January. 
The most basic observation to make about press control after the expiration of the 
Printing Act, therefore, is that the quantity of libellous material reaching the public became 
and remained higher after the lapse than it had been before.  That said, we should not focus 
on the ineffectiveness of post-lapse regulation, but should rather ask why censorship played 
out how it did, and what it tells us about the period.  Once the Printing Act had expired in 
April 1679, the regulation of the press rested on the king’s prerogative.  But the authorities 
found it difficult to engage with the press.  After the lapse, the king and Stationers Company 
still had something to lose.  The king still needed to protect his position at the head of the 
political hierarchy and the established church, and the Stationers Company as an institution 
still had an interest in preserving their commercial monopoly over publication.  As a result, 
they legislated against and pursued works which were harmful, libellous and unauthorised as 
they appeared.  However, the large-scale and relatively organised prosecutions which had 
existed before the lapse of licensing no longer took place once the Printing Act had expired.  
The largest and most systematic pursuit of a libel which happened after the lapse of licensing 
was the investigation of A letter to a person of honour concerning the black box.  The pursuit 
of this publication incorporated a system of informants and messengers which would not 
have looked out of place before the lapse of licensing, but ultimately the investigation came 
to nothing.  Nobody was tried as either the author or publisher of the libel, and nobody was 
identified as being a seller or distributor of it either.  The case ended with the king making 
three declarations against its contents, which said that he had married the duke of 
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Monmouth’s mother, making Monmouth a legitimate contender for the throne, and 
eventually debate around it subsided.
155
 
The main reason for press regulation proceeding as it did after the expiration of the 
Printing Act was the relationship between the king and parliament.  In the years immediately 
after the lapse, Charles barely allowed parliament to meet.  For much of the time, then, one of 
the main contributors to the system of press regulation before licensing lapsed, after its 
expiration was not in a position to contribute.  When parliament did sit, its contributions to 
the regulation of the press aimed only to serve its own interests.  Any sense in parliament’s 
policy towards the press of the need to preserve the political and religious orthodoxy had 
disappeared as licensing lapsed.  Instead of acknowledging that regulation had passed to 
being conducted according to the king’s prerogative, the Commons saw it as an arbitrary 
exercise of his power.
156
  So, while the agents of press regulation had never completely 
pulled in the same direction, they had never quite pulled apart to the same extent as they did 
after the Printing Act expired in April 1679. 
Overall then, licensing lapsed in 1679 for two main reasons.  The first was that it did 
not get chance to be renewed, because parliament was disrupted due to its engagement with 
policies which were more immediately dangerous to the political and religious status quo 
than the expiration of the Printing Act.  The second was that there was both a theory, in print, 
and a practice, in parliamentary debate, at work behind the lapse.  Parliament’s attacks on 
both the descent of the crown and the king’s apparatus for rule meant that Charles intervened 
in their debates by not allowing them to sit for any great length of time.  The renewal of the 
Licensing Act therefore had to be put off, in the face of the more prominent debate on 
exclusion and political impeachment.  But within this more visible, more open, wider 
political debate, was taking place a more subtle discussion of the liberty of the press.  
Without making a comparison of importance, the debates regarding exclusion and 
impeachment rested on the surface, and the discussions of the freedom of the circulation of 
ideas underneath, the broader negotiation of the dynamic of power between king and 
parliament.  Both exclusion and impeachment on the one hand, and the liberty of the press on 
the other, were part of the same debate. 
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As there had been while the 1662 Printing Act was in effect, after the lapse of 
licensing there was a theory and practice of press control.  However, with the lapse, the 
boundaries between theory and practice became blurred.  Because of how volatile wider 
political and religious debate was during the last three parliaments of Charles’ reign, the 
government’s engagement with ideas through press regulation became unsystematic, 
spontaneous and reactionary.  The king still wanted to preserve his position at the head of the 
political state and the established church after April 1679 and identified publication as being 
unlawful and prosecuted it accordingly.  But the house of commons abstained from 
legislating against and pursuing publications unless they directly conflicted with 
parliamentary interests.  For the lower house, the increase in publication as a result of the 
lapse corresponded with their movement against tyrannical kingship. 
By this point in the seventeenth century, people had realised that their ability to make 
policy and participate in politics depended on their ability to access the information on which 
government decisions were based and to discuss that information without fear of prosecution.  
A person’s political position was informed by and fed into their beliefs about the correct 
extent of the freedom of the press.  During Charles II’s last three parliaments, liberty of the 
press became almost synonymous with a protestant and more parliamentary form of 
government.  By contrast, a formal regulation of the press meant a political and religious state 
dominated by the king and his successors.  With the lapse of licensing in 1679, therefore, 
press regulation became more politicised than it had ever been since the restoration of the 
monarchy in 1660. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
170 
 
Conclusion 
 
The central concern of this thesis has been to explore how in 1670s England the crown and its 
opposition sought to turn their ideas into reality through making and implementing policy.  It 
has examined a number of different means by which political power was exercised in 
Restoration England and has tried to show how the conflict between Charles II’s continuing 
attempts to make policy independently as a personal monarch, and his opponents’ efforts to 
prevent that ability and to force their own way into policymaking, shaped political culture in 
the 1670s and led to the final breakdown of the constitution in March 1681.  In doing so, it 
has emphasised the importance of the practical, and often mundane, day to day constraints on 
the decisions made in government.  And it has explored how those constraints influenced 
contemporary thought about the constitution, how power should be distributed and exercised, 
who should be able to make policy, and what ends policy should be made for. 
On 17
th
 May 1679, Thomas Preston wrote an ‘admonitory address’ to both houses of 
parliament, ‘on the subject of there proceedings against the roman catholicks of England’.1  
Preston had been implicated in Titus Oates’ information during the extraordinary council 
meeting at the end of September 1678.
2
  He had had his house in the north of Lancashire 
searched for popish priests by William le Fleming the following November.
3
  And in April 
1679, he was named in the house of commons’ impeachment of the earl of Powis as an 
associate of the five catholic lords in the Tower, and as one of those who had ‘traiterously 
consulted, contrived, and acted to and for the accomplishing’ of the popish plot.4  It was from 
the relative safety of exile in Paris, then, that he wrote his letter to parliament that May. 
Preston’s design, he said, ‘is not to insist on the defence of our religion: however give 
me leave in few words to propose to your consideration how inconsistant it is with your 
profession, and how unwarrantable by your owne principles to persecute on that account’.5  
He was not interested, then, in engaging parliament in a theoretical discussion of correct and 
incorrect religious doctrine.  It was, rather, the way in which parliament were acting on their 
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beliefs, or how they were trying to turn their ideas about religion into practice, which 
concerned him. 
‘You have raised a most violent persecuting against roman catholicks’, Preston wrote, 
exasperated, ‘and all this under colour of an hellish plot’.6  He was enraged by the clear 
falsehood of Oates’ revelations, and embittered that parliament had lost all prudence, honour 
and shame in their prosecution and encouragement of allegations which they knew to be 
false.  He insisted that, not only ‘Christianity, but even Turks and infidels will write against 
you as the common enemies of human nature’, and urged politicians to recognise that their 
current path would lead them to ‘the total ruine of our country, and the extirpation of our 
people’.7  And, most significantly, he explained how parliament’s current policy, of ‘thickly 
sow[ing]’ ‘numerous and heavy persecutions’ upon catholics, would not protect the property 
and religion of the subject as parliament had designed, but was so inconsistent with protestant 
doctrine that it would in fact ruin church and state.
8
 
‘Pray reflect on this dilemma’, Preston asked.  ‘Either god almighty has left us some 
living guide or guides here on earth for interpreting holy writt, and the directing us in all 
other points of religion and under paine of damnation hath obliged us to follow the same: or 
else he hath left us this task to each of us in particular imparting to us the authority of our 
being our own guides and freeing us from all necessity of submission to any other’.9  
Parliament, as protestants, he suggested, would deny the former, because by the reformation 
they had assumed a liberty from the theological guidance of anybody else, on the grounds 
that all earthly guides were fallible and would lead their followers to eternal damnation.  
They must, therefore, Preston said, maintain the latter, that everyone on earth is empowered 
to guide themselves.  But ‘do you not perceive already that in men of your principles there is 
not the least excuse for penalties on religion?’, Preston asked.  ‘What are dissenters in 
religion guilty of but of presuming to guide them selves[?]’.10  So by shaping and enforcing 
the penal laws as rigorously as they had, parliament, Preston said, were following a policy 
which was not pursuant to their professed faith and the protestant doctrine, to the extent that 
their chosen course of action was undermining their beliefs and contradicting their religious 
principles. 
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It is unclear who in parliament Thomas Preston thought would read his letter of a little 
over 4,600 words.  Certainly, if they did, a letter from an exiled catholic which told them that 
they were unchristian in many of their policies and unconstitutional in many others, was 
unlikely to have been entertained for long.  And, it is doubtlessly true that a protestant 
commentator would have been unlikely to have viewed parliament’s policies quite as 
negatively as Preston did.  But, in spite of its clear bias towards the catholic cause and against 
parliament’s, Preston’s letter elucidated a number of important points about Restoration 
political culture.  Firstly, his letter exemplifies the distinction which contemporaries made 
between politics and policy.  Secondly, Preston implied that the means of exercising power 
were multivalent and labile, being available in different ways to different people, and 
differently applicable in different circumstances.  And thirdly, it demonstrated how, alongside 
the intellectual culture of representation and discussion, the processes of making and 
implementing policy could feed back into politics and change people’s beliefs, ideas and 
designs for the world around them.  These are themes which I have tried to explore in this 
thesis, and which, by way of conclusion, I would like to reiterate briefly here. 
First of all, then, historians have long demonstrated the richness and vibrancy of 
Restoration-period intellectual culture.  People at this time, they have said, developed, 
represented, challenged, and debated a range of religious, political, social, and cultural ideas, 
in order to understand and address the issues in their society.  Politics advanced as people 
coalesced around different political agendas and identities, and represented their ideas in 
debate in order to gain intellectual dominance and precedence for their notions of why 
politics should be done.  But this dialogic process of the representation and debate of ideas 
was only one side of a much broader political culture.  As Preston intimated, there was 
another, more mundane and practical side of political culture, in which people actively tried 
to turn their ideas and agendas into practice.  It is this other side which has been the focus of 
this thesis. 
Contemporaries recognised that to make their ideas and ambitions become a reality, 
they had to command the physical, day to day processes of making and implementing plans 
for change.  Alongside their more theoretical dialogue about why politics should be done, 
there was also a fierce competition around how politics should be done.
11
  There was a 
central pool of means of exercising power, which were the processes of generating, collecting 
                                                 
11
 Historians of Louis XIV’s France have tended to be much better at picking out these tensions within 
government than historians of England have been, and they continue to generate compelling results.  See, for 
instance, Soll, The Information Master; Rule and Trotter, A World of Paper; Takeda, Between Crown and 
Commerce. 
173 
 
and applying wealth, of communicating and processing information, of creating, shaping and 
executing the law, and of access to and control over government bureaucracy.  The king and 
different groups in parliament fought for command of these processes of governance, since it 
was only by controlling them in the correct measure that they would be empowered to take 
the role in policymaking which they wanted, and to implement that policy correctly in 
practice.  So, the king aimed to control wealth, information, the law, and bureaucracy enough 
to be able to develop his own policies for solving the issues which he identified himself, and 
for achieving his own political aims.  His opponents in parliament, however, wanted to 
control the means of exercising power enough to be able to hold the king to account for his 
decisions in government, and to be able to enforce their own will in policymaking.  This 
competition, between a king trying to acquire the means of making policy and governing 
independently as a personal monarch, and his parliamentary opposition trying to institute a 
more shared control of policymaking, contributed to the gradual decline of relations between 
Charles and his parliament through the 1670s and led to the dissolution of the Oxford 
parliament in March 1681. 
But, the second conclusion to draw is that we should be careful about viewing these 
means of exercising power as equally accessible for everybody who was trying to participate 
in government, and equally useful for them in all circumstances.  While people shared the 
ability to exercise power through wealth, information, the law, and bureaucracy, these means 
of exercising power were, as historians have shown structures of belief and the contemporary 
methods of discussing them to have been, multivalent and labile.
12
  The means of exercising 
power were multivalent because they were available to people in different ways depending on 
who they were.  And they were labile in the sense that people could all shape the means 
available to them according to the issue they wanted to solve, or the ideological end they 
wanted to reach, or the circumstances in which they found themselves. 
When, in the early 1670s, Charles pursued his lacklustre attempts to improve his 
political influence in Europe through the third Anglo-Dutch war, he practised an aggressive 
form of political economy based on a belief that, by reducing his European neighbours’ share 
in the finite European wealth, he would be able to increase his own wealth and his political 
power along with it.  As Charles began to lose the war, however, and his approach yielded no 
such improvement in either his wealth or power, the earl of Danby showed him a different 
                                                 
12
 Peter Lake has shown how beliefs and the methods by which people discussed them were multivalent and 
labile.  See, in particular, his ‘Calvinism and the English Church’, or his ‘Anti-popery: the structure of a 
prejudice’, in R. Cust and A. Hughes (eds.), Conflict in Early Stuart England (London, 1989). 
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approach to political economy and a different means of using wealth in order to realise his 
political ambitions.  In the summer of 1673, Danby believed that, rather than seeking to 
restrict competitors’ access to European markets, a more peaceful approach to political 
economy would maximise Charles’ and his foreign neighbours’ ability to generate wealth 
through trade.  The king practised Danby’s form of political economy for two years with 
some success, until it became apparent that it would only produce the results that Charles 
wanted if he could make sure that all the other foreign princes would follow suit.  As the 
effects of the war on the continent continued to impose themselves on English merchants’ 
ability to trade through the summer of 1676, and Charles began to be sucked back into the 
conflict through the negotiations at Nijmegen, Danby changed his attempts to exercise power 
through wealth once again and sought to reinforce the king’s peaceful approach to political 
economy with the raising of an English army and the threat of re-joining the war.   
At the same time as Charles and Danby were trying to adjust their use of wealth to 
achieve their aims in Europe, parliament used wealth in their own way to attempt to shape the 
king’s ability to realise his designs.  Time and again through the 1670s, parliament sought to 
disrupt Charles’ foreign policy by not voting him supply or by withholding supply until he 
compromised in his policies.  The king’s changing approach to political economy, then, and 
parliament’s withheld supply demonstrate the multivalence of wealth as a means of 
exercising power, since different sides in politics were using wealth differently in order to 
influence foreign policy decisions.  But wealth was also clearly labile, in the sense that 
Charles was seeking to use different forms of political economy in order to reach a fairly 
consistent end – the improvement of his standing both in Europe and at home. 
And the third conclusion which I would like to draw is that policymaking and 
implementation was not a linear process.  As people came to develop and implement policies 
to realise their political, religious and social aims, they often found the means of exercising 
power feeding back against their plans.  When Charles came to develop and change his 
European policy and his approach to political economy, the end he wished to reach was not 
the only influence over the changes which he made.  As he changed his policies, the status in 
Europe which he was seeking to cultivate remained virtually the same.  It was the way in 
which he sought to implement his policies through the means of exercising power which fed 
back on itself and changed the policy he was seeking to implement.  Here we can see then, a 
different set of influences over how policy was made from that which historians have often 
discussed.  When we are looking at how policy was made, it is not sufficient to study merely 
the ideas behind the policy, or the reality which different politicians were seeking to 
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construct, for it was also the more practical influence of the means of executing their designs 
which could come to change their plans. 
So where does this thesis fit in to the wider history of the seventeenth century?  
Looking to the earlier part of the century it is clear that robust debate about the distribution of 
political power characterised the middle decades of the 1600s.  Thereafter, as Pepys and 
Coventry reflected that day in the spring of 1669 when they walked alone at the Tower, the 
Restoration of Charles II and the constitutional settlement which was devised in the first 
years of his reign did little to answer the long-standing questions about who should make 
political decisions and how.  And in turn, this lack of clarity in the Restoration constitution 
could well account for why politicians in the later decades of the seventeenth century were 
still asking the same questions about the role of king and parliament as their parents and 
grandparents had been doing sixty years earlier.  But as other historians have already made 
clear, and as this thesis has tried to argue, we should be careful about treating the restoration 
period, and the ways in which politicians at this time were trying to change the world around 
them, as simply being a bridge between two more important phases of English history.
13
  We 
need, rather than treating politicians’ attempts to effect change through policymaking as a 
symptom of debate or circumstance as some historians have tended to, to work harder at 
contextualising the plans which people developed.  We need to explore how contemporaries 
understood their circumstances in relation to their aims and ambitions, and sought to use the 
means of exercising power in order to develop plans which would allow them to navigate the 
world around them and to reach their desired ends.  In this way, policy was not a passive part 
of political culture, either dropping out of a process of representation and debate or locked in 
to a specific form by circumstance.  It was contested by politicians, reading their 
circumstances differently, and with different political, religious and social ideas, actively 
seeking to achieve their ends in different ways. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
13
 While this point was first developed by revisionists such as John Miller and J. R. Jones, it is William Bulman 
who has most convincingly made the case for contextualising the decisions which politicians made about how to 
make political change.  See his Practice of Politics. 
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Appendix I 
 
A Charge or Impeachment against Thomas Earl of Danby Lord High Treasurer of England; 
containing several Offences, Crimes, and Misdemeanors of a very high Nature. 
(Brought to the house of commons on 26
th
 April 1675) 
I. That the said Earl hath overthrown and violated the ancient Course and Constitution of the 
Exchequer, by perverting the Method of Receipts, Payments, and Accounts, contrary to Law; 
whereby the King's Revenue is put into Confusion, and a wasteful Way of Expence; to the 
Destruction of his Majesty's Credit; and exposing his Majesty's Treasure and Revenue to 
private Bargains and Corruptions; and hath ingrossed into his own Hands the sole Power of 
Disposing almost all the King's Revenue; laying aside the Chancellor and Under Treasurer of 
the Exchequer, and other Officers: Whereby the usual and safe Government of his Majesty's 
Affairs relating to his Revenue, and all Checks and Comptrolls are avoided. 
 
II. That, a Suit of Law being intended about the Marriage of the Daughter of Sir Thomas 
Hyde, the said Earl caused one Mr. Brandly, a principal Witness in the said Case, to be 
arrested by an extraordinary Warrant from one of the Secretaries of State; and to be kept for 
some Time in close Custody; during which Time the Agents of the said Earl did labour the 
said Mr. Brandly, by Threatenings and Promises of Reward, not to declare the Truth: And at 
Midnight he was brought, and examined before his Majesty, upon Oath; where the said Earl 
was present, and assisting: Whereupon the said Mr. Brandly did, by the Means aforesaid, 
deliver in a Testimony, contrary to his own Knowledge, and against his Conscience; he being 
then in Duress: By which illegal Practices his Majesty was highly abused, the Parties 
concerned in the said Law Suit greatly prejudiced, and the Truth suppressed, to the manifest 
Obstruction of Justice: And all this was done with an Intent to procure the said Heiress to be 
married to the Second Son of the said Earl. 
 
III. That the Earl hath received very great Sums of Money, besides the ordinary Revenue, 
which have been wastfully spent, and far greater Sums than ever issued for secret Service, 
without Account; the King's Debts remaining unpaid, the Stores unfurnished, and the Navy 
unrepaired, to the Discredit and Hazard of the King and Kingdom. 
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IV. That the said Earl hath violated the Rights and Properties of the People, by stopping, 
without Authority, their legal Payments, due in the Exchequer. 
 
V. That though the Office of Lord High Treasurer of England is always very full of great and 
necessary Employments, yet the said Earl hath also assumed to himself the Management of 
the Irish Affairs, which were in precedent Times dispatched always by the Secretaries, and 
passed in Council; thereby interrupting the said Secretary's Office; and neglecting his own; 
and subtily enabling himself, the better to convert a very great Sum of Money out of the Irish 
Revenues, to his own private Advantage. 
 
VI. That the said Earl hath procured great Gifts and Grants from the Crown, whilst under 
great Debts, by Warrants countersigned by himself. 
 
VII. That about the Fourth of December 1674, at the Hearing of a Cause in the Treasury 
Chamber, some Acts of Parliament, now in Force, were urged against a Proclamation, and 
contrary to what his Lordship aimed at: Whereupon the said Earl, in Contempt of the Law, 
uttered this arbitrary Expression, "That a new Proclamation is better than an old Act;" several 
of his Majesty's Subjects being present: And, upon his Lordship's Report to the Privy 
Council, the Person in Question, being a Foreigner, and not obeying such Proclamation, but 
pursuing his Right at Law, was banished the Kingdom.  
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Appendix II 
 
Articles of Impeachment of High Treason, and other High Crimes and Misdemeanors, and 
Offences, against Thomas Earl of Danby, Lord High Treasurer of England. 
(Read in the house of commons on 21
st
 December 1678) 
I. That he hath traiterously encroached to himself Regal Power, by treating in Matters of 
Peace and War with Foreign Princes and Ambassadors, and giving Instructions to his 
Majesty's Ambassadors a broad, without communicating the same to the Secretaries of State, 
and the rest of his Majesty's Council; and against the express Declaration of his Majesty and 
his Parliament; thereby intending to defeat and overthrow the Provisions which had been 
deliberately made by his Majesty and his Parliament, for the Safety and Preservation of his 
Majesty's Kingdoms and Dominions. 
II. That he hath traiterously endeavoured to subvert the ancient and well established Form of 
Government in this Kingdom; and instead thereof to introduce an arbitrary and tyrannical 
Way of Government. And the better to effect this his Purpose, he did design the Raising of an 
Army, upon Pretence of a War against the French King; and then to continue the same as a 
Standing Army within this Kingdom: And an Army being so raised, and no War ensuing, an 
Act of Parliament having passed to pay off and disband the same, and a great Sum of Money 
being granted for that End, he did continue this Army contrary to the said Act, and 
misemployed the said Money, given for disbanding, to the Continuance thereof; and issued 
out of his Majesty's Revenue divers great Sums of Money for the said Purpose; and wilfully 
neglected to take Security from the Paymaster of the Army, as the said Act required; whereby 
the said Law is eluded, and the Army is yet continued, to the great Danger and unnecessary 
Charge of his Majesty and the whole Kingdom. 
III. That he, traiterously intending and designing to alienate the Hearts and Affections of his 
Majesty's good Subjects from his Royal Person and Government, and to hinder the Meeting 
of Parliaments, and to deprive his Sacred Majesty of their safe and wholesome Councils, and 
thereby to alter the Constitution of the Government of this Kingdom, did propose and 
negotiate a Peace for the French King, upon Terms disadvantageous to the Interest of his 
Majesty and his Kingdoms: For the Doing whereof he did endeavour to procure a great Sum 
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of Money from the French King, for enabling of him to carry on and maintain his said 
traiterous Designs and Purposes, to the Hazard of his Majesty's Person and Government. 
IV. That he is popishly affected; and hath traiterously concealed, after he had Notice, the late 
horrid and bloody Plot and Conspiracy contrived by the Papists, against his Majesty's Person 
and Government; and hath suppressed the Evidence, and reproachfully discountenanced the 
King's Witnesses in the Discovery of it, in favour of Popery; immediately tending to the 
Destruction of the King's Sacred Person, and the Subversion of the Protestant Religion. 
V. That he hath wasted the King's Treasure, by issuing out of his Majesty's Exchequer, and 
several Branches of his Revenue, for unnecessary Pensions and secret Services, to the Value 
of Two hundred Thirty-one thousand Six hundred and Two Pounds, within Two Years: And 
that he hath wholly diverted, out of the known Method and Government of the Exchequer, 
One whole Branch of his Majesty's Revenue to private Uses, without any Account to be made 
of it to his Majesty in the Exchequer, contrary to the express Act of Parliament which granted 
the same: And he hath removed Two of his Majesty's Commissioners of that Part of the 
Revenue, for refusing to consent to such his unwarrantable Actings therein, and to advance 
Money upon that Branch of the Revenue, for private Uses. 
VI. That he hath by indirect Means procured from his Majesty for himself, divers 
considerable Gifts and Grants of Inheritance of the ancient Revenue of the Crown, even 
contrary to Acts of Parliament 
For which Matters and Things, the Knights, Citizens, and Burgesses of the House of 
Commons, in Parliament, do, in the Name of themselves and of all the Commons of England, 
impeach the said Thomas Earl of Danby, Lord High Treasurer of England, of High Treason, 
and other the high Crimes, Misdemeanors, and Offences, in the said Articles contained. And 
the said Commons, by Protestation, saving to themselves the Liberty of exhibiting at any 
Time hereafter, any other Accusation or Impeachment against the said Earl, and also of 
replying to the Answers which the said Thomas Earl of Danby shall make to the Premises, or 
any of them, or any Impeachment or Accusation that shall be by them exhibited, as the 
Cause, according to Course and Proceedings of Parliament, shall require, do pray, That the 
said Thomas Earl of Danby may be put to answer all and every the Premises, that such 
Proceedings, Examinations, Trials, and Judgements, may be upon them, and every one of 
them, had and used, as shall be agreeable to Law and Justice; and that he may be sequestered 
from Parliament, and forthwith committed to safe Custody. 
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